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Abstract
Calls for monetary policy coordination has increased as the intensied macro-
economic interdependence cultivates the conict of interests between economics,
especially following the current crisis. Yet the literature has not reached a con-
sensus on whether monetary policy coordination is welfare-improving.
This thesis, taking from another perspective, assesses the real-world existence
and extent of monetary policy coordination associated with economic interdepen-
dence between the United States (US) and the Euro Area (EA), and investigates
the changes of international transmission in the presence of coordination.
Monetary policy coordination is represented by direct responses of monetary
policy instruments to contemporaneous and lagged values of the real exchange
rate. By using the method of indirect inference, this research also incorporates
historical data into in-sample evaluation and estimation of the Dynamic Sto-
chastic General Equilibrium(DSGE) model.
Beginning with indirect inference evaluations of a two-country DSGEmodel of
the US and EA, it is found that models with coordination generally outperform
their non-coordination counterpart  indicating the existence of coordination.
The real exchange rate is the essence of such improvement in the models e¢ cacy;
and it is shown that coordination models have an excellent ability to replicate
real exchange rate dynamics and volatility relative to a non-coordination model,
even though it still remains a source of relatively poor performance of model.
By applying an extensive indirect inference estimation, the existence of mon-
etary coordination is ascertained since a partial-coordination model outstrips the
non-coordination model remarkably. Both the US and EA economies exhibit
moderate to high levels of monetary coordination. Such features improve the
models performance; particularly in terms of dynamics of US time series, volatil-
ity of EA time series and both dynamics and volatility of the real exchange rate.
Impulse responses and variance decomposition reveal substantial cross-country
spillovers in contrast to the non-coordination model case.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the aftermath of this most recent nancial crisis, the recovery of the domestic
and global economy has been on top of all policymakersagendas for a consid-
erably long period. Multiple conventional or unconventional monetary policies,
such as keeping the o¢ cial interest rate at e¤ectively zero1, negative nominal
interest rate2, and Quantitative Easing (QE)3 are implemented in attempts to
stimulate the economy. Other unconventional policies like helicopter dropat-
tract increasing discussions among economists and policymakers as QE proceeds.
Nevertheless, it is conceded that the risk of a policy-induced ination surge
and currency devaluation can be detrimental. Despite the argument that ina-
tionary pressure can be mitigated if production growth outstrips ination and
management of these monetary tools is successful, di¢ culties that economies
confront are apparent and severe. More importantly, their policy implications to
1Since the end of 2008, Federal Open Market Committee has been keeping US e¤ective
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) at a range of 0% to 0:25%. UK o¢ cial bank rate has also been kept
at 0:5% by the Bank of England (BoE) since March 2009. Also, the European Central Bank
(ECB) has been keeping its o¢ cial interest rate below 1:5% since early 2009. And current ECB
o¢ cial rate has been 0:75% since July 2012.
2It was reported in mid-2009 that Swedens Riksbank was the rst Central Bank (CB) to
implement negative interest rate. However, it is denied by the o¢ cials. In July 2012, Denmarks
Nationalbank cut its deposit rate to  0:2% in order to mirror the policy decision in the ECB.
In February 2013, BoE deputy governor Paul Tucker carefully raised the consideration of a
negative interest rate to be implemented in the UK.
3Quantitative Easing (QE) is an unconventional monetary policy rst used by the Bank of
Japan in tackling liquidity trap and economic stagnation. It has been extensively implemented
in the US and EA since 2008 when the nancial crisis was at its peak.
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other economies or close trading partners perhaps trigger more global anxieties.
Some people view ination as de facto devaluation. And some argue that money
supply increases in a home economy e¤ectively devalue domestic currency against
foreign currency. It creates policy-induced speculations unless the same foreign
policies are also implemented neck and neck with the home economy. Conse-
quently, the worst scenario might be the so-called competitive devaluation, or
currency warin more hostile terms.
Two 21st century confrontations with competitive devaluationmaybe the
2010-2011 conict between the US and China over the value of the Yuan and the
early 2013 Japanese Yen devaluation versus Euros. The former ended with the
second sharp climb of the USD/CNY (Dollar to Yuan) exchange rate since 2005,
and the latter resulted in public commitments of refrainment from competitive
devaluationby G7 and G20 members.
All in all, at the heart of these anxieties, it is the macroeconomic interde-
pendence that cultivates the conict of interests between economies. In partic-
ular, once it is translated into monetary interdependence, monetary authorities
are brought up against more challenges in designing and conducting monetary
policies. Foremost, feedback responses from foreign Central Banks (CBs) can
potentially promote or impede the e¤ectiveness of domestic monetary policy. Ad-
ditionally, diverse policy stances may bring about persistent monetary spillovers
and, consequently, ine¢ cient monetary policies in the absence of international
monetary coordination.
This interdependence among economies intensies, from both perspectives of
impact span and impact scale, gradually and vastly as exchange rate regimes shift
and globalisation becomes widespread. Undoubtedly, it demands that policymak-
ers take other economiespolicy action into account when they design domestic
monetary policies, regardless of their willingness to participate in such a strategic
game. It is not surprising that attention on macroeconomic policy cooperation
or coordination4 has surged in the recent years of growing cross-country spillover,
4International cooperation takes various forms: it can be institutionalised or work through
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especially with the severe economic downturn5. After all, in times of crisis and
uncertainty, economies are more attracted to coordinated actions in order to min-
imise negative spillovers; whereas in the time of peace, economies focus on their
comparative advantages (Masson and Pattison, 2009).
Decentralised and independent policymakers can export the e¤ects of domes-
tic economic actions. Monetary cooperation and coordination internalise policy
externalities, and thus, should improve joint welfare. Yet neither theoretical
nor empirical evidence gives a denitive conclusion on whether monetary coop-
eration and coordination are welfare-improving. The second generation model
incorporates explicit international misalignments that may disrupt international
price adjustment and cause resources to deviate from exible price allocation.
Nonetheless, such a comprehensive structure still cannot permit rm evidence
of welfare gains, although the scale of the gains can be more signicant in such
models if the gains are granted.
On the other hand, it can be quite challenging to ascertain monetary co-
ordination by monetary authorities. After all, appearances of some monetary
interactions can be similar even if there are diverse underlying policy intentions.
Without explicit agreement, policymakers are inevitably engaging in some sort
of strategic gameonce their monetary policy design encompasses consideration
of bilateral policy impacts with other economies in any manner. Considering
the fact that the exchange rate reects relative fundamental changes between
two economies, a monetary instruments reaction to the exchange rate can be
expressed as a strategic interaction based upon the existence of monetary inter-
dependence. That is to say, a policy instrument that is reacting to the evolution
of the exchange rate may unveil a policymakers attitude towards coordinating
international meetings of policymakers; it may simply coordinate minimum standards or set up
and monitor international standards; it can be bilateral or multilateral; it can be cooperation
in monetary policy, scal policy or nancial regulation, etc. See Masson and Pattison (2009)
for a detailed discussion.
5For instance, the G20 replaced the G8 after 2008 Washington summit for wider commu-
nication among economies; and several rescue packages were approved by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), etc.
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monetary policy across nations.
Another strand of the literature that is relevant to this study is the devel-
opment of structural model in recent years. Kydland and Prescott (1982) rst
presented a micro-founded general equilibrium macroeconomic model with fully-
edged dynamic and stochastic properties6. It showed that the technological
development, normally serving as the main driver of long-run economic growth,
could also cause short-run economic variations. The possibility of applying con-
ventional econometric techniques to Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models for quantitative policy analyses has attracted enormous atten-
tion from academics and policymakers.
The DSGE modelsmicroeconomic foundation species the technology, re-
source constraints, and economic agentspreferences; thus it allows policy analysis
to be carried out using utility-based welfare. The structural property of DSGE
models also ensures that the analyses based on a DSGE model is not subject
to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976). The stochastically coherent structure frees
macroeconomic modelling from certainty equivalent assumptions, and enables
counterfactual experiments to be carried out. Moreover, its ability to transform
from structural parameters to reduced-form parameters may help to understand
the inside of economic functioning.
The empirical validation of DSGE models has been extensively questioned,
albeit its advantages. In fact, it is the work by Smets and Wouters (hereafter SW,
2003, 2007) and Christiano, Eichebaum and Evans (hereafter CEE, 2005) that
set forth the success of DSGE models. In 2010, a piece of work by Le, Meenagh,
Minford, andWickens (hereafter Le et al., 2010) presented a two-country model of
the US and EU by combining the individual model of SW (2003) and SW (2007).
6In the 1970s, the so-called stagation gave rise to two new macroeconomic schools of
thought  monetarismand new-classical macroeconomics. While two schools distinguish-
ing themselves from neo-Keynesian(For example, the 1974 Brown conference and subsequent
publication Stein (1976)), the rational expectation hypothesis evolved to be the fundamental
component of the new-classical macroeconomics. Kydland and Prescott (1982) is an example
of such development combining a new methodological ground of micro-foundations and the
new-classical thought of rational expectations.
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It concluded that integrating international goods and asset markets can improve
a models performance to some extent in terms of replicating data dynamics and
volatility, while the mystery remained of having a nil cross-country interaction.
In light of these two motivations, this thesis would like to assess the exis-
tence and extent of monetary coordination based upon the plausible two-country
DSGE model of the United States (US) and the Euro Area (EA) presented in Le
et al. (2010). The existence of monetary coordination is assessed by comparing
the modelsperformances before and after incorporating monetary coordination
specication, which is described by direct response of monetary instrument to
real exchange rate at both contemporaneous and lagged values. The null hypoth-
esis of the existence of monetary coordination holds if a models performance is
signicantly improved by the presence of a policy instruments direct response to
the real exchange rate. Measurement of the extent of monetary coordination is
carried out by indirect inference estimation of 37 structural parameters, including
4 parameters that characterise monetary coordination. In addition, this thesis
intends to evaluate the extent of improvement in the DSGE models performance
and examine the scale of cross-country spillovers when an additional exchange
rate channel is specied.
The method being used in this thesis is indirect inference methodology drawn
from Method of Simulated Moment (MSM). The nature of this method decides
that no tractable likelihood functions or complete set of time series are required;
and that conventional statistical evaluation of the macroeconomic model can
be implemented on the basis of key features of observables. Moreover, when
indirect inference is used in model evaluation, the evaluating objects are the
models ability to replicate data properties rather than the models ability at
out-of-sample forecasting.
To obtain information from actual data, structural shocks are derived from
the structural model using calibrated parameters and 17 macroeconomic time
series of the US and EA economies. The dynamics and volatility of structural
shocks are described by parameters (autoregressive (AR or ARMA) coe¢ cients
5
and variances) obtained from individual regression on those shocks with a spec-
ied structure. Vector-bootstrapping is used on exogenous innovations in order
to preserve correlations between shocks. For each sample drawn from vector-
bootstrapping, a set of simulated data can be generated, and in turn, be used
in producing a set of auxiliary parameters, which consists of V AR(1) coe¢ cients
and variances of each time series. To compute the actual Wald statistic, the set
of auxiliary parameters that is obtained from actual data is compared with the
set of means obtained from simulated auxiliary parameter sets (depending on
the number of samples that are drawn by vector-bootstrapping). As the actual
Wald statistic serves as an indication of distance between actual auxiliary para-
meters and simulated means of auxiliary parameters, the lower the value it has,
the better the models ability to replicate the properties of the data. In addition,
for each actual Wald statistic a corresponding normalised Mahalanobis Distance
(hereafter normalised MD) is also shown to give a clearer view on the overall
closeness.
The structure of this thesis is as follows: following this introduction, Chapter
2 provides a literature review on exchange rate and its role in monetary policy.
Chapter 3 presents a general discussion on indirect inference methodology and
a short review on the benchmark models that will be used in this thesis. What
follows is an evaluation and comparison of the models performances as well
as a conclusion of hypothesis testing with regard to the existence of monetary
coordination in Chapter 4. Moreover, for conrming the test result and assessing
the extent of monetary coordination, indirect inference estimations are carried out
on both the non-coordination model and partial-coordination model in Chapter
5. And nally, Chapter 6 briey concludes this thesis.
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Chapter 2
A Literature Review on the
Exchange Rate and its Role in
Monetary Policy
2.1 Introduction
An entire decade has passed since a major transformation in the monetary pol-
icy framework. Even since then, ination targeting under a oating exchange
rate regime has been popularised by countries across the globe1. Although the
CBs main objectives are still maintaining price stability and assisting economic
growth, their main concerns have moved onto ination deviation, output gap and
potentially interest rate volatility2, leaving exchange rate determination primarily
to the international market.
Despite mainstream thinking, an issue remains on the role of the exchange
1Since 1990, pioneered by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the main central banks in the
world have tended to converge into an ination targeting monetary framework. The work by
Bhundia and Stone (2004) provides a taxonomy of monetary regimes, according to which, by
2003, 20 countries have employed full-edged ination targeting, 5 countries have employed an
implicit price stability anchor (relatively opaque ination anchor) and another 20 countries are
classied as ination targeting lite.
2Strict ination targeting refers to the case where the CBs loss function consists only of
ination deviation and output gap; exible ination targeting normally refers to the case where
the CBs loss function consists of other variables beyond the standard ination target.
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rate in the monetary policies: should CBs be concerned about exchange rate
uctuation when they conduct monetary policy; or further, should CBs respond
to or target exchange rate movements; and to what extent should they respond
to exchange rate uctuation if this is the case?
The relationship between the exchange rate and trade has become the premier
focus of academics and policymakers ever since the issue arose. However, what
attracts the attention of academics and policymakers is, more broadly, the macro-
economic interdependence, and consequently, the macroeconomic policy design
in the context of globalisation and market integrations.
In terms of monetary policy, the questions being asked become whether or not
monetary authorities should cooperate or coordinate in designing their monetary
policies; and to what extent they should cooperate or coordinate if this is the
case.
This literature review begins by reviewing the crucial role of the exchange rate
and its associated risk (level change and volatility) in deciding macroeconomic
variables. Neither from the level value of the exchange rate perspective nor the
exchange rate volatility perspective can literature give a denitive conclusion
on either the direction or the magnitude of exchange rate impacts on various
macroeconomic aspects, such as international trade, capital ow, current account
balance and monetary policy e¢ ciency.
The review then turns to illustrate the role of the exchange rate in design-
ing monetary policy in an open economy context. Again it is inconclusive as to
whether economies should be, or actually are, responding to exchange rate or ex-
change risk; and whether monetary policy coordination is welfare-improving. Yet
theoretically, international misalignments validate additional trade-o¤s between
stabilising internal targets and minimising external di¤erentials. That is to say,
the necessity of international monetary cooperation or coordination may exist
and maybe welfare-improving under a comprehensive global economic structure.
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2.2 Why Do the Exchange Rates Matter?
Shortly after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1973, many at-
tempts were made to restore the control of the exchange rate. Not many of
these attempts were successful, instead, these attempts typically led to great
losses when the currency was on the edge of collapsing. Aside from those his-
torical moments, the theoretical viability of the xed exchange rate regime has
also been seriously questioned attributed to a wide range of research that has
demonstrated the huge di¢ culties and costs of maintaining a xed exchange rate
regime. On the other hand, exible exchange rates have been advocated by both
academics and policymakers, not only because of its applicability under current
global economic conditions, but also its ability to facilitate the international rel-
ative price adjustment and multilateral trade. Even so, fear of oating3 arises
from the potentially large exchange rate uctuations as the impossible trinity
has foreseen mutually unsustainable exchange rate stability and monetary in-
dependence in the context of a fast growing global capital mobility. Currency
Unions (CUs), with the Euro Area (EA) being the largest, have been established
from the fear that a highly volatile exchange rate is substantially detrimental to
price stability and multilateral trade.
The impacts of level changes as well as exchange rate volatility, either in
nominal or real terms, are both core concerns because of their strong implications
on macroeconomic stability, e¤ectiveness of monetary and scal policies, current
account balance and international capital ows.
2.2.1 Expenditure-Switching E¤ects
An early advocate of a exible exchange rate, Milton Friedman (1953) viewed a
system of oating exchange rates as absolutely essential for the fullment of our
basic economic objective. The argument lied in what is called the expenditure-
3This term rst appeared in Calvo and Reinhart (2002), in which they explored the reasons
for fear of oating and the extent to which the o¢ cial labels of exchange rate policy can
account.
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switching e¤ect of the exchange rate, stemming from the Keynesian approach to
international macroeconomics.
Under a exible exchange rate regime, monetary authorities make no inter-
vention in the foreign exchange market. That is, a countrys o¢ cial reserves
will have no changes associated with smoothing exchange rate variations. In the
presence of certain real shocksin the home country, any change in the balance
of payments (BoP)4 will be immediately reected in exible exchange rates that
represent the relative price of goods and services across countries. Consequently,
the foreign price of home goods becomes exible even when the producer price of
such goods is assumed to be rigid. Hence, expenditure switches internationally
and domestically towards the relatively price-competitive nation, whose current
account will be rebalanced if it was previously in decit. For example, a pro-
ductivity shock in the home country implies that domestic products are cheaper
relative to foreign products. Hence, the home country will experience a foreign
expenditure switch from foreign products to domestic products (an increase in
exports); meanwhile, the domestic demand switches towards domestic products
since foreign goods become relatively expensive (a decline in imports). The real
exchange rate is a measurement of foreign goods in terms of domestic goods:
Qt =
"tPt
P t
(2.1)
where "t is nominal exchange rate dened as the relative price of foreign currency
4The balance of payments is dened as a statistical statement that systematically summa-
rizes, for a specic time period, the economic transactions of an economy with the rest of the
world(IMF, 1993). It consists of two main groups of accounts. The current account records
transactions of goods and services, income and current transfers that involve economic val-
ues and occur between resident and non-resident entities. The capital and nancial account
records the transactions of 1), capital transfers and acquisition or disposal of non-produced,
non-nancial assets and 2), nancial assets and liabilities. Typically, reserve assets (except for
the valuation changes) are included in the nancial account.
The balance of payments manual has been revised by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) since the 1st edition was published in 1948. The latest edition (BPM6, 6th edition)
was published in 2008. Its denition of balance of payments is consistent with System of
National Accounts (SNA) and is also used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the statistical o¢ ce of the European Union (Eurostat), and the United
Nations (UN).
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in terms of home currency5; P t and Pt are the Consumer Price Indices (CPI) for
the foreign and home economy, respectively. Hence, the value of Qt rises as the
home currency appreciates in real terms.
Historical evidence shows that real and nominal exchange rates have relatively
close movement in the short to median term. In fact, a high degree of comovement
between real and nominal exchange rates is one of the most puzzling stylised facts
of exchange rate behaviour in exible exchange rate regimes. As early evidence
on this issue, Mussa (1986) found that under a exible exchange rate regime,
the variability and persistence of real exchange rates were both accounted for
by nominal exchange rate behaviours. This result, therefore, implies a rejection
of nominal exchange rate neutrality and support to those models that assume
sluggish adjustments at national price level. Given such comovement between
the real and nominal exchange rate, any economic variable that is a¤ected by the
exchange rate thus, has relatively consistent responses to both real and nominal
exchange rates.
Another strand of the literature that is closely related to the expenditure-
switching e¤ect is the role of the Terms of Trade (TOT) in international trade.
By denition, the home economy TOT is the relative price of imported goods in
terms of exported goods:
T Ht =
PF;t
P H;t
"t
=
"tPF;t
P H;t
(2.2)
where PF;t is the domestic currency price of foreign goods imported by the home
economy; P H;t is the foreign currency price of home products that are exported to
the foreign economy. Conventionally, the domestic economy TOT deteriorates (an
increase in value) as the domestic currency depreciates. The domestic importing
price PF;t becomes higher, subjected to the movements in the nominal exchange
rate6, while the exporting price
P H;t
"t
remains una¤ected due to the fact that the
5This thesis adopts an indirection quotation for exchange rate. The home currency is treated
as the xed currency, while the foreign currency is treated as the variable currency.
6Foreign goods are priced in the foreign currency at P F;t. As Law of One Price (LOOP)
holds (PF;t =
PF;t
"t
), a domestic currency depreciation (a decrease in the value of "t) increases
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exports are priced according to the producer price.
Both the real exchange rate and TOT, as a form of international relative
price, are measurements of real competitiveness across countries. It is their role
as e¤ective facilitators in adjusting international demand and supply allocations
that initiates calls for adopting the exible exchange rate regime.
More recently, a series of papers using New Open Economy Macroeconomics
(NOEM) models, pioneered by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1998, 2001), has pro-
vided evidence for Friedmans old a¢ rmation about the equivalence of inter-
nal price exibility and exchange rate exibility7. In a model with Producer-
Currency-Pricing (PCP), the foreign price of domestic products is adjusted in
accordance with nominal exchange rate movements in order to keep the domestic
and foreign prices of such products in line with each other. In the absence of any
disturbance that creates an ine¢ ciency wedge, the exchange rate and TOT reect
e¤ectively the relative competitiveness across countries, and therefore, exploit the
maximum possibility of expenditure-switching. The same optimal exible price
equilibrium can be achieved through the exible exchange rate, and no policy
coordination will be required in such a system.
2.2.2 Exchange Rate Pass-Through
In spite of the early attempts to explore the potential reallocative e¤ect of the
oating exchange rate, the extent of such expenditure-switching can vary subject
to the inuence from multiple factors. Principally, it depends on the sensitivity
of importing country price level to exchange rate variations, which refers to ex-
change rate pass-through8 (henceforth pass-through unless it is otherwise noted).
With segmentation in the international market, particularly for global capital,
PF;t.
7Friedman (1953) also emphasised in his famous 1953 paper that If internal prices were as
exible as exchange rates, it would make little economic di¤erence whether adjustments were
brought about by changes in exchange rates or by equivalent changes in internal prices
8This phenomenon, related to a very low degree of exchange rate pass-through to consumer
prices, is referred to as the purchasing power parity puzzle (PPP puzzle). The di¢ culties
created by PPP puzzle in macroeconomic modelling are discussed in a later session.
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the extent of exchange rate pass-through is essential for both intra- and interna-
tional issues. For an individual economy, the conduct of monetary policies and
macroeconomic stability maybe extensively constrained or promoted by the de-
gree of pass-through; on the other hand, international transmission of shocks and
policies, capital ows as well as the sustainability of current account imbalance
are chiey conditional upon exchange rate pass-through.
The complete exchange rate pass-through is when the response of importing
price to exchange rate is one to one. Despite those plausible theoretical analyses,
the empirical consensus has been that the pass-through is normally less than
one across countries and sectors. Movements of the exchange rate and national
consumer price are found to have a weak or even non-existent link in the short
run.
For example, Jabara (2009) concluded that the pass-through to US aggregate
import price (less oil) was 0:47 and to import price of consumption goods was
0:26. The country-specic degrees of pass-through to the US were 0:16, 0:26, 0:49
and 0:59 from Japan, the EU, Canada and Latin America, respectively9. Partic-
ularly, she reported a non-existent pass-through from the Newly Industrialised
Economies (NIEs). Hellerstein et al. (2006) reported that the US exchange rate
pass-through was 0:51 averaging over two decades before the recent nancial cri-
sis10. Campa and González-Mínguez (2006) found the pass-through in the Euro
Area (EA) was less complete with an average of 0:62 in the short-run and was
stronger with an average of 0:78 over a longer horizon11. In the short-run, degrees
of pass-through di¤ered across the EA members, with Spain and Finland on the
high degree panel and with Belgium-Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece and Austria
9These results are generally consistent with the existing literature and correspond to the
pricing pattern of the particular country or economic relationship. For countries that are
closely trading with the US, such as Mexico and Canada, the exchange rate pass-through is
higher. On the other hand, countries like Japan and the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs)
that have extensive pricing to market pattern have typically a low degree of pass-through.
10They also stated that the degree of pass-through did not decline.
11In their study, the EA consisted of 12 countries that were already members of the EA by
2006 (excluding Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia). Belgium and Luxembourg
were treated as one economy.
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on the lower degree panel. In the long run, pass-through has been more com-
plete, with 6 out of 11 economies not able to reject the hypothesis of complete
pass-through.
The earlier attempt to explain incomplete exchange rate pass-through focused
on the diversity of countriestraded and non-traded goods sectors. It was later
shown that price level of non-traded goods, pushed up by higher overall pro-
duction cost, went in line with the traded goods sector. More recently, three
prominent aspects in explaining the common phenomenon of low pass-through
have been widely quoted in the literature - Pricing-to-Market (PTM), Local-
Currency-Pricing (LCP) and cross-border production.
Pricing-to-Market
In challenging Keynesian assumptions on producer price stickiness, Pricing-to-
Market (PTM) and Local-Currency-Pricing (LCP) are both pricing strategies
developed by rms in accordance with observed pricing behaviour. Following
the evidence that the PTM strategy is extensive internationally, Krugman (1987)
o¤ered a preliminary overview on PTM and claimed that 35% to 40% of the US
dollar real appreciation is absorbed by PTM behaviour.
In terms of a US dollar real appreciation, instead of letting the dollar price
of their exports oat against the exchange rate, German luxury automobile ex-
porters attempted to stabilise US import prices (in the US dollar) by e¤ectively
cutting their domestic currency export prices (in Deutsche marks), without which
persistent price divergence would have induced arbitrage incentives12. Hence, ex-
change rate uctuations are absorbed by exporterssqueezed prot margins, and
the relative prices of German products in Germany compared to German exports
to all the foreign economies are equivalently maintained.
12Maintaining the dollar price of German goods regardless of a dollar appreciation would
inevitably increase German export prices to the US. The relative prices of German goods in
Germany compared to German exports to the US would be lower. And so are the relative
prices of German exports to other economies compared to German exports to the US. Large
and persistent price divergences will induce incentives for international arbitrage.
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Exchange rate pass-through to US import prices is incomplete. In fact, the de-
gree of pass-through will depend on the frequency and the extent that exporters
update their destination market prices and on other inuencing factors under
consideration. In an extreme case where exporters strictly maintain their desti-
nation market prices, the exchange rate pass-through to importing country price
level is not viable; instead, a complete pass-through is made for the exporting
countrys domestic prices.
More interestingly, the ination rate in Germany, which would otherwise in-
crease13, falls in response to a comparative real depreciation against the dollar,
whilst the US price level is stable, ceteris paribus. Prior to PTM, it was common
to deduce from similar models that depreciation and ination are going side by
side under a PCP scenario, regardless of the stance of macroeconomic policies.
On the one hand, supply-induced ination is caused by both higher prices of im-
ported inputs and less price competition from foreign economies. On the other
hand, demand-induced ination is caused by the increasing demand for domestic
goods from both domestic and foreign markets. More directly, higher import
prices for the domestic economy can also contribute to domestic ination. PTM
pricing strategy, in contrast, demonstrates the possibility of falling ination rate
13Comparatively, the Deutsche mark experienced a real depreciation as the dollar appreciated
in real terms. A lower value Deutsche marks resulted in higher import prices in Germany,
hence, directly pushed up the prices that Germans paid towards imported goods from the US.
Indirectly, increasing demand and production costs for German goods can also push up the
overall domestic price level in Germany. When the prices of German goods become cheaper,
the demand for German goods from the US shall increase. Consequently, the price of German
goods in Germany tend to be forced up if the share of exports to the US is large enough to
compete with domestic demand that results in a decline in supply to the domestic economy
(demand-induced ination). Meanwhile, Germanys imported inputs from the US become more
expensive, and so does its products that necessarily require imported inputs from the US (cost-
pushing/supply-induced ination).
This explanation simply takes the point of view of international trade theory and of the
demand and supply analysis. When the stance of macroeconomic policies is also considered,
a depreciation of the Deutsche mark can be an indication of the underlying macroeconomic
policies. Therefore, both ination expectations and potential policy impacts can foresee an
inationary consequence in Germany.
A theoretical framework to analyse this causal relationship between the exchange rate and
ination can be found in Kahn (1987). The empirical analyses showed that the value of the
dollar had a statistically signicant inuence on ination. A once-and-for-all dollar depreciation
typically increased ination over a period of ve or more years, although such e¤ects were
temporary and small in the short term.
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in countries that are experiencing home currency depreciation.
Local-Currency-Pricing
More widely adopted by recent general equilibrium models, Local-Currency-
Pricing (LCP) and possibly Vehicle-Currency-Pricing (VCP) are argued to be
more appropriate for describing a rms pricing strategy. In particular, LCP was
shown to have been extensive in traded industries.
Under LCP, exporting rms set the prices of home goods in the local currency
of the importing economy14, rather than in its home currency. In the presence
of local price rigidity, the local (foreign/importing) price of home products will
not adjust to exchange rate changes in the short run. Over a longer horizon,
exporting rms may gradually adjust prices (in local currency) to be in line with
the local price level for maintaining a rms prot margin in terms of the local
currency.
For instance, when a company based in South Korea exports electronic appli-
ances to the US, it may set the price of those electronic appliances in US dollars
rather than in the South Korean won. In the short term, such a price is kept
relatively stable in line with the US price level, independent of the USD/KRW
(Dollar/Won) exchange rate uctuations. In the long term, the company adjusts
the price according to its strategy and local economic conditions, such as local
price rigidity and ination. Consequently, exchange rate pass-through is incom-
plete in the short run; while in the long run, depending on various factors, the
degree of pass-through can be higher.
Beyond the local price level, there is a possibility that rms reset their prices
in accordance with exchange rate movements by re-optimising periodically; whilst
it is also possible that they resist adjusting prices for certain reasons. After all,
factors like market shares and the relative competitiveness are beyond compa-
nies short term economic protability, but undoubtedly have implications on
14It is also referred to as local currency invoicing or pricing to consumer currency.
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their long term protability. Under this circumstance, in order to maintain their
competitiveness and market share in the destination market, exporting rms may
be willing to give up the prot margins to some extent by not adjusting the price
of their products frequently against the exchange rate variations. For this reason,
models incorporating LCP are able to explain short-run and even long-run low
exchange rate pass-through15.
Campa and Goldberg (2005) measured the elasticity of pass-through for 23
OECD countries, including 11 Euro Area (EA) members16, and suggested the
average elasticity of pass-through to be 0:466 in the short run and 0:636 in the
long run. In particular, the US economy had, among the lowest, an elasticity of
0:23 in the short run and 0:42 in the long run.
Some studies also brought increasing attention to VCP and its relevant policy
implications, especially for the role of the dollar, pound, and euro as vehicle
currencies in international trade. Under VCP, an exporting company sets the
price of its goods neither in the domestic currency nor in the local currency of
the destination market; instead, the price is set in a third currency, such as the
US dollar or the euro.
The use of VCP is justied by the importance, prevalence or stability of the
vehicle currency in global trade. For example, trade in raw materials like crude
oil is normally invoiced in the dollar or the pound. A Nigerian exporter, who
exports crude oil to China, may set its price per barrel in the British pound,
rather than the Nigerian naira or the Chinese yuan.
Similar with LCP, the pricing pattern under VCP implies that exchange rate
pass-through will be somehow incomplete. Gopinath et al. (2010) found that the
immediate pass-through into the US import price was nearly zero if the goods
were priced in dollars; while it was nearly complete if the goods were priced in
15In the case where local prices are less rigid, the exchange rate pass-through can be higher.
Meanwhile, without the local price rigidity, if the exporters change the prices in the importing
country to be in line with exchange rate changes, there is no di¤erence between PCP and LCP
in terms of having complete exchange rate pass-through.
16The included EA member countries were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
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non-dollars. Also, the median-term pass-through was 0:17 and 0:98 for goods
that are priced in dollars and non-dollars, respectively.
CrossBorder Production and Import Composition
Most of the early literature would have the producer or local price rigidity as an
essential assumption in order to explain the underlying causes of the incomplete
exchange rate pass-through. However, another strand of the literature builds its
theoretical interpretation upon the economic behaviours that are independent of
nominal rigidity.
One phenomenon that describes globalisation is the increasing international
fragmentation or the sharing of integrated productions, since cross-country het-
erogeneities and specialisation of productions appear to be crucial in deciding
a countrys relative competitiveness and in facilitating the global resource and
wealth allocation. In practice, for maximising the e¢ ciency of one integrated
production globally, several countries may each participate in a small fragment
of the production that it has expertise in, and export its products as interme-
diate goods. This global practice complicates the way that the exchange rate
pass-through is determined.
Considering a static case with two trading partners, the home country imports
a portion of its inputs (intermediate goods) and exports nal products; the for-
eign country, on the other hand, exports intermediate goods (its nal products)
to the home country and imports nal goods to satisfy its domestic consumption
demand. When companies in both countries adopt a PCP strategy, the apparent
exchange rate pass-through of a single product from one economy to another is
complete. That is to say, the nal good prices are primarily set in the home
currency; the foreign prices of nal goods will oat fully against exchange rate
variations. Meanwhile, the intermediate good prices are primarily set in for-
eign currency; the home prices of intermediate goods will also oat fully against
exchange rate variations.
However, the observed pass-through to the foreign price level may not be
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complete. When the home countrys nal products consist of an equal portion
of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, a 5% home currency depreciation
pushes up production costs by 2:5% in the home country, ceteris paribus. In
order to maintain their prot margin, rms in the home country adjust their
nal good prices fully to the production costs. The importing price of nal goods
that foreign country confronts is 2:38% cheaper, relative to the price prior to
home depreciation.
In fact, as the proportion of imported inputs in the nal good production
increases, the percentage decrease of the nal good prices that the foreign country
confronts is narrowed down17. That is to say, exchange rate pass-through to the
nal price level diminishes as the proportion of the imported inputs grows, ceteris
paribus. This simple example ignores the potential demand switching due to the
relative price changes. Nevertheless, the conclusion will not be reversed unless
the demand elasticity for the intermediate and nal products is exceptionally
high.
Hence, even with complete pass-through at both intermediate and nal good
levels, because of cross-border production sharing, the observed exchange rate
pass-through may not be complete. As a further matter, incomplete pass-through
at either intermediate good level or nal good level can result in dispersion of
the observed degrees of pass-through. Moreover, the import composition and
the availability of alternative resources are also crucial in shaping exchange rate
pass-through in the presence of cross-border production sharing.
Ghosh (2009) provided a theoretical framework of international fragmenta-
tion. He studied two simple cases with either complete or incomplete pass-
17As the proportion of imported inputs in the home country increases from 25% to 75%, the
percentage increase of nal good production costs rises from 1:25% to 3:75%. The percentage
decrease of nal good prices that the foreign country confronts declines from 3:57% to 1:19%.
In the case where no imported inputs are involved in the nal good production, the nal good
prices that a foreign country confronts shall decline by 4:76% in response to a 5% home currency
depreciation. In the case where the entire intermediate good production is dominated by the
foreign country, the nal good production costs rise by 5%, and the nal good prices that the
foreign country confronts has not been changed even though the home currency experiences a
5% depreciation.
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through at the intermediate good level, and conrmed that a higher pass-through
at the intermediate good level was translated into a lower pass-through to nal
good prices between two trading partners. Further complication of the model
with multiple resources of intermediate goods allowed rms to moderate their
production costs, which may have a consequence of even more stable nal good
prices.
Exchange Rate Pass-Through Determinants
The determinants of exchange rate pass-through are still open to debate. Firms
diverse pricing behaviour under nominal price rigidity is the most investigated
among various interpretations and is most prevalent in macroeconomic mod-
elling for incorporating the incomplete pass-through. Nevertheless, some recent
research has revealed endogeneity in rmspricing strategies, and also the de-
gree of pass-through, to macroeconomic fundamentals and conditions, including
the relative macroeconomic stability, country sizes, competitiveness and ination
growth as well as the prevalence or the importance of currency in trade, and
volatility of exchange rate.
One earlier but rather strong piece of evidence presented in Taylor (2000)
was that persistently low ination during the great moderation, coupled with
prevalent monetary policies, helped to lower rmsexpectation on persistent and
volatile changes in costs and product prices. Low uncertainty, in turn, prevented
rms from passing through cost and price changes associated with exchange rate
changes into local prices. Provided stability, exchange rate pass-through acts
to mitigate ination variability even further, whereas in a period of instability
the high pass-through induced by larger uncertainty accelerates deterioration in
macroeconomic conditions.
Moreover, other arguments that are not pricing-strategy based and are not
closely linked to nominal price rigidity emerge as international economic relations
are complicated by modern economic structure. It was also made clear in Campa
and Goldberg (2005) that macroeconomic stability was essential in determining
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the degree of pass-through; in addition, the evolvement of import composition
was also one of the determinants, which had certain implications from an earlier
discussion about the international fragmentation.
2.2.3 Volatility of the Exchange Rate
An important implication drawn from the Mundell-Fleming model is the impos-
sible trinity (trilemma), which says that exchange rate stabilisation, monetary
independence and free capital mobility are not jointly achievable in an open
economy. It suggests that policymakers will have to give up one in the trade-o¤s
among these three desirable objectives.
There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence, such as the numbers of failures
and their associated huge losses in attempting to restore limited exchange rate
movement in the post Bretton-Woods era. The desire for monetary autonomy
and high capital mobility across borders unavoidably lead to enormous di¢ culty
in controlling the exchange rate.
In the literature, few studies have examined how binding the impossible trinity
constraint is. Rose (1996) rst attempted to examine the nature of these trade-
o¤s econometrically, but found very little evidence of trade-o¤s among the three
objectives, at least in the short run18. However, he claimed that the conclusion
was not denitive and subject to the measurement di¢ culties and the time scale
of the analysis19. On the contrary, Obstfeld et al. (2005) examined historical data
covering the classical gold standard, the post-World War II Woods system and
the modern exible exchange rate system, and concluded with strong evidence in
18The main results in his analysis were that the exchange rate volatility was signicantly
but weakly related to underlying macroeconomic and monetary fundamentals; and that the
government exchange rate policy can a¤ect exchange rate volatility above and beyond the
e¤ects of actual macroeconomic policy.
19Indeed, measuring empirically the underlying objectives of the trilemma, particularly mon-
etary independence and capital mobility, is very challenging. It may raise some disputes and
can potentially bias the result of the statistical analysis. On the other hand, there are factors
that can alter the degree of any of these phenomena in the short run. For example, both price
stickiness and an imperfect international asset market can dampen short-run capital mobility,
leading to rejections of the trilemma.
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favour of the trilemma20.
The classical gold standard period was characterised by almost xed exchange
rates and unfettered capital ows, but a limited level of monetary autonomy. The
Bretton-Woods system, established in an e¤ort to rebuild the economic system
and facilitate international trade, was a period of xed but adjustable exchange
rates and monetary independence, but strictly limited capital mobility. Both eras
enjoyed both real and nominal exchange rate stability, which is desirable due to
its reduced risk in international trade.
Yet towards the end of the 20th century, the exible exchange rate regime as
well as capital liberalisation undoubtedly were popularised by modern economists
and policymakers. Exchange rate, theoretically predicted by the impossible trin-
ity and widely observed across the globe, is inevitably left oating on the foreign
exchange market. Ever since then, the determinants of exchange rate volatility
and the channels through which increasing volatility can have impacts on the real
side of the economy have been at the centre of a rich academic debate.
The nature and the extent of the impact on international trade and invest-
ments from volatile exchange rates is one of the core concerns of economists and
policymakers, especially in a period of crisis and the recent fear of currency war.
Indeed, on the advent of the oating exchange rate era, economists conceded
that volatile exchange rates might have detrimental impacts on trade, and conse-
quently on the current account balance. McKenzie (1999) interpreted exchange
rate volatility as the risk associated with unexpected movements in the exchange
rate. It is taken from the belief that the uncertainty induced by volatile exchange
rates depresses risk-averse exporterswillingness to trade. The subsequent welfare
losses due to the discouragedtrade become the rationale of currency unions and
one explanation for the radical movement toward single currency among some
20The data cover periods of the classical gold standard, post-World War II Bretton Woods
system and modern exible exchange rate system. The classical gold standard period was
marked by low monetary autonomy since the rapid interest rate shock transmission was ob-
served. In the Bretton Woods era, countries were still entitled to have monetary independence
in the xed exchange rate system because extensive capital controls were imposed.
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European countries in 1999. Nonetheless, over the decades of the post Bretton-
Woods period, numerous theoretical and empirical studies have found a rather
ambiguous relationship between exchange rate volatility and the volume of trade.
Even when exchange rate volatility was found to negatively inuence the trade
ows, the impact was small on average. The relevant literature surveys can be
found in McKenzie (1999), Clark et al. (2004), Ozturk (2006), and Auboin and
Ruta (2011).
Early theoretical analysis leaned towards supporting adverse e¤ects of ex-
change rate volatility on trade. An intuitive demonstration of such an impact
is that without he means of hedging exchange rate risk, a risk-averse rm that
cannot alter its production in the short term to match the demand and supply
misalignment due to exchange rate movements is subject to volatility in its rev-
enue (Clark, 1973). Thus, exchange rate movements are largely responsible for
the variability and uncertainty of a rms prots, and as a result, the decision
of cutting exports might be reached at the individual company level, and even
at the industry level. Yet this theory is heavily restricted and to a great extent
unrealistic. Further studies have relaxed some assumptions  lack of hedging
opportunities, perfect competition, the role of invoicing currency, the absence of
imported intermediate goods, the xed level of production and the level of risk
aversion and concluded rather ambiguously.
It was argued that in the modern global market, numerous ways of hedging
exchange rate risks or o¤setting negative exchange rate movements will to some
extent neutralise the impacts. Even so, Either (1973) incorporated the forward
exchange market and found that international trade was disturbed and depressed
by exchange rate volatility even with the forward exchange covering, when the
revenue of trading companies is uncertain to the future exchange rate movements
or when the forward exchange rate cannot accurately reect tradersexpectation
on future spot rate. Sensitivity of the trade volume to exchange rate volatility,
however, is a¤ected by factors like expectation, accuracy of forward rate reect-
ing future exchange rate and level of speculative activity by rms. Obstfeld and
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Rogo¤ (1998) also pointed out that adverse e¤ects can also be introduced by
higher export prices that are translated from high hedging costs. Firms with
high risk-aversion have a higher tendency in hedging exchange risks when the
exchange rate is highly volatile, with which they reduce the revenue uncertainty
associated with the exchange risks, and may arguably maintain the trade volume.
However, the hedging costs, accounting for fees incurred by actual hedging ac-
tions, will be reected in higher exporting prices, and adversely a¤ect the world
demand and trade ows. In such a case, uncertainty created by exchange rate
volatility not only enters rms revenues but also their costs. In other words,
certainty equivalence pricing accounts for not only revenue uncertainty but also
cost uncertainty.
In addition, the accessibility and costs of risk hedging instruments vary across
economies with diversities in size, openness and nancial market completion, and
e¢ ciency. Multinational corporations (MNCs), for instance, have more oppor-
tunities to access the international capital market and may have relatively low
hedging costs. Besides, their involvement in multi-currency trading maybe func-
tioning as an instrument for the short run mutual hedging. Baron (1976) provided
an extreme case of risk neutralisation by integrating a perfect forward exchange
market when the exchange risk was the only risk that is associated. He also put
forward the fact that the oating exchange rate has impacts on rmspricing
behaviour and correspondingly the risks associated with their pricing strategies.
Neither PCP nor LCP can completely screen a rms prots from exchange rate
uncertainty  there is either a transaction exposure when transferring prots
into the home currency under LCP or a quantity uncertainty when the foreign
price moves with the exchange rate under PCP. The combined e¤ect of pricing
strategies and diverse degrees of risk aversion may be responsible for the unpre-
dictability of trade ows relative to the exchange risk.
Integration of the global market enables cross-border production sharing. The
entire production process can even be switched to those relatively cost compet-
itive or low exchange risk countries. Clark (1973) mentioned that there were
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o¤setting e¤ects arising when the exporters indeed import intermediate goods
for production; in other words, the production cost becomes uncertain and vari-
able with the exchange rate (Baron, 1976).
De Grauwe (1988) also suggested that ambiguous positive e¤ects might be
possible when the relative risk aversion (RRA) was su¢ ciently high (greater than
unity). His theory was derived from the fact that divergent optimum might be
reached depending upon whether RRA was above or below unity. The economic
intuition is that when an exporter is of higher risk aversion, the income e¤ect
outweighs the substitution e¤ect  exports become more attractive since the
marginal revenue of exports has risen in accordance with exchange rate volatility.
The exporter re-allocates more resources into producing export goods in order to
maintain the same level of expected utility from export revenues without higher
risk. Some other relevant ndings can be found in early literature such as Hooper
and Kohlhagen (1978) and Cushman (1983).
The sunkcosts involving setting up export-related productions and networks
may also alter exporting decisions. Due to the existence of such costs, rms are
less sensitive to short term variations of the exchange rate, but are more cautious
about their enter and exit strategies when the observed exchange rate volatility
is high and persistent. Furthermore, instead of trade volume, trade composition
is found to be adjusted against exchange rate volatility. Capacities for adjusting
the production level in the event of sudden increases in the exchange risk also
play an important role in rmsimport and export strategies and in mitigating
detrimental impacts from the exchange risk.
2.2.4 Recent Developments
Since the 2000s, concerns about the impacts of the exchange rate on the trade
balance and other macroeconomic aspects reappeared in the aftermath of the
serious currency crisis in conjunction with seemly unsustainably large global ex-
ternal imbalances. Albeit large attention still remains on impacts from exchange
rate volatility, e¤ects from persistent movements of level exchange rate, which
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are reected in exchange rate misalignment, became the new focus of research.
Questions that attract policy concerns are whether prolonged currency underval-
uation improves the current account balance and boosts output growth; whether
the sustained exchange rate misalignment creates distortions in achieving e¢ cient
outcomes; and whether prolonged misalignment created articially by monetary
and scal policies actually exports the domestic crisis to trading partners and
dampens the global market; and last but not least, a long-asked question on wel-
fare changes and corresponding optimal policies in response to all those changes
in the global economic architecture. Another issue also being considered is the
extent to which policies can inuence the exchange rate, which has great impli-
cations on how macroeconomic policies a¤ect the global economy and how they
should be designed in achieving the domestic and global e¢ ciency.
The relatively short-time horizon in past studies is one aspect that has re-
ceived criticism. The J-curve e¤ect is in common use nowadays for summarising
impacts of currency depreciation on the trade balance at the beginning of a
real exchange rate depreciation the price e¤ect dominates, leading to a tempo-
rary deterioration of the trade balance; as it proceeds, the quantity e¤ect takes
over as trade orders are replaced with adjustments to the price change, leading
to a long term positive impact on the trade balance. In fact, it is agreed that
short-run responses of the trade balance to currency misalignment are far from
clear, and are subject to various conditions. Designing appropriate policies, how-
ever, requires understanding of the long-run e¤ects, although short-run impacts
are also under consideration.
Another criticism of past studies is the ignored heterogeneities across rms,
sectors, and economies, and the use of aggregate trade data that may result in
misleading implications. Diversity of rms in size, production specialisation, com-
petitiveness, risk aversion as well as the market environment has a varied impact
on a rms exporting strategies, which shape the global trading pattern to some
extent. There are also heterogeneities across sectors and industries in response
to exchange rate movements. Trade composition, built upon such diverse indus-
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tries and sectors, also shapes the aggregate trade pattern di¤erently. Moreover,
economies di¤ering in size, openness and nancial market development inuence
individual trading companies and hence an individual countrys trade pattern
di¤erently. From these arguments, there are calls for the use of disaggregated
data to avoid aggregation problems.
Furthermore, beyond the trade balance, studies have started exploring the
relation between the exchange rate and other macroeconomic variables such as
economic and technological growth. Most of the empirical evidence, in fact, leans
towards supporting positive e¤ects of undervaluation on economic growth, even
in the long run. In particular, emerging economies that are heavily relying on
exports benet from prolonged undervaluation, in spite of the large exchange rate
risk related to their under-development of the nancial market.
Progress in the literature since the late 1990s takes on the advantages of ad-
vances in micro-founded, stochastic general equilibrium macroeconomic models.
Instead of approximating equilibrium using certainty equivalence assumptions,
the stochastic general equilibrium models capture the exchange rate and other
macroeconomic risks within the model setting, and allow for interactions to be
observed. That is, in such a setting the exchange rate volatility, trade and other
closely related macroeconomic variables are endogenously determined. In addi-
tion, their microeconomic foundations allow welfare analyses of an explicit spec-
ication  the utility of economic agents  and provide an optimisation-based
monetary policy analysis framework. Even so, the extent to which the exchange
rate and its volatility have impacts on various macroeconomic aspects, such as
international trade, capital ows, current account balance and monetary policy
e¢ ciency, is still inconclusive.
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2.3 The Role of the Exchange Rate in Monetary
Policy
The debate about the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy is still very
much alive even though the exible exchange rate regime has been dominating
for decades. One strand of the literature that frequently asks whether monetary
policies should consider, or to some extent even target, the exchange rate is the
analysis of open economy monetary policies. In particular, can monetary policies
designed for a closed economy also t an open economy?
In a closed economy, an obstacle of designing monetary policies lies in the
trade-o¤ between stabilising ination and stabilising outputs. In an open econ-
omy, however, natural heterogeneities across nations take various forms and con-
tribute to the complexity of achieving a stabilising monetary policy. Therefore,
in an open economy context, transmission of monetary policies, which is other-
wise dominated by the interest rate channel, also has a large contribution from
the exchange rate channel. An inward-looking monetary policy rule, which has
exactly the same objective as in a closed economy, attempts to target domestic
price stability and possibly economic growth and interest rate variability regard-
less of the degree of economic openness. This type of policy might be optimal
when the exchange rate is instrumental to relative price adjustments. For in-
stance, the classical view of open economy monetary policy is often based upon
the assumptions of a frictionless international asset market and PCP, and thus,
complete exchange rate pass-through. Divine coincidence21 is achievable, and
therefore, monetary policies in the closed and open economies are isomorphic.
Contrarily, when exchange rate volatility serves as a source of uncertainty, a sta-
bilising monetary policy should be capable of maintaining ination at a low and
21The denition of this term is usually attributed to a seminal paper by Olivier Blanchard
and Jordi Galí in 2005, which was later published in the Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing (Blanchard and Galí, 2007). The Divine coincidence referred to a property of the new
Keynesian framework where CBs face no trade-o¤ between stabilising ination and stabilising
the welfare-relevant output gap. In their paper, they argued that this property was due to the
absence of non-trivial real imperfections, such as real wage rigidities.
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stable level while minimising international resource misallocation.
2.3.1 Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence of CBs indirectly inuencing the exchange rate through mon-
etary policies has been largely exploited. Some studies follow Structural Vector
Autoregression (SV AR) put forward by Sims (1980). Clarida and Gertler (1997)
provided a narrative together with SV AR evidence that Bundesbank responded
to the exchange rate in a clearly countercyclical fashion. Cushman and Zha
(1997) argued that appropriate monetary policies for a small open economy like
Canada needed to account for endogenous policy reactions to the interest rate
and the exchange rate. Kim and Roubini (2000) focused on G7 countries and
concluded that US Federal Funds Rate (FFR) was endogenously responding to
the USD/JPY (Dollar/Yen) and the USD/DM (Dollar/Mark) exchange rate, and
vice versa. They interpreted these ndings as either Germany and Japan were
su¢ ciently large economies to a¤ect the world interest rate or FFR responded
to monetary actions in these two countries to avoid the impact of exchange rate
variations on US ination. By extending the Kim and Roubini model Brischetto
and Voss (1999) claimed that Australian monetary policy can be explained better
by including the authoritiesresponses to the nominal exchange rate.
Another group of studies estimate monetary policy rules directly. Gerlach and
Smets (2000) found that those CBs using the Monetary Condition Index (MCI)
as an operating target, such as the Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, reacted to the exchange rate strongly, while the Bank of Australia did
not. Additionally, the large amount of literature focusing on Emerging Market
Economies (EMEs) puts even more attention on this issue since CBs in EMEs are
known to be highly active in foreign exchange market interventions and strongly
react to the exchange rate.
Meanwhile, the meetings of international macro-policymakers often put much
emphasis on the appropriatenessof exchange rate (and current account) develop-
ments. Meyer et al. (2002), providing a narrative study on macroeconomic policy
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coordination, summarised the reasons for such a focus on the exchange rate: it
constitutes the transmission channel by which macro-policies in one country are
transmitted to another; it is an information variable of the appropriateness of
macro-policies; movements of the exchange rate can lead to immediate and sub-
stantial pressures on ination in some countries; and the foreign exchange market
can be susceptive to macro-policy actions and subject to irrational movements.
The study concluded that policymakers viewed large exchange rate movements
as undesirable per se.
2.3.2 Analytical Framework
In an era when adopting the oating exchange rate framework is overwhelm-
ingly trendy, two issues put the exchange rate at the frontline of macroeconomic
research: 1), the detrimental impacts on the wide aspect of the economy gen-
erated by the highly volatile exchange rate and 2), the possible instrumental
function of the exible exchange rate in stabilising ination, output and other
real macroeconomic variables. Theoretically, exchange rate volatility not only
has negative impacts on economies from various aspects, such as trade, output
and employment, its associated uncertainty may also dampen welfare22. Also,
the instability that large exchange rate volatility may bring is of particular con-
cern in EMEs and in times of economic crisis. Indeed, highly stablewas one
requirement put together with free to varywhen Milton Friedman (1953) advo-
cated exible exchange rates. He also claimed that Instability of exchange rates
is a symptom of instability in the underlying economic structure. On the other
hand, exible exchange rates facilitate adjustments of relative prices, and hence
Terms of Trade (TOT), relative demand, and resource allocation globally. Ana-
lytical studies have a more clear-cut conclusion on the existence of some degrees
of expenditure-switching e¤ects that vary due to heterogeneities across countries,
sectors and time. In sum, it is the trade-o¤ between detrimental high volatility
22See Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) for an initial discussion.
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and instrumental exibility of the exchange rate that CBs and policymakers are
interested in.
Arguments for di¤erentiated monetary policies in closed and open economies
lie in the di¤erences of the underlying monetary transmission mechanism. In an
open economy that is targeting ination, transmission channels are the interest
rate channel, the main channel in a closed economy, as well as the exchange rate
channel. The interest rate channel, illustrated by imposing the Taylor rule, works
by altering the real interest rate, and hence aggregate demand to a¤ect ination.
The exchange rate channel inuences ination either directly by the exchange
rate pass-through to traded and possibly untraded good prices23, or indirectly,
by the expenditure-switching e¤ect that re-allocates the aggregate demand and
resources globally, which may alter the domestic ination. A common suggestion
is thus adding responses to various measurements of the exchange rate when
implementing monetary policies. Possible specications of the reaction to the
exchange rate vary in the literature depending on whether one focuses on real or
nominal exchange rates, on level or changes in the exchange rate, and similarly,
on contemporaneous or lagged e¤ects of the exchange rate24. One simplest form
of monetary policy rule presented in Taylor (2001) is:
rt = yyt + t + h0Qt + h1Qt 1; (2.3)
where rt, yt and t are the short-term nominal interest rate set by the central
bank, the deviation of real GDP from potential GDP and the rate of ination,
respectively; Qt and Qt 1 are current and lagged values of the real exchange
rate (it also applies to nominal exchange rate, depending on the focus of the
study), where an increase in values ofQ indicates real appreciation of the domestic
currency.
23Directly, ination is a¤ected by the exchange rate pass-through to the imported nal good
price, which would eventually enter domestic CPI. Indirectly, ination is a¤ected by the ex-
change rate pass-through to the imported intermediate good price, which in turn changes the
price of domestic products.
24A comparison of these di¤erent types of specication can be found in Batini et al. (2003)
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Early Research and Classical View
It was suggested in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) that the exchange rate is an
important economic indicator, and thus it should not be ignored when setting
monetary policies. Or in other words, relaxing monetary policies might be initi-
ated by exchange rate changes under certain circumstances25. As pointed out in
Taylor (2001), the implied policy rule to the exchange rate required either h0 < 0
if the level exchange rate is the concern, or h0 < 0, h1 =  h0 if the change
of the exchange rate is the concern26. Formal analytical frameworks allowing
for the appearance of exchange rates in monetary policy rules were evaluated
by Ball (1999b), Taylor (1999) and Svensson (2000). In general, marginal im-
provements in macroeconomic performance were found in these studies, yet the
ndings were not enough to support the proposal for including a direct exchange
rate response in monetary policy rules.
Using a model with a simple open-economy IS curve, Phillips curve and an
exchange rate reaction function to interest rate27, Ball (1999b) derived an optimal
monetary policy rule targeting a weighted average of the real interest rate and
the real exchange rate. Such optimal policy rule was supportive to a branch
of popular practice that used MCI as a policy instrument28. He illustrated the
25They wrote that substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate accompanied by slow
output growth furnishes a prima facie case for relaxing monetary policy. Nevertheless, they also
pointed out that policy responses to the exchange rate could also cause substantial deviations
from purchasing power parity (PPP). The second interpretation of weak analytical support for
open economy monetary policy in Taylor (2001) also stemmed from this statement.
26Althernatively, the policy rule can be expressed as rt = yyt+t+h (Qt  Qt 1), where
h = h0 =  h1 indicates the elasticity of the policy rate to changes in the real exchange rate.
27Instead of assuming Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), he assumed a simple rule of the real
exchange rate, Q = r + , where r is the real interest rate and v is a white noise shock. The
real exchange rate responds to the real interest rate at  = 2.
28From the late 1980s, several CBs adopted MCI (in real or nominal terms) as either their
operating targets or as one of the indicators for guiding monetary policy setting. The purpose
of this practice was to incorporate the exchange rate into policy implementations. The Bank of
Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand are two CBs that treated MCI as an operating
target  policy responses to certain economic uctuations consisting of changes in both the
interest rate and the exchange rate, depending on the weights specic to an individual CBs
preference. CBs of Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland used MCI merely for one economic
indicator among others. For more analytical discussion on MCI, see Gerlach and Smets (2000),
Freedman (1996) and Guender (2005).
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term t + Qt 129 as a long-run ination forecast that might deviate in the
short run due to real exchange rate deviations (when Qt 1 6= 0 ). Hence, the
existence of lagged real exchange rates implies that monetary policies should not
only target contemporaneous ination, but also adjust to the temporary impact
of real exchange rate changes on ination, which may otherwise cause excessive
reactions and ine¢ cient oscillations in output and ination. The paper came to
the conclusion that an optimal open economy monetary policy rule would (1), use
weighted sum of the interest rate and the exchange rate as policy instruments and
(2), target long-run ination to counteract fast e¤ects from the direct exchange
rate channel.
Svensson (2000) provided a more sophisticated model with built-in domestic
ination and CPI ination, ct = t ! (Qt  Qt 1)30, and found that the exible
CPI ination targeting generated low to moderate variability in all variables.
His interpretation was that policy reactions might entail impacts from a certain
forward-looking variable Qt due to the property of CPI ination. Di¤ering from a
closed economy policy rule that merely responds to domestic ination and output
gap, there is a considerable amount of real exchange rate stabilisation in the
open-economy policy rule, subject to the constraint respecting the cross-country
output-gap stabilisation. Hence, he concluded that the exible CPI-ination
targeting maybe an attractive alternative in the open economy.
Another early study, done by Taylor (1999), applied a multi-country general
equilibrium model to seven countries including three Euro Area (EA) member
countries31 and the US. The simulated policy rule for the European Central Bank
(ECB) implied that h0 =  0:25, h1 = 0:15. That is, 100% appreciation of the
euro will be eventually reected in a 10% reduction in the policy rate 25% in the
29t being ination and Qt 1 being the lagged real exchange rate.  is the elasticity of
ination in response to the lagged exchange rate growth. It rst appears in the open economy
Phillips curve: t = t 1+yt 1  (Qt 1  Qt 2)+ , where yt 1 is the lagged value of real
output (in logarithm),  is a white noise shock.
30ct being CPI ination; t being domestic ination; ! being the share of imported goods
in the CPI; Qt  Qt 1 being changes in the real exchange rate.
31Three EA member countries were France, Italy and Germany. The bilateral exchange rates
among these three countries were xed, and a single short-term euro interest rate was assumed.
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current period, o¤set in the following period by a 15% adjustment. Nevertheless,
welfare analysis revealed that neither the simple rule nor the open economy rule
with exchange rate responses strictly dominated the other. In particular, inclu-
sion of the exchange rate lowered ination in all three EA countries marginally,
while output variance in Germany was higher. This result was subsequently
echoed by the analysis of welfare-based optimal monetary policy rules that ex-
change rate targeted and cooperative monetary policies generated marginal or no
welfare gains.
Taylor (2001) put such unsupportive analytical evidence on welfare gains into
twofold explanations. First, even in a closed economy policy rule, the short-term
interest rate responds to the exchange rate implicitly due to inertial e¤ectsin
exchange rate transmission. This interpretation lies in the fact that the exchange
rate is a forward-looking variable that has impacts on expectations of ination
and expectations of policy rate movements, which in turn alter the current policy
rate indirectly. Second, responding to exchange rate deviations from PPP that
should not be o¤set by changes in interest ratecauses excessive uctuations in
the exchange rate and hence other real variables. In the case of strong unnecessary
responses to the exchange rate from policy rules, welfare gains from exchange
rate stabilisation come at the cost of welfare losses of harmful variability of the
interest rate and other real variables. If the former explanation is true, the direct
exchange rate reaction becomes redundant; while if the latter case holds true, it
becomes undesirable.
The advance of DSGE models, which imposes micro-foundations and restric-
tions upon open economy analyses, provides theoretical insights into the open-
economy transmission mechanism. The majority of studies focus on Small Open
Economies (SOEs), particularly those with export or import dominations or with
fewer trading partners. SOEs have a higher exposure to foreign shocks since they
are more likely to be inuenced by exchange risks.
In Clarida et al. (2001), a SOE model showed that monetary policies under
both open- and closed-economy contexts were isomorphic. International factors
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only a¤ected the domestic policy design to the extent that domestic ination
or the equilibrium real interest rate was a¤ected. Hence, under complete ex-
change rate pass-through, the CB should target domestic ination rather than
CPI ination. Clarida et al. (2002) further conrmed such isomorphismin a
Nash-equilibrium case. Nonetheless, potential cooperative gains were achievable
under a cooperative equilibrium, even though such gains are supply sidein na-
ture. The optimal cooperative policy required attention on not only the real
interest rate and domestic ination, but also foreign ination.
Galí and Monacelli (2005) developed a SOE-DSGE model with the Calvo
sticky price and wage setting for analysing monetary policies. They demonstrated
that equilibrium dynamics of an open economy were somehow canonical to the
closed economy, but with dissimilarities in coe¢ cients of equilibrium and the
natural rate of output and the interest rate. They also showed the presence of
two stabilisation trade-o¤s between the nominal exchange rate and TOT, and
between the domestic ination and output gap. The resulting superior policy
rule in terms of welfare hence is domestic ination targeting, although it also
induces a larger exchange rate and TOT volatility out of three monetary policies.
A summative demonstration of an open-economy optimal monetary policy
in the DSGE framework with divine coincidence can be found in Corsetti et
al. (2010). Comparing with the closed economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC), macroeconomic interdependence appears in an open-economy NKPC
as the modied marginal cost of production32. When the coe¢ cient for the home
consumption bias aH = 1, this open-economy NKPC collapses into a canonical
closed economy NKPC. In an open economy (aH < 1), however, the domestic
32The open-economy frictions are represented in the log-linearised marginal costs as an ad-
ditional term   (1  aH)
h
(  1)

T^t   ~T fbt + Q^t   ~Qfbt

  ^H;t   D^t
i
. T^t is the deviation
of the home economy TOT transformed from the ratio of import prices to export
prices "tPF;tPH;t , where PF;t is the home price of imported goods, P

H;t is the foreign price of home
goods in the foreign currency and "t is the nominal exchange rate that increases when the home
currency depreciates. ^H;t denotes deviation from Law of One Price (LOOP). Q^t = "tPtPt is the
real exchange rate where P t and Pt are the utility-based foreign and domestic Consumer Price
Index (CPI), respectively. D^t is the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted cross-country
demand di¤erential.
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ination dynamics is also subject to 1), the misalignment of relative prices of
good

T^t + ^H;t

and of consumption Q^t; 2), the relative demand imbalance D^t.
In other words, open-economy NKPC resembles its closed economy counterpart
only with the presence of perfect risk sharing and complete exchange rate pass-
through across countries. Not surprisingly, in response to e¢ cient shocks, optimal
cooperative monetary policy in an open-economy model with complete nancial
market and PCP coincides with that of a one-sector closed economy with exible
prices. This can be demonstrated by showing a linear relation between the TOT
deviation from the e¢ cient level and the cross-country output gap that removes
trade-o¤s in regard to stabilising the international relative price.
That is to say that exchange rates or TOT acts as an e¤ective international
shock absorber, and converges to its e¤ective rate once output gaps are stabilised
at individual country and hence cross-country level. Regardless of the various
degrees of nominal rigidity in an individual economy, country-specic shocks are
transmitted into exchange rate and hence, given complete pass-through, into
importing economy ination. Flexible exchange rate becomes a proxy to inter-
national price exibility and transmission of macroeconomic distortions, which
ensures achievability of exible price optimum at international level a justica-
tion to Friedmans assertion.
Intuitively, unnecessary responses to international relative price movements
induce disruption in the process of convergence, and hence, welfare losses. The
necessity of including any formation of exchange rate in monetary policy rule
occurs only when either price misalignment or demand imbalance is non-zero,
regardless of the existence of nominal rigidities in either economy.
Alternative Views
Recent criticism questions the classical view skeptically by examining two postu-
lations that are crucial for achieving divine coincidencein the classical model 
perfect exchange rate pass-through and perfect international risk sharing. Any in-
fringement of either assumption validates additional trade-o¤ between stabilising
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domestic targets and minimising international misalignments. As a consequence,
closed economy monetary policy may no longer be proper in an open economy
context.
Incomplete exchange rate pass-through and LCP As mentioned in the
previous section, even with nominal home price rigidity, complete exchange rate
pass-through featured in PCP ensures price exibility globally. Hence, e¢ cient
resource reallocation is achieved by the exchange rate acting as a shock absorber.
Borrowing notations from Corsetti et al. (2010), Pt (h) and
P t (h)
"t
denote prices in
domestic currency set by domestic rm h at time t for the domestic and foreign
market, respectively. Law of One Price (LOOP) holds since all the rms optimally
equalise the prices of their goods in both markets -
P H;t
"t
= PH;t and PF;t =
P F;t
"t
.
Terms of Trade (TOT) which is dened as the ratio of domestic importing price
to exporting price can be rewritten as:
T ct =
PF;t
P H;t
"t
=
PF;t
PH;t
(2.4)
The real exchange rate in log-linearised form is thus a function of TOT33:
Qc =   (2aH   1) Tt (2.5)
In the case of LCP, each rm h chooses its price in domestic market Pt (h)
in terms of the home currency and in foreign market P t (h) in terms of the
foreign currency regardless of the nominal exchange rate. In an economy with
Calvo nominal rigidity, those rms who receive market signal reoptimise prices
in both markets, otherwise the prices would be kept constant. With optimising
probability being , reoptimisation promises positive pass-through, and therefore,
deterioration of TOT. However, without a reoptimising signal, there is zero pass-
through to prices regardless of movements in the exchange rate. With PF;t and
33This function is derived from the assumption of symmetric parameters across countries 
aH = a

F = (1  aH). Further discussion in this section also assumes symmetric parameters.
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P H;t xed, home currency depreciation (decrease in "t) results in improvement
of TOT, rather than deterioration deduced from classical thinking. As a whole,
subject to degrees of local nominal rigidity, thus incomplete exchange rate pass-
through, TOT movement is indecisive it improves when the former dominates,
but deteriorates when the latter dominates.
The violation of LOOP creates a wedge between real and nominal exchange
rates. The real exchange rate is also subject to a term describing deviations from
LOOP:
QLCP =   (2aH   1) Tt   2aHt (2.6)
where t = H;t = F;t is deviation from LOOP, assuming symmetric parame-
ters across countries. Since it enters marginal cost of production in each country,
this deviation also appears in the relation between cross-country output gap and
TOT as an additional term. Consequently, the design of monetary policy encoun-
ters an international trade-o¤between stabilising domestic and cross-country out-
put gap and domestic ination. Tightening or easing monetary policy in order to
close output gap

Y^H;t   Y^ fH;t

 

Y^F;t   Y^ fF;t

, which implies changes in relative
currency values, will unavoidably cause deviations from LOOP. As mentioned in
the previous section, misalignment of relative prices

T^t + ^H;t

and Q^t drive
ination further away from its target. To the extent that monetary policy can
open a wedge between an observed price to its e¢ cient level, the trade-o¤ be-
tween stabilising ination deviation and output gap are exaggerated. This result
stresses the need for policy concerns on international relative prices including
the real exchange rate, terms of trade and their misalignments.
Adolfson et al. (2007) described an open economy model of EA with both
nominal and real rigidities and working capital channel, treating foreign variables
as exogenous. Most importantly, by specifying local currency invoicing and im-
posing local currency price rigidities, the model allowed incomplete exchange rate
pass-through in both import and export sectors. They also specied a monetary
policy rule with response to lagged real exchange rate in addition to other con-
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ventional inuential factors. The degrees of pass-through in EA were found to
be low 45% to price of imported consumption and 25% to price of imported
investment and were subject to specic types of shocks. Bayesian estimation of
the models parameters suggested that monetary policy responds to lagged real
exchange rate positively but weakly. It is consistent with Balls argument that
the policy rate tightens up in response to lagged exchange rate for adjusting short
term ination over-reaction to exchange rate. Nevertheless, the highest elasticity
of response at h1 = 0:018, in particular being under the assumption of low cap-
ital adjustment cost, largely worsens the modelst measured by log marginal
likelihood.
Leitemo and Söderström (2005) found that optimised h0 =  h1 > 0 (both in
the nominal and real exchange rate case when exchange rate pass-through is lower
than 0:5. This, as opposed to the rule of thumbsummarised in Taylor (2001),
implies that the policy rate declines when exchange rate appreciates. They in-
terpreted it as the potential conict between direct exchange rate channel and
other channels of monetary policyas exchange rate is forward-looking when
exchange rate pass-through to ination is high, the interest rate responds nega-
tively to exchange rate volatility for the purpose of reducing ination variability,
but at the cost of higher exchange rate and interest rate volatility (cases in
Svensson (2000) and the case of Germany in Taylor (1999) were referred to);
meanwhile, when exchange rate pass-through to ination is low, interest rate and
exchange rate volatility can be reduced by letting the policy rate respond posi-
tively to exchange rate changes, but at the cost of allowing higher ination. This
explanation is somehow in line with Taylors second point that also results in the
trade-o¤s between stabilising exchange rate (and potentially interest rate) and
other real variables.
Incomplete International Asset Market Another necessary condition as-
suring e¤ective allocation to be the best exible price allocation is the com-
plete international asset market. A perfect global asset market generates perfect
39
international risk sharing that determines the real exchange rate:
Qct =   (Ct   Ct ) +
 
C;t   C;t

(2.7)
where C;t and 

C;t are consumption preference shocks in domestic and for-
eign economy, respectively. The global demand imbalance, dened as Dt =
Qt    (Ct   Ct ) +
 
C;t   C;t

is zero whenever the above risk sharing holds.
An e¢ cient shock moves TOT and the exchange rate in an opposite direction 
positive home productivity shock, for example, results in depreciations in the real
exchange rate and TOT. With complete pass-through, exibility of the exchange
rate allows e¤ective adjustment, by which the induced expenditure-switching ef-
fect can restore e¢ cient reallocation of cross-country demand of consumption.
On the other hand, an imperfect asset market connes international risk shar-
ing. Ambiguity of exchange rate and TOT movements in response to e¢ cient
shocks is permitted in contrast to the perfect asset market. Assuming nancial
autarky and symmetric parameters across economies, the determination of the
real exchange rate, instead of depending solely on intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, depends on both degree of home bias aH and elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods . The log-linearised exchange rate and TOT
can be presented in terms of global demand and production gaps as:
Qt =   2aH   1
2aH  1 (Ct   C

t ) (2.8)
  (1  2aH (1  )) Tt = YH;t   YF;t (2.9)
Compared with perfect risk sharing (2.7), the equation (2.8) deviates in terms
of elasticity of global demand to real exchange rate and preference shocks. The
global demand imbalance, thus, is non-zero unless in extremely rare circum-
stances. Noticeably, when  < 2aH 1
2aH
, TOT responds to home productivity shock
negatively. The classical thought of the expenditure-switching e¤ect can no longer
be assured when strong preference towards home goods prevails. It was presented
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in an earlier section that a non-zero global demand imbalance distinguishes open-
economy NKPC from its closed economy counterpart. The design of monetary
policy confronts a trade-o¤ between global output di¤erential and relative de-
mand imbalance in addition to home ination and output gap trade-o¤.
2.3.3 The Exchange Rate and International Macroeco-
nomic Puzzles
Despite the voluminous literature arguing an important role for exchange rates in
monetary policy, uncertainty about the determinants of exchange rate movements
and the connection between exchange rates and macroeconomic variables can
easily turn such e¤orts into futility. The undesirability of volatile exchange rates
to macroeconomic policymakers stems from the perception that the exchange
rate is an information variable and has signicant impacts on macroeconomic
fundamentals. Yet, various unresolved exchange rate puzzles can a¤ect, and
potentially sabotage, models incorporating the preceding assumption.
The Mussa puzzle (Mussa, 1986) describes the high level of co-movements
between real and nominal exchange rates. To enable a model to re-produce such
co-movements, a certain level of price rigidity at national level will be required.
The consumption-real exchange rate anomaly, which focuses on the correla-
tion between the exchange rate and the relative level of consumption, describes
the contradiction between the positive correlation predicted by macroeconomic
models and the negative (or positive but small) correlation observed by empirical
studies. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (hereafter CKM (2002)) intended to model
the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly in a general equilibrium monetary
model by introducing an incomplete bond market and habit persistence. The
result was not promising for eliminating the anomaly.
Obstfeld and Rogo¤(2001) included two exchange rate puzzles in the list of the
six major puzzles in international macroeconomics the PPP puzzle emphasising
the weak connection between exchange rates and national price levels; and the
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exchange-rate disconnect puzzle.
The PPP puzzle is characterised by an observed high level of volatility and
persistence in exchange rates. Such a phenomenon is di¢ cult to account for
through a theoretical model. Monetary and nancial shocks are normally con-
sidered as the major source of volatility, but will require an unrealistic level of
nominal rigidity to account for the persistence. On the other side, without mon-
etary or nancial shocks, macroeconomic models have di¢ culties in generating
enough exchange rate volatility.
The exchange-rate disconnect puzzle describes the phenomenon that the ob-
served exchange rate volatility is much higher relative to the volatility of macro-
economic fundamentals the exchange rate uctuates widely without having a
sizable contemporaneous impact on the real economy. This phenomenon weakens
the arguments for including exchange rates in the CB loss function - if the loss
induced by the exchange risk were lower than the cost of hedging, why should a
CB target the exchange rate?
In addition, the failure of UIP and its associated puzzles can be held against
the models with a UIP specication. The UIP implies that the currency in the
country with higher interest rates should depreciate (a positive relationship); and
the expected excess returns from the foreign currency arbitrage34 should be zero.
Yet the empirical observations regarding time periods and currency pairs say the
opposite thus the UIP puzzle; and the expected excess returns are not zero -
thus the forward premium puzzle.
The anecdotal evidence shows undetermined exchange rate responses to an
interest rate di¤erential. In theory, the assumption of perfectly exible prices im-
plies a positive relationship between the exchange rate and the nominal interest
rate di¤erential; whereas the sticky price assumption predicts a negative rela-
tionship. Depending on the magnitude of the ination di¤erential (either large
34The linearised approximation of the UIP is Et"t+1   "t = rft   rt, where rt and rft are
nominal interest rates in the home and foreign economies, respectively. The expected excess
returns from foreign currency arbitrage is then dened as Etxt+1 = "t+1   "t + rt   rft.
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or small), these two theoretical interpretations can each explain certain histori-
cal moments or geographical variations. However, given a commonly observed,
moderate ination di¤erential, it is di¢ cult to develop a model describing the
relationship between the real interest rate and real exchange rate well.
Dornbusch (1976) was one early paper establishing a model to interpret the
relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates. In the short-run,
a monetary expansion resulted in an immediate domestic currency depreciation;
such exchange rate overshooting can in turn lead to an expectation of appreciation
the movement of exchange rates will be reverted towards the long-run depreci-
ation level. The extent to which the monetary policy can a¤ect the interest rate
and the exchange rate depends on the behaviour of output xed output leads
to a combination of a depreciation and lower interest rates; whereas, adjustable
output leads to a combination of a depreciation and higher interest rates.
In a structural model, UIP imposes an empirically falserestriction on the
relationship between the interest rate di¤erential and the exchange rate di¤er-
ential, undermining the models performance. Moreover, the UIP has a strong
implication on the cross-country di¤erential in monetary stances it e¤ectively
demonstrates that the di¤erence between monetary policy rates in two coun-
tries will be reected in a bilateral exchange rate di¤erential. Pippenger (2013)
suggested that these two puzzles can be explained by a combined e¤ect from
monetary policy and the covered interest parity. More interestingly, Backus et
al. (2010) restated UIP in terms of monetary policy, in particular the domestic
and foreign Taylor rules. An asymmetric case (the foreign monetary policy, but
not the domestic monetary policy, reacted to exchange rate variations) was able
to explain the UIP puzzle and yielded a best model performance.
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2.4 Monetary Policy Coordination and Cooper-
ation in the Exchange Rate
2.4.1 Economic Interdependence and its Policy Implica-
tions
Literature on open economy monetary policy often emphasises the importance
of exchange rate by its role as trade facilitator and destabiliser. Therefore to
some extent, the presumption of these analyses is monetary independence among
economies similar to what is pointed out by Hamada (1976) that traditional
approaches normally assume the monetary policies of other countries as given or
take the international cooperation of monetary policies for granted. Nevertheless,
the complication of designing monetary policy in an open economymay be beyond
the exchange rate impact dimension.
Interdependence among economies emerged gradually and vastly as exchange
rate regimes were switched and the phenomenon of globalisation became wide-
spread. Cooper (1969) referred economic interdependence as marginal propen-
sities to import and the interest sensitivity of international capital movements.
Hamada (1976) also summarised two channels of economic interdependence: the
world ination is weighted average of credit expansion of all economies; and one
countrys decit is made up by another countrys surplus. More specic to mone-
tary policies, existence of such macroeconomic interdependence is translated into
monetary interdependence that challenges monetary authorities in designing and
conducting monetary policies.
Foremost, potential feedback responses from foreign CBs have crucial im-
plications for domestic policy design in response to both domestic and foreign
shocks. In particular, impacts that a small open economy may receive from pol-
icy changes in large or closely traded counterparties and the extent to which
monetary spillovers can impede the e¤ectiveness of domestic policies are heavily
studied. In addition, heterogeneity in monetary policy stances may lead to mon-
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etary spillovers, and hence, ine¢ ciency in conducting domestic monetary policy
without international monetary cooperation or coordination. Empirically, per-
sistent undervaluation of currency is supportive to domestic economic growth,
especially for emerging economies; whilst, it is also found to be hindering foreign
counterparties by introducing distortions and weakening policy e¤ectiveness.
In such an increasingly interdependent world, there is an incentive for rational
policymakers to take other countriespolicies into consideration when they design
domestic policies. The concepts of monetary policy non-cooperation, cooperation
and coordination hence arose in response to such intuition. The non-cooperative
policy of an economy, normally referred to as Nash equilibrium, is designed by
policymakers maximising the welfare of their own economy, taking other coun-
triespolicy actions as given. In contrast, cooperation often refers to two or more
economies to decide jointly on policies that will be conducted in all of the collab-
orated countries using strategic game theory, it is designed by the policymakers
to jointly maximise a weighted average of their individual welfares(Canzoneri
and Henderson, 1991).
The distinction between coordination and cooperation maybe ambiguous within
the literature they appear interchangeable sometimes. Or more broadly, coordi-
nation also refers to the entire subject area. Cooper (1969) referred coordination
to the extent that policymakers take into account the objectives and prospective
actions of other policymakers. Even for independent policymakers, there are
unavoidable game aspectsin designing their own policies due to macroeconomic
interdependence, regardless of whether or not an explicit agreement is settled
and regardless of whether they participate in the game willingly or unwillingly.
Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) described coordination as choosing one solution
in the entire set of multiple cooperative game solutions. Despite such ambiguity,
it is greatly debated by academics and policymakers whether or not monetary
coordination or cooperation is necessary and whether or not such coordination
or cooperation is welfare-improving.
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2.4.2 First Generation Models for Monetary Cooperation
and Coordination
The rst generation of models for monetary policy cooperation mostly started
in the 1970s when the oating exchange rate was popularised. Strategic game
models were adopted and some theoretical support for the necessity of monetary
policy coordination was found. Externalities or spillover, generated by imple-
mentation of certain policies in one economy on its foreign counterparties, were
the core of the arguments. Being the earliest analytical study, Hamada (1976)
showed that aggravation of world ination occurred under both xed and oat-
ing exchange rate, although the underpinning of such a phenomenon di¤ers 
the preference of monetary authority leaned towards overall account decit in
the former case, while towards current account surplus in the latter case. Oudiz
and Sachs (1984) made new progress in their attempt to quantify welfare gains
from coordination in a game theory framework. Their overall ndings were posi-
tive but small 1:5%, or slightly above, of GNP gain as a result of coordinated
expansion.
Canzoneri and Gray (1985), on the other hand, emphasised the importance
of economic structure, in determining gains from policy cooperation. They com-
pared cooperative, Stackelberg and non-cooperative xed-exchange-rate solutions
and concluded that switches of exchange rate regimes might be the result of large
economic structure changes since the early 20th century. In addition to conven-
tional interest rate (capital mobility) and good demand channel (trade), wage
indexation and xed oil price channels were all brought to attention. They ar-
gued that economic structure determined the relative importance of these four
channels in international transmission, and hence, the welfare benet of di¤erent
degrees of cooperation.
Rogo¤ (1985), contradicted with the previous literature and argued that co-
ordination could be counterproductive when coordinating CBs lost credibility to
private sectors. The cooperative agreements mitigate the negative impacts of
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exchange rate depreciation, due to domestic monetary expansion, on either the
domestic or foreign economy. As a result, policymakers have less incentive on
restricting inationary surprises. But instead, unanticipated monetary expan-
sion will be used more frequently in order to systematically boost employment.
The CBs lack of credibility and commitment triggers demand for higher time-
consistent wage, and eventually leads to higher equilibrium ination. Ever since
then, di¤erent counterproductive conditions have been derived. Canzoneri and
Henderson (1991) also presented a third-party model alongside two cooperative
economies, and showed that a coalition might be counterproductive if the third-
party reaction was also considered. In addition, they also found that a trigger
mechanism in repeated games gave policymakers incentives to stick with cooper-
ative agreement, rather than cheating to gain an immediate advantage.
Furthermore, since monetary spillover is the main argument in advocating
policy coordination, it is intuitive in thinking that the larger the spillover be-
tween two economies, the stronger the welfare gain from their cooperative poli-
cies. Canzoneri and Minford (1988), however, used the Liverpool World Model,
which incorporated strong economic interdependence, and found empirically that
strong spillover was necessary but not su¢ cient in guaranteeing expected coop-
erative gains. Su¢ ciently large disturbances and certain restrictions on policy
preference were also required.
Henderson and McKibbin (1993), using a multi-region model, carried out em-
pirical comparison of paired monetary policy regimes  an individual country
might be targeting interest rate, money supply, nominal income, combined real
output and ination or nominal exchange rate. The shocks under considera-
tion consisted of three categories money demand, good demand, productivity
shocks  as well as one exchange rate risk premium shock and one global oil
supply shock. The property of these shocks were also extended to be either sym-
metric, asymmetric or country-specic. There were no clear-cut answers on which
policy regime dominated the others  the stabilisation property of each mone-
tary regime varied by wage contracts, shocks and shock properties. Coupled with
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other studies in the book, there was no denitive conclusion on the gains from
policy coordination; rather, it was suggested that gains, and even losses, from
coordination might depend on the policy regime upon which each country was
conducting monetary policy.
This generation of models provided a rationale for monetary policy coordina-
tion, although the nature and extent of gains from coordination was ambiguously
shown. For a thorough understanding of early game-strategic literature, one can
refer to Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), within which a wide range of theoretical
analyses, including both static and dynamic, were taken out. A general empirical
survey on this issue can be found in McKibbin (1997), although the focus was on
industrial economies. It also discussed some studies on the impact of uncertainty
upon coordination gains. The uncertainties, such as in information exchange,
true models and individual policy multipliers, were said to potentially raise the
gains. Yet, an overall empirical evaluation found that the gains from monetary
coordination were quantitatively small.
2.4.3 New Generation Models for Monetary Cooperation
and Coordination
Since the early 2000s, literature has followed recent contributions from the New
Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) and the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models with nominal and real rigidities. The advantage of
this approach stems internally from the characteristics of the model adopted.
Foremost, its microeconomic foundations featured by economic agentsoptimisa-
tion provide structural complications that enrich our understanding of the whole
economy relative to conventional reduced form econometric models and provide
an explicit utility-based welfare framework that enables more comprehensive pol-
icy analysis. Besides, the integration of dynamic general equilibrium and stochas-
tic modelling characterise both intra- and inter-temporal trade-o¤s and enrich the
modelsdynamics without relying on certainty equivalence assumptions.
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Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) were among the earliest to lay down founda-
tions of a new analytical framework for economic interdependence and policy
induced welfare changes. They showed that domestic monetary expansion could
not promise output and employment improvements in an open economy; instead,
Beggar-Thyself might occur when negative TOT deterioration overwhelms posi-
tive current account improvement. This argument was also well specied in their
recent paper Corsetti et al. (2010). The directional movement of e¢ cient exible
price TOT hinges on whether or not  is above or below unity whether home
and foreign goods are complementary or substitutional35. This unconventional
conclusion hence suggests no incentive for competitive devaluation.
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) presented a NOEM model with incomplete inter-
national asset market and wage rigidity. They showed that cooperative monetary
rule is equivalent to Nash equilibrium rules under either separable utility function
with respect to tradable and non-tradable goods or all the shocks are global rather
than country-specic. The implication was that monetary policy is self-enforcing
under those exceptional circumstances, and cooperation can be sustained even
without clear agreements. Di¤ering from conventional arguments, this suggested
that lack of cooperation may not be an issue since country-specic monetary
policies would approximate cooperative outcomes as global market integration
proceeds. This echoed early studies, such as Canzoneri and Minford (1988),
that found cooperative and non-cooperative allocations were clustering or oper-
ationally indistinguishable, although there were exceptional cases.
Nonetheless, they also pointed out that the smaller the cross-country mone-
tary spillover, the less need there is for policy cooperation. As covariance, which
was absent in the conventional certainty equivalence modelling, appeared in TOT
and consumption spending. Monetary policies directly a¤ected consumption
through agentsexpectations and attitude towards risk (presented by the covari-
ance term)36. The monetary authorities, hence, have an incentive to manipulate
35Additionally, it is also shown that output spillover is not entirely neutralised even with
 = 1, since preference shocks have a separate channel from TOT transmission.
36Recent empirical discussions on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy and time-
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the exchange rate, TOT or global demand gap, which reduces covariance between
world demand and exchange rate, for pure domestic benets at the expense of
other economies the Beggar-Thy-Neighbour issue.
Benigno and Benigno (2003), in contrast, argued that conditions for non-
cooperative monetary policies to coincide with e¢ cient policy, or exible price
allocation, were more stringent. Their main arguments lied in what was also
echoing the ndings in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) that independent policymak-
ers had an incentive to implement Beggar-Thy-Neighbour policy, unless there
was strict assumptions on policymakerspreference. In a closed economy, ex ante
policy commitment is su¢ cient in avoiding the Barro-Gorden argument of ina-
tionary bias; whilst in an open economy, there is an incentive for policymakers to
exploit TOT volatility in correcting cross-country production di¤erentials, and
even to create negative externality on other counterparties. Therefore, unless the
TOT channel is ine¤ective or domestic economy is invariant to TOT variations37,
there are potential gains by cooperative policies even when the global good and
nancial markets are integrated and exchange rate pass-through is complete.
Note that, in spite of the minor impact from international preference shock
di¤erential, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products ex-
hibits crucial role in determining welfare gains from coordination. As criticised
by Sutherland (2004), restriction of unity elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods  in some studies potentially ruled out the expenditure switch-
ing e¤ect and restricted the role of nancial markets in analysis of welfare gains
from coordination. They, therefore, used second-order approximation to derive
explicit policy rules and corresponding welfare gains from a model with non-
unity assumption on elasticity of substitution between home and foreign prod-
ucts. They suggested that when  was greater than unity, increasing in particular,
varying risk-aversion are supportive to such an argument.
37When the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign products is  = 1, the TOT
channel becomes ine¤ective since there is no home bias in creating global demand imbalance.
When  =  1, (the inverse of intertemporal consumption substitution, or  = 1) cooperation
is self-enforcing since domestic output is the only condition needed to gain equilibrium solution.
These two conditions were also shown in Corsetti et al. (2010).
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the existence of the nancial market exaggerated spillover e¤ects. The extent of
gain, however, was shown to be sensitive to nancial market structure whether
trade of asset took place before or after policy in their case.
Canzoneri et al. (2005) also pointed out the missing TOT externality in the
model potentially limited the scope and extent of gains from policy coordination.
By examining models in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(2000), they asserted that gains from coordination might be of more importance
in models of a new generation relative to the rst generation. This general view on
new generation models contradicted the view of the rst generation models that
their structure has limited the gains from coordination (Canzoneri and Minford,
1989).
As presented in Corsetti et al. (2010), either incomplete exchange rate pass-
through or incomplete risk sharing could create disturbances in exchange rate,
TOT and global demand in adjustment to an e¢ cient level. Under incomplete
exchange rate pass-through, there is an additional trade-o¤ between stabilising
cross-border output di¤erentials and domestic output gap and ination; while
under an incomplete global nancial market, there is an additional trade-o¤ be-
tween stabilising domestic ination and global demand imbalance. Similarly,
these international trade-o¤s can emerge when decentralised policymakers export
externality of domestic policy impacts, for instance, competitive devaluation in
an attempt to boost the domestic economy. In either case, the design of open
economy monetary policy hence requires attention on correcting global misalign-
ments in addition to deviation of international relative price, such as exchange
rate or TOT, to its e¢ cient level. Therefore, monetary policy coordination is
potentially welfare-improving, except for some special cases presented earlier in
this section, such as assumption of  = 1 and global symmetric shocks.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has given a rough review on the importance of the exchange rate
and its volatility in the modern global economy with integrated markets, capital
mobility and macroeconomic spillovers. The rst half reviewed the crucial role of
the exchange rate and its associated risk in deciding macroeconomic variables.
The initial argument is that changes in the value of the exchange rate in-
duce expenditure-switching. However, the extent or even the existence of the
expenditure-switching e¤ect relies heavily upon exchange rate pass-through. Since
empirical evidence is not supportive to complete pass-through, the impact of
changing the exchange rate value on macroeconomic variables cannot reach a
denitive conclusion. The exchange risk, or volatility of exchange rate attracts
more attention since the new generation of general equilibrium models, NOEM
and DSGE models, become prevailing tools in analyses. Even though these mod-
els can incorporate exchange risk into their comprehensive structure, the impact
of exchange risk remains ambiguous.
The second half of this chapter turned to explore the role of exchange rate in
designing monetary policy in an open economy context. The globalisation and
integration of the market facilitate international spillover and promote macroeco-
nomic interdependence. The additional trade-o¤ that a monetary authority may
confront in designing monetary policy implies a need for policies to react, or even
target the exchange rate. The reactions of monetary policy to exchange rate can
take multiple forms either to real or nominal exchange rates, and either to level
or change of exchange rate and either to the contemporaneous or lagged values.
The empirical evidence suggests that some countries do take actions in response
to exchange rate in some forms. Yet welfare analyses give rather ambiguous
implications.
Again, it is inconclusive whether monetary cooperation and coordination are
welfare-improving. The rst generation model calls for monetary coordination
due to the externalities that maybe generated by decentralised policies, but leaves
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a rather controversial conclusion that gains from monetary coordination marginal
marginal. The second generation model, using NOEM and DSGE models, reveals
explicitly the international misalignments that may hinder international relative
price from adjusting to its e¢ cient level, and cause economic resources to deviate
from exible price allocation. That is to say, the comprehensive structure of
a new generation model permits larger, but still uncertain, welfare gains from
coordination.
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Chapter 3
Methodology and Benchmark
Model
3.1 The Method of Indirect Inference
3.1.1 Indirect Inference Estimation
Modern macroeconomics incorporates an enormous amount of complexity into
modelling, causing computational di¢ culties. For instance, intractability of the
likelihood function can potentially weaken the e¢ ciency of estimating model pa-
rameters. Much literature has taken the approach of replacing the criterion by
either an approximation of the exact likelihood function, or the exact likelihood
function of a model approximation, while other researchers are devoted to nding
an alternative.
Earlier attempts include, for example McFadden (1989), which introduced the
Method of Simulated Moment (MSM). He argued that when the moment condi-
tion cannot be evaluated directly, a Monte Carlo simulated moment condition can
be used instead. Smith (1993) compared Simulated Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
(SQML) with Extended MSM(EMSM), and concluded that although EMSM
was asymptotically more e¢ cient, the requirement of estimating a weighting ma-
trix could compromise the e¢ ciency when the sample size was limited, which is a
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common phenomenon in Macroeconomic studies. Gourieroux et al. (1993), which
was titled Indirect Inference, described in steps how to obtain consistent indirect
estimators and how to conduct signicance tests and hypothesis tests with appli-
cations on various areas. In the recent literature the method of indirect inference
estimationhas been used in model estimation to some extent. Canova (2005)
summarised the simulation estimatorfollowing the GMM estimator, with de-
tailed discussion on its asymptotic properties and various applications.
Estimations using indirect inference choose a set of parameters to simulate
data from a macroeconomic model. The simulated data are then compared to
the actual observations using the chosen auxiliary model, which produces certain
criterions on both simulated data and actual data. The optimal parameter set is
the one that can minimise the distance between simulated data and actual data,
represented by a statistical measurement such as Wald statistics. Indirect infer-
ence estimation requires neither a tractable likelihood function, nor a complete
set of time series involved in the model1.
Assuming a set of parameters , which takes the form of k1 vector, the struc-
tural model can generate a vector of time series xt ()m1, where t = 1; : : : ; T ,
m is the number of variables. The set of variables in xt () can be selected vari-
ables, instead of the entire variable set included in the model specication. Let
yt (t = 1; : : : ; T ) represent an m1 vector of corresponding observed time series.
Assuming that both xt () and yt are stationary and ergodic, there is a unique
set of parameters 0 with which these two vectors of time series have identical
conditional stationary distributions. Accordingly, if we choose a particular den-
sity function, corresponding to which an auxiliary modelf is then chosen, the
conditional density functions can be shown identically:
f [xt (0) ; S] = f [yt; T ]
1More discussion on the advantages over the GMM estimation in the cases of missing data
and unobserved shocks can be found in Canova (2005).
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where S and T are parameter vectors of the auxiliary model (the auxiliary
parameter vectors/sets) corresponding to simulated data xt (0) and actual data
yt, respectively.
S and T can then be estimated using Maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE):
^S ()  argmax
2
LS [xt () ;S]
^T  argmax
2
= LT [yt;T ]
Dene an n1 vector of function g (^T ) and g (^S ()) , which are the measure-
ments we use to compare the distance between the auxiliary parameters obtained
from actual data and the auxiliary parameters obtained from simulated data2.
And let GT (^T ) = 1T
PT
t=1 g (^T ) and GS [^S ()] =
1
S
PS
s=1 g [^S ()]. Hence,
EMSM estimator 0 can be achieved by minimising the distance between ^S and
^T , which can be measured by fGT (^T ) GS [^S ()]g:
~0  argmin fGT (^T ) GS [^S ()]g0WT fGT (^T ) GS [^S ()]g
where WT is an n n positive denite weightingmatrix.
3.1.2 Indirect Inference for Model Evaluation
The method that is used to evaluate models comes from the same root as indirect
inference estimation, but di¤ers in the sense that it is taking indirect inference
from the aspect of appraising how well the calibrated model can replicate actual
data, or how close actual data are to the simulated data. That is, instead of
nding a parameter set that enables the structural model to simulate data closer
to actual observations, the indirect inference model evaluation takes the structural
2Note that, this vector of function g () can be any functional forms that is focused in a
research, such as the moments, the impulse response functions, the autocorrelations or the
coe¢ cients produced by the auxiliary model, as long as the function is continuous and the pa-
rameters are identiable. (See Canova (2005) for more discussion of the problems in identifying
parameters)
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model parameter  as given, either calibrated in previous studies or estimated
from other estimation methods, and simulates a certain number of sets of data.
Given the stationary and ergodic assumptions of actual and simulated data,
the auxiliary parameter set derived from simulated data and the auxiliary para-
meter set derived from actual data are of the same distribution. Therefore, the
Wald Statistic (WS) and the Mahalanobis Distance (MD) are both suitable in
assessing the distance between these two sets of parameters.
The hypothesis of indirect inference model evaluation is that if the structural
model is correctly specied, the set of parameters obtained from auxiliary model
f based on the model-simulated data should not signicantly di¤er from those
obtained from auxiliary model f based on actual data. Put di¤erently, the Wald
statistic or the Mahalanobis distance used to measure the distance between pa-
rameter sets can also be interpreted as a numerical indication of the models
performance, as they both give statistical measurements of the closeness between
the data replicated from the structural model and actual data.
To test the performance of a particular macroeconomic model, the specic
set of model parameters  is taken as calibrated or partially estimated by other
methods. Vector-bootstrapping of exogenous model innovations are carried out
in order to replicate the exogenous shock prole over the sample period. For each
vector-bootstrapped sample, one dataset is simulated from the structural model,
and so is an auxiliary parameter set ^S;n
 


, where n = 1; : : : ; N is the total
number of bootstraps. The bootstrapped mean of the matching function can be
dened as GS

^S
 


= 1
N
PN
n=1 g

^S;n
 


. Meanwhile, GT (^T ) = g (^T ) is
obtained by applying the auxiliary model to actual data. The Wald statistic,
which is the square of the Mahalanobis distance, can be presented as:
WS =

GT (^T ) GS

^S
 

	0
W
 

 
GT (^T ) GS

^S
 

	
The following section explains in steps how theWald test is implemented using
the vector-bootstrapped exogenous innovations of the structural model and the
57
chosen auxiliary model.
 Step 1: Derive structural errors and estimate exogenous innovations using
the observed data and .
Derive structural errors "it, where i = US;EA, from the structural model given
observed data and the structural parameter set . For equations not involving
expectations, errors are derived simply by solving the error terms from equations.
For those with expectations, the expectation terms are rst derived using the
instrumental variable procedure, followed by solving the error term as normal.
The distributions of the structural error are not necessarily assumed to be normal.
But given the assumption that e¤ects of the omitted variables are all reected
in these structural errors, empirical distributions of the structural error can then
be given by the structural error we derived. In most cases, structural errors
are assumed to be autoregressive processes, including the SWs models that are
being tested in this paper. Based on the assumption we have made about the
specication of structural errors, exogenous innovations can then be derived as
residuals from either AR (1) or ARMA (1; 1) regressions.
 Step 2: Simulate data using the structural model and bootstrapped exoge-
nous innovations
To generate N sets of simulated data, N sets of vector-bootstrapped exoge-
nous innovations need to be drawn following the procedures described in step 1.
In order to preserve correlations among exogenous innovation, this thesis adopts
the vector-bootstrapping method, rather than the bootstrapping of individual
exogenous innovation. In vector-bootstrapping, because it is the time line that
is being bootstrapped, exogenous innovations are kept in line with each other at
each time period; thus, the empirical distributions of each shock are preserved.
The model with the given structural parameters is solved and represented as a
V AR(1) using Dynare. And hence, N sets of simulated data are synthesised by
combining the V AR(1) representation of the structural model, a set of initial
values, and N sets of vector-bootstrapped exogenous innovations.
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 Step 3: Estimate using the auxiliary model and calculate Wald statistics
and normalised Mahalanobis distances
Auxiliary parameters that reect datas dynamic properties, are estimated
by applying the auxiliary model, V AR (1), to a dataset. That is, the auxiliary
parameters obtained from actual data ^T can be estimated by applying V AR (1)
to a set of actual data. The auxiliary parameters obtained from simulated data
^S can be estimated by applying V AR (1) to a set of simulated data.
Alternative auxiliary parameters, such as the moment conditions of time se-
ries, are also considered in this study. More specically, for analysing datas
volatility property, variances of the selected time series are also included in the
auxiliary parameter vectors ^T and ^S.
As discussed earlier, the objective function g (), whose distance is being
minimised, can vary. In this study, the comparison is based on the V AR (1)
coe¢ cients and variances of time series that represent properties of either ac-
tual data or simulated data. That is, g (^T ) = ^T , g

^S
 


= ^S
 


, where
S
 


= 1
N
PN
n=1 ^S;n
 


is the mean of N auxiliary parameter sets derived from
N simulated datasets.
Hence, the distance between the auxiliary parameter vector of actual data
and the auxiliary parameter vector of simulated data (the mean) is
GT (^T ) GS

^S
 


= ^T   S
 


.
Furthermore, the optimal weighting matrixW
 


is taken as the inverse of the
covariance matrix estimated directly from simulated data, which can be shown
as:
W
 

 1
=
1
N
NX
k=1
(^k   k)0 (^k   k) (3.1)
where k = 1N
PN
k=1 ^k is the mean of the coe¢ cients across all simulated samples.
For a particular coe¢ cient a 2 ^S, a collection of the value ak (where k =
1; : : : ; N) reects the sampling variation by the structural model with regard to
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this particular coe¢ cient. Hence, the vector of coe¢ cient ^k (k = 1; : : : ; N)
represents the sampling variation across all coe¢ cients by the structural model.
Hence, the actual Wald statistic measuring the distance between actual data
and the mean of simulated data is calculated as
WST =

^T   S
 

0
W
 

 
^T   S
 


(3.2)
Accordingly, the corresponding Mahalanobis Distance is written as
MDT =
q
[^T   S()]0W ()[^T   S()] (3.3)
Similarly, the Wald statistic measuring the distance between one bootstrap-
simulated dataset and the mean of simulated data is
WSS;n = [^S;n   S()]0W ()[^S;n   S()], (3.4)
where n = 1; : : : ; N . And the corresponding Mahalanobis Distance is:
MDS;n =
q
[^S;n   S()]0W ()[^S;n   S()] (3.5)
AWald statistic percentile measured by P (WSS < WST ) is shown to indicate
the probability that a model is not rejected by indirect inference:
Wald Percentile =
number of WSS less than WST
total number of WSS
(3.6)
Additionally, for a better representation of the closeness between actual data
and the simulated mean, a normalised Mahalanobis Distance (normalised MD)
is computed alongside the Wald statistic percentile. The Wald statistic, which is
the square of the Mahalanobis distance, follows a 2 distribution. As the degree
of freedom gets large, it can be approximately normalised to have unit variance
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(Fisher ,1928)3. Hence, the normalised MD is presented as
normalised MD =
p
2MD2T  
p
2n  1q
2MD2S;95%  
p
2n  1
 1:645 (3.7)
where MDS;95% is the value of the Mahalanobis distance corresponding to the
95% tail in the simulated distribution of MDS; n is the degree of freedom. This
presentation ensures the normalised MD is 1.645 when MDT coincides with the
95% critical value of the simulated distribution.
3.2 Two-country Model of the US and the EA
The purpose of this study is to nd out whether there is signicant evidence of
monetary policy coordination between the US and the EA, two large economic
blocs in the world. Our benchmark non-coordination model is a US-EA two-
country model adopted from Le et al. (2010)4. They constructed the model by
putting two individual models of the EU (SW, 2003) and the US (SW, 2007)
together, leaving out the Rest of the World (ROW). By doing this, uctuations
of key macroeconomic factors from the ROW form part of the shocksto the US
and EA economies. For instance, exports to the ROW enter the residual term
in the US market clearing equation; and hence are explained as a demand shock
from the ROW to the US economy. Thus it is expected that the correlation
between shocks is amplied due to the fact that a quarter of the world economy
is missing in the model. While this leaves room for the further completion and
3Fisher ,1928 stated that given large degrees of freedom, a 2 distribution can be transformed
into a standard normal distribution using the expression
p
22 p2n  1. Wilson and Hilferty
(1931) also showed that 3
q
2
n is normally distributed with mean 1  29n and variance 29n .
The formation being used in this paper follows Fishers expression. In some cases where
Wilson and Hilfertys expression is used, they would be indicated by WH.
4Note that, SW (2003), Meenagh et al. (2009) and Le et al. (2010) all named the European
counterpart as the EU model, although the data they used were the Euro Area aggregates.
This study will continue to use EUwhen referring to their models. However, the model used
in this study will be referred to a US-EA two-country model for distinguishing from the EU
27-country aggregate.
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improvement of the model, it does simplify the problem we are nding evidence
that is consistent with the existence of monetary coordination between these two
economic blocs.
3.2.1 Smets and WoutersEU and US models
SWs EU and US DSGE models are applications of the Real Business Cycle
(RBC) model with a twist of the New Keynesianliterature. Households max-
imise an intertemporal utility function with separable consumption, labour, and
real money balance5. Also, they act as labour suppliers in the market with a
certain degree of monopoly power. Finally, for deciding the level of investments
they maximise an intertemporal objective function by choosing the level of in-
vestments and maintaining a certain level of capital stock. On the producer side,
each economy has a perfectly competitive nal good sector and an intermediate
good market with a continuum of intermediate good producers competing mo-
nopolistically. The aggregate price is then determined by the cost minimisation
in the nal good sector; meanwhile, the law of motion of prices is then given by
the cost minimisation in the intermediate good market.
Some additional elements provide the model with New Keynesianfeatures.
The use of Calvo-style sticky nominal prices and wages implies that households,
which are acting as the labour supplier, can re-optimise the nominal wage once a
wage changing signalis released to them from the market. In such a way, nomi-
nal wages are set in a forward-looking manner, taking account of the probability
of not being able to re-optimise nominal wages in accordance with fundamental
changes for some periods. Otherwise, they adjust the nominal wage according to
the past ination following a partial indexation rule, with which more backward-
looking dynamics is brought into the wage setting strategy. On the production
side, the intermediate goods producers behave similarly, and hence the price
mark-up varies over time with exogenous shocks from the economy. Also, the
5The real money balance is not analysed in this study, therefore it is left out in the model
specication and is not mentioned again in the paper.
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cost of the capital adjustment is more dynamic as it is positively correlated to
the changes in the investment, rather than to the investment level. Furthermore,
the external habit formation smooths consumptions dynamically to be consistent
with empirical ndings of consumption persistency. Finally, the model is closed
by a exible ination-targeting monetary policy rule specied to let the interest
rate respond to current or past ination deviations from a set ination objective.
A certain degree of interest rate smoothing and current output gap is also taken
into account in the policy rule.
The SWs EU (2003) model consists of ten structural shocks  two supply
shocks (a productivity shock and a labour supply shock), three demand shocks
(a preference shock, an investment shock and an exogenous government spending
shock), three cost-pushing shocks (a price mark-up shock, a wage mark-up shock
and a capital risk premium shock) and two monetary policy shocks (a shock to
the ination objective and a shock to the nominal interest rate).
The structural parameters were then estimated using Bayesian estimation on
seven quarterly time series ranging from 1980Q2 to 1999Q4. They formed the
prior information frommicro- or macro-econometric studies for preserving the ex-
plicit link with the previous calibration-based literature. All exogenous innova-
tion variances and coe¢ cients representing the dynamics of structural errors were
also estimated given their own priors. Furthermore, performances of the DSGE
model to a non-theoretical V AR by marginal likelihood and cross-covariance were
compared. The impulse response and the variance decomposition were then used
to identify the main shocks that drive volatility in the Euro Area.
The Bayesian estimators appeared to be reasonable and signicant. High
degrees of price and wage stickiness were required by the model specication
for generating enough data persistency. The model seemed to be able to cap-
ture key features of the EA macroeconomic gures, but only when there were
enough structural shocks for capturing the stochastics. It was not tting the
data cross-variance well, as it produced large cross-covariance error bands. Over-
all, persistent monetary policy shocks had a small output e¤ect, but no liquidity
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e¤ect consistent with the argument in Galí (2002).
In SWs US (2007) model, the number of structural shocks was reduced to
seven a total factor productivity shock, a risk premium shock, an investment-
specic technology shock, a wage mark-up shock, a price mark-up shock, an
exogenous government spending shock and a monetary policy shock. Instead of
detrending data before the estimation, a deterministic growth rate driven by the
labour-augmenting technology was specied in the model. Furthermore, the US
model replaced the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in the intermediate good market and
the labour market by a more general aggregator developed in Kimball (1995).
The structural parameters were then estimated over a period from 1966Q1 to
2004Q4 using the Bayesian method. The performance of the out-of-sample fore-
cast was improved relative to the V AR and BV AR models, which made this
micro-founded DSGE model more suitable for the policy analysis. The model
also required both Calvo sticky price and wage frictions to be high; while partial-
indexations were not necessary in generating the model dynamics. Regarding
real frictions, it was costly to cut down the elasticity of adjustment costs and the
habit formation; while the variable capital utilization was found to play a trivial
role. Moreover, the overall impact from a monetary shock on the output and in-
ation volatility was small, apart from the recession and the following disination
period from the 1970s to early 1980s.
3.2.2 Indirect Inference Testing on SWs EU and USmod-
els
As early experiments that implemented model evaluations using indirect infer-
ence, Meenagh et al. (2009) and Le et al. (2011) evaluated SWs EU and US
model individually. In Meenagh et al. (2009), the SWs EU model was tested
over the sample period of 1970 to 1999 (quarterly) on ve main observables: in-
ation, interest rate, output, investment and consumption. The test focused on
the models dynamic features, that is, only 25 V AR(1) coe¢ cients, but no data
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variances, were taken for computing Wald statistics. Moreover, apart from the
original version of the SW New Keynesian model (SWNK), a version of the New
Classical model (SWNC) was also taken into consideration.
They found that both models performed reasonably well as long as proper
error properties were chosen. When using the scaled down actual disturbances,
both models generated excessive variances but far fewer autocorrelations com-
pared with actual data, although the actual source of the models poor per-
formances di¤ered. The NK model was mainly driven by demand shocks that
limited nominal variations reasonably well, but were not persistent enough to
generate the datas dynamics. On the contrary, the NC model was mainly driven
by supply shocks that transferred too much volatility into nominal variables such
as ination and the nominal interest rate. Further study devoted to nding the
optimal combination of SWNK and SWNC models showed a small share of New
Keynesian behaviour in the economy: 8% in the labour market, 6% in the goods
market and 4% in the monetary policy rule. In general, the contradictory results
between using Bayesian estimated errors and model-derived actual errors, as well
as the relative success of the mixed model, called for further work on the model
specication.
Le et al. (2011) provided an indirect inference model evaluation on SWs US
model over the post-war period of 1947Q1-2004Q4 with more detailed robustness
checks. Various detrending methods were used to test the impact of these meth-
ods on the testing result. The ndings conrmed that the choice of detrending
methods did not create signicant divergence, and thus linear-detrending was
used for keeping ltered information at least. Both the New Classical (SWNC)
and the New Keynesian (SWNK) versions of the SW models were tested, but
results were discouraging. Again, corresponding to the ndings in Meenagh et
al. (2009), a hybrid model, a weighted combination of the SWNC model and the
SWNK model, was then tested based on the discussion that the NK model failed
to deliver enough nominal variations while the NC model did the opposite.
They found that optimal weights for the NK model are 0.1 in the wage setting
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equation and 0.2 in the price setting equation. The US market showed stronger
stickiness than the EU market, but in general, the overall evidence indicated
that markets behave predominantly in a New Classical way. Although the hybrid
model was 100% rejected by full Wald statistics (for both dynamics and volatil-
ity), the same as the SWNC and SWNK were, the normalised MD indicated a
substantial improvement in the models capability of replicating data dynamics.
The result, however, favoured the high degree of nominal rigidity in a way dis-
cussed earlier that limited nominal variations in the NK model, which helped to
t in with the Great Moderationquite well.
3.2.3 US-EU Two-Country DSGE Model
Based on the previous testing on two individual models, Le et al. (2010) presented
a two-country model and performed the indirect inference model evaluation on
the two-country model. The model linked the US and the EU regions using trade
and the exchange rates while exogenising ROWs economic activities. Hence,
statistically one quarter of the World GDP was left unconstructed, and ROWs
economic uctuations were treated exogenously as part of the error term in the
structural model. A summary of factors that combine two individual models into
one is presented below.
First, households from both economies are able to choose their consumption
bundles over home and foreign goods according to the relative price. By allowing
arbitrage, the real exchange rate reects the same home-to-foreign good price in
each country. An identical CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function for
consumption, which consists of home and foreign goods from each economy, takes
the form of an Armington (1969) aggregator
Ct =

!
 
Cdt
 
+ (1  !) & t

Cft
 (  1)
(3.8)
where Cdt and C
f
t are the domestic consumption of home and foreign goods, re-
spectively; ! and (1  !) are weights of home and foreign goods in the consump-
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tion composite; the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
is  = 1
1+
; and & t is the preference error. The households therefore maximise
the consumption composite with respect to choices of home goods (Cdt ) and for-
eign goods (Cft ), given that the total expenditure on consumption ( ~Ct) has been
chosen over the trade-o¤ between consumption and leisure. Dene P dt as the
domestic good price in the domestic market, P ft as the foreign good price in the
domestic market, and Pt as the general price level in the domestic market; the
total amount of goods consumed by an economic agent can be represented by
~Ct =
P dt
Pt
Cdt +
P ft
Pt
Cft , which can also be expressed as
~Ct = p
d
tC
d
t + qtC
f
t (3.9)
where pdt =
P dt
Pt
is the relative price of domestic goods to the general price level;
and qt =
P ft
Pt
is the relative price of foreign goods in the home currency to the
general price level. The maximisation expresses the home demand for home goods
and foreign goods as equation 3.10 and 3.11
Cdt
Ct
= !
 
pdt
 
(3.10)
Cft
Ct
= [(1  !) & t] q t (3.11)
Hence, the consumption budget can be represented as:
1 = !
 
pdt

+ [(1  !) & t] qt (3.12)
A logarithmic approximation of the consumption budget is
log pdt =  

1  !
!

log (qt)  1


1  !
!

log & t + const (3.13)
Second, the existence of the foreign bonds market gives the Uncovered Interest
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Parity (UIP)
rt + Et ln "t+1   ln "t = rft (3.14)
Subtracting the expected ination, we obtain the uncovered interest parity in
real terms. That is, the di¤erential between home and foreign real interest rates
reects the expected change in the real exchange rate.
rrt + Et lnQt+1   lnQt = rrft (3.15)
where rrt and rrft are the real interest rates in the domestic and foreign economies,
respectively.
The linearised model was tested using indirect inference over a period of
1975Q1 to 1999Q2. A V AR(1) in eight variables, including output, ination
and interest rate from each region, real exchange rate, and US-EU trade balance,
was formed as an auxiliary model representing key macroeconomic behaviour of
the open economy. As noted that neither the SWNKmodel nor the SWNCmodel
performed well in previous studies, the test on the two-country model focused on
the weighted model combining both the NK and the NC features in the price set-
ting equation, the labour supply equation and the monetary policy rule in each
region. The weights of New-Keynesian behaviour in the price-setting, the labour
supply and the monetary policy were 0:2, 0:1 and 0 for the US and 0:06, 0:08 and
0:04 for the EU, respectively. The complete model is shown in Appendix B6.
The weighted model showed better performance of matching data variances.
Although it was fully rejected byWald test statistics (including the data dynamics
and volatility), the average t-test Wald statistic (the normalised MD) indicated
substantial closeness of model-simulated data to actual data. The supply shocks,
especially the productivity shock and the labour supply shock were the main
resource for macroeconomic variations. It is worth noting that the EU economy,
especially EU ination, was much more sensitive to monetary shocks; on the
6The price setting equation, the labour supply equation and the monetary policy rule are
shown in a New-Keynesian style.
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contrary, monetary shocks only had trivial impacts on the US output and interest
rate, and slightly more impact on ination. It was due to the fact that elasticities
of the interest rate in the EA monetary policy rule declined largely under the NC
setting, which was the dominant behaviour in the weighted model. The inuences
on the interest rate were not as diversied as the original SWs EU model; hence,
monetary shocks stood out as a major contributor to variations in the interest
rate and ination.
Surprisingly, the model showed few cross-country interaction, that is, domestic
shocks mostly only a¤ected the domestic economy in a similar way to a closed
economy. The supply shock, particularly in the US, contributed predominately
to variations in the real exchange rate and the trade balance. But clearly, in each
of the economies, the transmission of uctuations in the real exchange rate and
the trade balance to other macro-variables was not bi-directional as we thought it
would be. A negative supply shock in the US economy causes a real appreciation
in the US dollar, represented as a real exchange rate increase; and thus, the EA
trade balance is positively a¤ected, mainly by a foreign demand shock. It was
noted that the economy predominantly behaves in a NC style, and demand shocks
have little inuence; therefore, this foreign demand shock may be absorbed by
changes in the consumption composite, but not transmitted into uctuations in
the EA output, ination or interest rate.
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Chapter 4
Testing the US-EA Two-Country
DSGE Model Using Indirect
Inference - Does Monetary Policy
Coordination Matter?
4.1 Introduction
Issues in monetary policy coordination have always been revisited, as globalisa-
tion has deeply planted the thought of interaction between economies in our mind.
The existence of macroeconomic interdependence undoubtedly requires policy-
makers to take other economiespolicy actions into account when they design
domestic macroeconomic policies. It is intuitive to think that the decentralised
and independent policymakers will not internalise their policy externalities; thus,
macroeconomic policy coordination may be welfare-improving in terms of its abil-
ity to internalise policy externalities and to achieve joint welfare-improvement.
The majority of the literature focuses on welfare changes from a non-cooperative
(non-coordinated) to a cooperative (coordinated) world, yet neither theoretical
nor empirical studies since the 1970s have given a denitive answer.
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On the other hand, the existence of monetary coordination is di¢ cult to iden-
tify since it is more likely to be embedded in the CBsactions or monetary policy
rules implicitly. After all, even without an explicit agreement, policymakers will
inevitably engage in some sort of strategic gamewillingly or unwillingly. This
study would like to test its existence by comparing the performance the models
with and without monetary coordination based on a well-developed, two-country
DSGE model of the United States (US) and the Euro Area (EA). The mone-
tary policy coordination, referring to the interdependence between economies,
is represented by direct responses of the monetary instrument to real exchange
rate uctuations. The null hypothesis of monetary coordination existence holds
when the models performance is signicantly improved by the presence of the
monetary instruments direct responses to the real exchange rate.
In an increasingly interdependent world, countries unavoidably respond to
each others situations in a variety of ways  through macroeconomic policies,
trade policies and even retaliatory policies in response to hostile actions by their
counterparties. Monetary authorities, a focus in this study, reveal themselves
through their responses to exchange rate uctuations1. The change in the real
exchange rate, which measures movements in the international relative price and
competitiveness, is a reection of relative fundamental changes in economies. In
spite of the noise that may be contained in exchange rate volatility, a response
of monetary policies to the exchange rate signals a CBs concern regarding the
potential spillover from its counterparties.
Indeed, a monetary policy action can be the result of a CBs optimal coopera-
tive strategies as well as be due to some self-interest-oriented thoughts. However,
the spectrum of these underlying reasons has yet to be clearly identied. There-
fore, instead of those inseparables, the focus of this study is to look for the
evidence of economic interdependence, which involves both types of actions, and
1CBs might respond to the exchange rate in di¤erent manners. Some might have implicit
concerns on exchange rate variations, while others might target the exchange rate explicitly
and even x the exchange rate in extreme cases.
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its impacts on the behaviour of the world economy. The fact that purely self-
oriented actions inevitably a¤ect foreign economic counterparts has potential in
limiting self-oriented actions, and thus ensuring strategic cooperation. Monetary
policy coordination, therefore, is broadly dened in a way that was described
in Cooper (1969); nevertheless, the possibility of self-interest oriented actions
cannot completely rule out.
The two-country DSGE framework is built on the basis of the well-known
papers by Smets and Wouters (hereafter SW, 2003, 2007), in which individual
models of the US and the EA are suggested to be plausible in tting certain fea-
tures of macroeconomic variables. Despite the great advances of DSGE models,
especially the role it has gained in CB policy analyses, its questionable empiri-
cal validation has been largely undermining studies adopting the DSGE frame-
work. In particular, it is argued that DSGE models should not be tested against
their forecasting abilities due to various di¢ culties that can bias the statistical
test towards rejecting the DSGE model2. Furthermore, a subsequent study by
Le, Meenagh, Minford, and Wickens (hereafter Le et al., 2010) suggested that
economies act orthogonally to each other when there are only goods market and
nancial market links. This study intends to build up macroeconomic interdepen-
dence by allowing monetary policy coordination, and to evaluate DSGE models
performance through their ability to replicate actual data properties drawn by an
auxiliary model, rather than through forecasting ability as with the Likelihood
Ratio (LR).
The method used for evaluating DSGE models is drawn from the method of
indirect inference; instead of estimation, it is used as an approach to draw the
classical statistical inference out of a calibrated or an estimated model, while
maintaining key features of actual data. To extract information from actual
2For example, Wickens (2012) suggested that the DSGE model should not be tested through
their forecasting ability, since forward-looking dynamics that are di¢ cult to forecast might
result in over-rejection of the model. Edge and Gurkaynak (2010) also argued that forecasting
ability during the Great Moderation is not a good metric by which to judge models due to the
nature of macroeconomic uctuations that make certain macro-variables unforecastable.
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data, shocks are derived from a structural model given structural parameters
and 17 macroeconomic time series. They are then vector-bootstrapped ensuring
that correlations between shocks are preserved. Indicating the distance between
model-simulated data and actual data, Wald statistics are computed on the basis
of auxiliary parameters (V AR (1) is chosen as an auxiliary model) from actual and
model-simulated data. For overall evaluation of the modelsability to replicate
data dynamics and volatility, V AR coe¢ cients and simulated variances are both
included in computing Wald statistics, while evaluations can also be carried out
to separately account for dynamics or volatility. In addition, the corresponding
normalised Mahalanobis Distance (normalised MD) is shown to give a clear view
on the overall closeness between actual and model-simulated data.
In general, coordination models outperform the baseline non-coordination
model across a large number of variable combinations3, mainly as a result of
the higher prediction precision as well as the lower prediction uncertainty gener-
ated from coordination models. The EAs coordinating policy plays a crucial role
in cutting down volatility across both economies in spite of the trade-o¤s between
degrees of coordination. On the contrary, sole US coordination has no obvious
benet, but might become one of the causes of high exchange rate volatility. It
is also found that model performance deteriorates heavily once the real exchange
rate is included, regardless of the presence of monetary coordination. On the
other hand, inclusion of the real exchange rate sharply widens the performance
gap between coordination and non-coordination models, which implies that the
representation of the exchange rate is essential in improving DSGE model per-
formance.
Moreover, the international transmission mechanism of shocks is enhanced by
the additional exchange rate channel. In particular, the US productivity shock,
price mark-up shock, and government spending shock become largely inuen-
tial to the EA economy. Engaging in monetary coordination can be benecial
domestically and internationally, as it speeds up policy impacts on aggregate
3In total, there are 38 variable combinations drawn from 7 key macroeconomic variables.
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targets, such as ination and output, as well as accommodates shocks and sta-
bilises economies through policy adjustment feedback reected in the exchange
rate. However, the coordinating economy is also more likely to encounter global
uctuations, especially when its counterparties have no intention to demonstrate
policy coordination. On the other hand, an economy with no coordination might
be able to isolate itself from foreign shocks while benet from the fact that the co-
ordinative actions taken by the coordinating economy tend to lower real exchange
rate volatility and act as a stabiliser to some domestic shocks.
4.2 Models in Practice
As discussed previously, the two-country model showed rather weak economic in-
terdependence in terms of its trivial responses of one economy to the shock or the
policy change in another economy. Presumably, given all aspects of globalisation
and the extensive empirical evidence on business cycle comovements, this models
prediction on the correlation between key macroeconomic variables might not be
robust. In the statistical practice, a weak cross-country spillover potentially com-
promises a models performance and may become one of the explanations leading
to the rejection of a model. After all, in order to embrace actual data parameters,
the benchmark model needs to produce really large simulated V AR(1) coe¢ cient
bounds. It, therefore, will be interesting to see whether monetary coordination
can enhance spillovers and improve a models performance in terms of both model
dynamics and volatility.
4.2.1 Monetary Policy Rules
Taylor (1993a) proposed a simple interest rate rule shown to describe the FFR
well for most of the period from the 1980s to early 1990s:
rt = t + 0:5yt + 0:5 (t   2) + 2 (4.1)
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where rt is the FFR; t is the rate of ination over the previous four quarters;
yt is the percent deviation of real GDP from trend real GDP. It is subsequently
adopted in much of the literature as a rule of thumb of monetary policy 
the short-term nominal interest rate systematically responds to real economic
activities and ination.
Extensions of the Taylor rule include adding policy inertia (interest rate
smoothing), adding lead and lag terms of ination and output, or adding the
short-term deviation represented by a rst order di¤erential of ination or output.
Some empirical estimations suggested that the Taylor rule generally represented
CBspolicy, particularly in industrialised economies. Such a conclusion stems
from the observation that interest rates approximately follow a Taylor rule.
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Srinivasan et al. (2002)4, there is an observa-
tional equivalencebetween a Taylor rule and Taylor-typerules. Other economic
relations can potentially resemble the statistical relevance of interest rates, ina-
tion, and the output gap. For example, a money supply rule could give rise to
interest rate behavior that looks like a Taylor rule(Minford et al. , 2002). More
recently, Minford and Ou (2013) showed that the DSGE model with an optimal
timeless rule5 could reproduce the data that resembles a Taylor rule.
That is to say, a Taylor rule cannot distinguish itself from other policy regimes
in terms of the observed interest rate behaviour; and one cannot identify a CBs
policy by simply estimating a single-equation Taylor rule. In practice, although
the representations of the interest rate behaviour remain similar, the underlying
monetary policy regimes are di¤erent, and so are economic agentsbehaviours it
is made clear by Lucas (1976) that the structure of econometric models is altered
as the policy changes. Since the early 1970s, both the US and EA have undergone
a series of changes in the way that the monetary policy is implemented6. In
4A modied version of this paper is published in Economics Letters (Minford et al. , 2002).
5The optimal timeless rule is derived by minimising the social welfare loss function. It
species an implicit instrument rule that achieves the trade-o¤conditional t =   (xt   xt 1).
6For example, the US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) mainly targeted the price
of bank reserves (Federal Funds Target Rate) before 1979. Between 1979 and 1982, the FOMC
targeted the quantity of money (non-borrowed reserves) in order to control ination. In late
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particular, the recent nancial and banking crises have led to variations in the
approach to monetary policy. Put di¤erently, using a Taylor rule to summarise
the US or the EA monetary policy since the 1970s can potentially victimise the
associated analyses by the identication problem or structural changes.
Despite the aforementioned arguments, the use of an extended Taylor rule as
the monetary policy rule can be justied as follows:
First, this study focuses on nding out whether the CBs of the US and EA
directly respond to the real exchange rate, rather than uncovering their exact
monetary policy rules. The Taylor rule, treated as a semi-reduced form of the
policy actions, unveils the macroeconomic interdependence and its associated
policy actions at both the domestic and international levels. From a partial
perspective, the Taylor rule simplies the analysis and enables the focus to be on
the role of the real exchange rate in monetary policy.
Second, DSGE models are built on microeconomic foundations specifying the
technology, resource constraints, and economic agentspreferences; the parame-
ters of a DSGE model are structural. In principle, it is possible to analyse the
evolution of macro-aggregates in response to various shocks and policy changes
using a DSGE model. In other words, the DSGE model, in principle, should not
be subject to the Lucas critique.
4.2.2 Monetary Coordination
Monetary coordination refers to how an economy coordinates its monetary pol-
icy, implicitly or explicitly, with another economy in terms of the real exchange
rate. Changes in economic fundamentals and policies in one country can cause
potential spillovers for its foreign counterparties, particularly when cross-country
interdependence is growing markedly. Monetary authorities inevitably encounter
situations where monetary policies are needed to counteract such cross-country
1982, the FOMC shifted back to target the price of money, while there was also some focus on
the broader monetary aggregate (M2). In the EA, the largest change is the adoption of the euro
and the transition from individual national central banks to a centralised monetary authority
(the ECB).
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impacts. Beyond its appearance, the design of a domestic monetary policy in
an open economy is far more complicated than that within a closed economy
context, as it is also subject to the feedback impacts from foreign counterparties.
Monetary interdependence and its corresponding monetary coordination from
monetary authorities, though sophisticated, can be revealed through the policy
response to the real exchange rate. As a measure of the international relative price
and competitiveness, the real exchange rate unveils relative changes in economic
fundamentals and policy stances between two economies. As a consequence, a
monetary instrument is responding to fundamental and policy changes in the
foreign economy as long as reactions to the exchange rate are included in its rule
under the oating exchange rate regime; or as long as the nominal exchange rate
is aimed to be xed (the xed exchange rate regime). In either case, a monetary
policy can be considered to be game-strategically coordinating in response to the
economic interdependence.
For instance, under the oating exchange rate regime, shocks and policy
changes in one economy will be transferred immediately into real exchange rate
variations. Under the complete pass-through, the real exchange rate moves side
by side with TOT (Equation 2.5); and with the complete risk sharing, the real
exchange rate is determined purely by the cross-country demand di¤erential and
preference shocks (Equation 2.7).
When the completeness of exchange rate pass-through is violated, a wedge
is created between the real exchange rate and the TOT movement  the real
exchange rate contains information on the relative import to export price as well
as possible price misalignments expenditure switching e¤ects are distorted. On
the other hand, with completeness of the international nancial market being
violated, a wedge is created between the real exchange rate and the cross-country
demand di¤erential the real exchange rate contains information of the cross-
country di¤erential for both production and consumption as well as the cross-
country demand misalignment and allocative e¢ ciency of the exchange rate is
distorted. Consequently, a monetary policy that includes responses to the real
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exchange rate ensures the monetary instrument responds to uctuations and pol-
icy changes in the other economy, that is, monetary authorities are coordinating
strategically.
Under a xed-exchange-rate regime, where one country (follower country)
aims to x its nominal exchange rate against another countrys (leader country)
currency, the followers monetary policy is also said to be cooperativeto the
leaders monetary policy. In essence, a pegged-exchange-rate regime is a form of
asymmetric monetary policy cooperation.
Assuming that the log real exchange rate identity holds as Qt = "t + P ust  
P eat , where "t is the nominal exchange rate between the US dollar and the euro
(USD/EUR; the US dollar appreciates when the value of the nominal exchange
rate increases), it can be rewritten in the form of ination as Qt = "t+ ust  
eat , where Qt is the change in the real exchange rate; "t is the change in
the nominal exchange rate and ust = P
us
t and 
ea
t = P
ea
t are US ination
and EA ination, respectively. Since the follower country targets the nominal
exchange rate, di¤erential of the nominal exchange rate is set to be zero ("t = 0),
assuming the nominal exchange rate was at the target rate in the previous period.
Thereby, when the US leads the policy making, EA ination is determined by US
ination and real exchange rate adjustments:
eat = 
us
t  Qt (4.2)
Similarly, when EA is the leader country and US is the follower country, EA acts
as an independent policymaker; hence, US ination follows EA ination and real
exchange rate changes:
ust = 
ea
t +Qt (4.3)
The dynamics of the real exchange rate, thus, demonstrate ination di¤erentials
across two economies. And the follower country cooperates to the extent that its
ination is dependent externally on the leader countrys ination.
Intuitions of monetary coordination can be drawn from both domestic and
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international perspectives. Domestically, it creates an exchange rate channel
that delivers e¤ects of the monetary policy faster than the conventional interest
rate channel7. An attempt to reduce real exchange rate variations driven by
domestic shocks or policy changes may also internalise the associated externalities
to the foreign economy. The less spillover, the less feedback impact from the
foreign economy, and hence the less complication in designing domestic monetary
policies, since international trade-o¤s of an open economy monetary policy are
minimised.
Additionally, in a world of two economies, one economys coordination may
accommodate the impacts of policy changes and shocks from the other economy
more directly and e¤ectively. With the traditional trade channel, an economy
responds to foreign shocks when the spillover appears in domestic variations or
cross-country di¤erentials. Time-lag of the expenditure-switching e¤ect the real
variables need time to adjust potentially slows down, not to mention the fact
that the degree of exchange rate pass-through is still indecisive and that the price
misalignment and demand misalignment are not accounted for. In contrast, an
economy responds to foreign shocks directly when the real exchange rate appears
in the monetary policy rule. Monetary changes associated with the contemporary
changes in the real exchange rate are, hence, able to counteract foreign shocks
prior to the actual impact on the real side of the domestic economy. The stabilised
real exchange rate and the minimised domestic uctuations are, in turn, expected
to mitigate the feedback of domestic policy response and ease stabilisation burden
for the foreign economy.
7For example, Ball (1999b) illustrated this using a simple three-equation open economy
model. The empirical literature also conrms that the monetary policy takes one year to a¤ect
ination through the exchange rate channel, rather than two years through the interest rate
channel.
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Type 1 Model (Benchmark): Non-Coordination Model(NonC)
US rust = 
usrust 1 + (1  us)
h
rus 
us
t + r
us
y

yust   yusft
i
+ rusy

yust   yusft   yust 1 + yusft 1

+ "r;ust
EA reat = 
eareat 1 + (1  ea)
h
rea 
ea
t 1 + r
ea
y

yeat   yeaft 1
i
+ rea
 
eat   eat 1

+ reay

yeat   yeaft   yeat 1 + yeaft 1

+ ";eat
Type 2 Models: Fixed exchange rate with no coordination from dominating country
DOM-2.1 US dominates Model
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Type 3 Models: Coordination Model: C-3.(1 to 11)
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Type 4 Models: Fixed exchange rate with coordination from dominating country
DOM_C-4.(1 to 3) Coordination Model with US domination
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DOM_C-4.(4 to 6) Coordination Model with EA domination
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This table lists the Monetary Policy rules in the NK model;
The actual monetary policy rule in model simulations would be the weighted Taylor rule of the NK and NC models
Table 4.1: Monetary policy rules for testing models
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For example, when a positive total factor productivity shock strikes the US
economy (particularly in the traded good sector), US output is expected to rise
with the higher productivity, while ination may fall on the impact due to lower
marginal costs8. Meanwhile, by the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect, the cross-country
productivity di¤erential implies a US dollar appreciation9. Coupled with the
potential larger increases in the US consumption and investment relative to the
increased output, the US net exports can decline in the short run10.
Such changes in the US translate into the EA economy as a short-run ina-
tionary e¤ect, assuming TOT moves in the same direction with the real exchange
rate, pulling up the short-run EA output, and possibly ination depending on
its trade structure and production capacity. Conventionally, the EA interest rate
will only respond with periods of delay when EA output and ination become
higher. With the direct exchange rate channel, contrarily, the EA interest rate in-
creases in response to a real appreciation of the euro instantaneously, with further
adjustments to be made if the EA economy is still a¤ected by the foreign shocks.
Meanwhile, the EA policy response feeds back to the US economy through the
real exchange rate with a depreciating e¤ect on the US dollar, which counteracts
with the US dollars appreciating trend, and contributes to the stabilisation of
the US economy.
Optimistically, by opening a direct exchange rate channel one can expect
(1), the interaction between economies to be more substantial due to the direct
8In an RBC model with no price and wage rigidities, ination can fall as long as the price
decrease due to lower marginal costs is larger than the real wage increase due to the higher
marginal product of labour. In the presence of wage and price stickiness, producer price ination
experiences a fall on the impact of the productivity shock, due to lower marginal costs. With
a longer time horizon, ination can climb as the real wage is gradually adjusted to the level
consistent with the productivity level.
9Although the empirical analyses found ambiguous evidence for the relation between the
real exchange rate and the cross-country productivity di¤erential, the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect
is the principle hypothesis in the relevant exchange rate literature.
10Backus et al. (1992) extended the closed economy RBC model to an international RBC
model, and showed a sharp decline in net exports in the home economy upon the impact of a
home technology shock. However, it is also shown that after trade frictions are introduced, the
volatility of net exports is less volatile.
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transfer of shocks through real exchange rate variations; and (2), if shocks in one
economy pass-through to the other economy more substantially, the model pre-
dicted variance would decline due to the accommodating e¤ect on both economies.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the exchange rate channel will produce excess
volatility if the interaction is substantially weak.
In the case where exchange rate pass-through is highly incomplete in the US,
EA shocks do not a¤ect US output and ination, since the US import price
is not adjusting at all or su¢ ciently to induce the expenditure-switching e¤ect
(with su¢ ciently low demand elasticity). The immediate interest rate response
to exchange rate changes initiates impacts on the US economy, which need to be
o¤set by subsequent interest rate adjustments. Therefore, the direct exchange
rate channel acts as a good policy channel domestically, but also potentially
exposes the domestic economy to foreign shocks.
Studies often nd that direct responses to the real exchange rate do not sta-
bilise output and ination better, but sometimes even enlarge the variation com-
pared to policy rules that are inward looking. The aim of this study is then
to reconsider the impact of the exchange rate coordination in a more complete
DSGE environment. The Null hypothesis, therefore, can be summarised as data
simulated from coordination models are substantially closer to the actual data,
or equivalently, monetary coordination exists. The potential improvements lie in
the closeness between any of the dynamic, correlation and variance properties in
simulated data and in actual data.
4.2.3 Models
Table 4.1 lists four types of models evaluated in this study non-coordination
(benchmark) model under a oating-exchange-rate context (NonC), xed-but-
adjustable-exchange-rate model with the dominating economy not coordinating
(DOM-2), coordination models under a oating-exchange-rate regime (C-3) and
xed-but-adjustable-exchange-rate model with the dominating country also co-
ordinating (DOM_C-4).
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As introduced in the previous section, the two-country model in Le et al.
(2010) is adopted as a benchmark of the non-coordination model (Model NonC).
First of all, individual models of the US and the EU and the joint US-EU two-
country model have been tested using indirect inference in Meenagh et al. (2009),
Le et al. (2011) and Le et al. (2010). The experimental practices provide some
useful directions on the choices of method over various aspects, such as choices
of detrending method, testing time ranges, and possible weights attached to the
NK economy and the NC economy. Second, although ndings in Le et al. (2010)
showed substantial closeness between model-simulated data and actual data in
a two-country DSGE model compared to individual country models, some is-
sues still remain unsolved, such as the surprisingly weak interaction between the
two countries. Such a weak link is not supported by the empirical evidence or
the real world observations, particularly during a period of widespread nancial
crisis and the disastrous aftermath across industries and the globe. The well-
established DSGE framework and those previous conclusions potentially facilitate
experiments in this study that are aiming to identify missing links.
The non-coordination benchmark model (NonC) is a simple oating-exchange-
rate open economy DSGE model, within which economies set up monetary policy
rules that are consistent with their own interests11, but have no response to
the real exchange rate at all. And hence, both economies would have to react
to foreign economic uctuations transited via the weak link of cross-country
demand di¤erential and UIP, but would not coordinate in the real exchange rate
11Taken from SW (2003), the EA monetary policy instrument (the short-term EA real interest
rate) is a function of an interest rate smoothing term, a lagged ination deviation from the
ination target, an output gap between the current output and the output that prevails in
the corresponding exible economy, a short-term ination deviation featuring the di¤erence
between the current and lagged ination rate, and a short-term output gap featuring the change
of current output gap from the previous period.
Taken from SW (2007), the US monetary policy rule is slightly di¤erent. The US monetary
policy instrument (the short-term US real interest rate) is a function of an interest rate smooth-
ing term, an ination deviation from the ination target, an output gap between the current
output and the output that prevails in the corresponding exible economy, and a short-term
output gap featuring the change of current output gap from the previous period.
The mathematical expressions of the monetary policy rule in the US and the EA are shown
in Appendix B2.
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for potential stabilisation e¤ects.
The second type of model (DOM-2) is under a xed-but-adjustable-exchange-
rate regime, where the leader country species a monetary policy rule in ac-
cordance with its own domestic interests, whilst the follower country insists on
a xed-but-adjustable-exchange-rate policy with an objective to x the nominal
exchange rate against the leader countrys currency. Notably, although the leader
operates under a oating-exchange-rate regime, the design of its monetary policy
excludes policy reactions to the real exchange rate. Technically, this is a coop-
erative model with the follower country cooperating entirely with the leader
countrys policy stance. Even so, this cooperative commitment di¤ers from the
type of coordination this study is investigating monetary policy rules that are
designed to respond to real exchange rate uctuations. Models tting into this
category are, therefore, coded by DOM-2, indicating their one country domi-
nationand no response to the real exchange rate by the dominating country
setting.
In particular, model DOM-2.1 is a US domination model, where the US as a
leader sets its monetary policy rule according to its own interests to the ination
target and output gap, whilst the EA ination adjusts in a way that the nominal
exchange rate can be restored to the target rate. A shock in the US makes US
ination and the real exchange rate uctuate, while EA ination is determined
entirely by US ination and real exchange rate di¤erentials. On the other hand,
as the EA economy has no monetary independence, it cannot self-accommodate
domestic shocks using the monetary policy. Thereby, the EA economy can only be
stabilised, if not by other means, by the responsive US ination and real exchange
rate movements. Model DOM-2.2 is an EA domination model, which is the exact
opposite of model DOM-2.1. US ination is determined by the EA ination rate
and the real exchange rate di¤erential. In each model, one monetary policy
shock ("r;ust for the US and "
;ea
t for the EA) is included in the followers ination
determination equation for catching the change in the adjustableexchange rate
target by the follower countrys authority.
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The third type of model is the partial-coordination model (C-3) in a oating-
exchange-rate context, within which both the US and the EA have their indepen-
dent monetary policy rules and may respond to the real exchange rate in di¤erent
ways. In either economy, exchange rate coordination comes into the monetary
policy rule in the form of interest rate responses to the current and past value of
the real exchange rate at various degrees. Impacts from shocks and the di¤erence
of policy responses are then eventually absorbed by the oating exchange rate. A
exible ination-targeting monetary policy consists of the same components as in
the benchmark model, as well as the current and past value of the real exchange
rate.
Four parameters (hus0 ; h
us
1 for the US model and h
ea
0 ; h
ea
1 for the EA model) in
monetary policy rules characterise this coordination feature. hi0 (where i = us; ea)
indicates the elasticity of the instrument rates responses to the contemporaneous
real exchange rate; hi1 (where i = us; ea) indicates the elasticity of the instrument
rates responses to the lagged real exchange rate. In agreement with the rule of
thumb of exchange rate rules in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), hi0 and h
i
1 are both
sign-restricted. An increase in the value of the real exchange rate indicates a real
appreciation of the home currency (the US dollar), or equivalently a real depreci-
ation of the foreign currency (the Euro). Following that, US monetary authority
decreases the interest rate in response to a contemporaneous contractionary im-
pact (i.e. an increase of the real exchange rate Q) and raises the interest rate
against the same real exchange rate change in the following period for o¤setting
the e¤ect from contemporaneous policy responses as such change happens; mean-
while, the EA monetary authority reacts in an opposite manner to the US policy
in response to an increase of the real exchange rate, with which inationary pres-
sure is created for the EA economy. Therefore, the coe¢ cient for the elasticity
of US policy rate responses to the contemporaneous real exchange rate is limited
to be negative (hus0  0), and that to the lagged real exchange rate is limited to
be positive (hus1  0), while the EA counterpart takes a positive value for the
former (hea0  0) and a negative value for the latter (hea1  0), respectively. For
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a CB targeting real exchange rate changes, the absolute values of the elasticity
for contemporaneous and lagged real exchange rate simply need to be set equally
(hus1 =  hus0 ; hea1 =  hea0 ). Moreover, for a non-coordination case to be considered
in such formation, the values of these coe¢ cients simply need to be restricted to
zero (hus0 = h
us
1 = h
ea
0 = h
ea
1 = 0).
Di¤erent calibrations of these parameters distinguish them farther from each
other within one category of coordination model. There are eleven models (see
Table 4.2) in this category, including three US coordination onlymodels (Model
C-3.1 to C-3.3), three EA coordination onlymodels (Model C-3.4 to C-3.6), three
both US and EA coordination (to the same degree, hus0 = h
ea
0 and h
us
1 = h
ea
1 )
models (Model C-3.7 to C-3.9) and two models in which both the US and the
EA coordinate but to di¤erent degrees (Model C-3.10 and C-3.11). The reason
for this wide selection of coordination models lies in the fact that within this
well-developed DSGE framework it is possible to examine the robustness of the
proposed open economy policy rules from a new angle by looking at the closeness
of model-simulated data and actual data. And hence, it would be better to
nd out the possible existence of monetary coordination between economies by
searching across diverse cases.
Models Parameter Combinations
C-3.1 USFull hus0 =  1; hus1 = 1; hea0 = 0; hea1 = 0
C-3.2 USSvensson hus0 =  0:45; hus1 = 0:45; hea0 = 0; hea1 = 0
C-3.3 USTaylor hus0 =  0:25; hus1 = 0:15; hea0 = 0; hea1 = 0
C-3.4 EAFull hus0 = 0; h
us
1 = 0; h
ea
0 = 1; h
ea
1 =  1
C-3.5 EASvensson hus0 = 0; h
us
1 = 0; h
ea
0 = 0:45; h
ea
1 =  0:45
C-3.6 EATaylor hus0 = 0; h
us
1 = 0; h
ea
0 = 0:25; h
ea
1 =  0:15
C-3.7 BothFull hus0 =  1; hus1 = 1; hea0 = 1; hea1 =  1
C-3.8 BothSvensson hus0 =  0:45; hus1 = 0:45; hea0 = 0:45; hea1 =  0:45
C-3.9 BothTaylor hus0 =  0:25; hus1 = 0:15; hea0 = 0:25; hea1 =  0:15
C-3.10 USFull,EATaylor hus0 =  1; hus1 = 1; hea0 = 0:25; hea1 =  0:15
C-3.11 USTaylor,EAFull hus0 =  0:25; hus1 = 0:15; hea0 = 1; hea1 =  1
Table 4.2: A list of exchange rate response coe¢ cients for Type 3 coordination
models
The coordinating parameters here are selected from the early literature that
focused on the role of the exchange rate and had discussed the sensible degrees
of response to real exchange rate changes. The earlier work by Ball (1999b)
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rst introduced a new open economy Taylor rule with responses to real exchange
rate changes. He found the parameter set of h0 =  0:37, h1 = 0:17 to be
optimal in a small open economy with sticky prices12. The following study by
Svensson (2000) found the optimal parameter set to be h0 =  0:45, h1 = 0:45.
Moreover, the result showed the ination variance was narrowed down, but the
output performance deteriorated in terms of having a larger variance. Finally,
a set of coe¢ cients h0 =  0:25, h1 = 0:15 was suggested in Taylor (1999), in
which he examined a Taylor rule within a multi-country framework and found
that adding the real exchange rate would improve some countriesperformances,
while some would deteriorate. An additional pair of parameters h0 =  1, h1 = 1
is also considered in this study central banks have the target interest rate fully
responding to the current real exchange rate but also fully o¤set by the same
amount of adjustment in the subsequent period. Although some empirical studies
have concluded that the macroeconomic performance worsened when CBs reacted
to the exchange rate strongly (Taylor, 1993b, 2001), the importance of the real
exchange rate in the transmission mechanism is undeniable. This study would
like to evaluate the e¤ect of a strong reaction in a DSGE framework, and possibly
identify the cause of the deterioration in the macroeconomic performance.
The fourth category of models is also structured in a xed-but-adjustable-
exchange-rate context (DOM_C-4), in which the leader economy sets the mon-
etary policy rule reacting to common factors such as the output gap and the
ination deviation, as well as the real exchange rate. That is, the leader country
is also coordinating in the means of reacting to the real exchange rate. Mean-
while, the followers interest rate, determined according to the leaders interest
rate, varies to keep the nominal exchange rate stable around a certain target
rate. Therefore, this category of models is coded as DOM_C-4, indicating the
co-existence of cooperation under the xed-exchange-rate policy and coordination
12This study does not report the indirect inference testing result for this set of parameters
as the DSGE models rank condition is not veried given the complete set of parameters used
in this study. Further study for nding whether there is one optimal set of values close to the
nding in Ball (1999b) can be done by using indirect inference estimation.
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through the real exchange rate.
In the rst three of these models (DOM_C-4.1 to DOM_C-4.3), the US
monetary policy rule responds to the real exchange rate with the selected set
of parameters consistent with Type 3 models (model list in Table 4.3), whilst
EA ination follows US ination and the real exchange rate di¤erential13. The
latter three models (DOM_C-4.4 to DOM_C-4.6) are the exact opposite cases,
and have an EA-leader-US-follower type of monetary coordination. Again, one
monetary policy shock is included in each of the followers ination determination
equations for catching changes in the nominal exchange rate target.
Models Parameters set
DOM_C-4.1 USd_Full hus0 =  1; hus1 = 1
DOM_C-4.2 USd_Svensson hus0 =  0:45; hus1 = 0:45
DOM_C-4.3 USd_Taylor hus0 =  0:25; hus1 = 0:15
DOM_C-4.4 EAd_Full hea0 =  1; hea1 = 1
DOM_C-4.5 EAd_Svensson hea0 =  0:45; hea1 = 0:45
DOM_C-4.6 EAd_Taylor hea0 =  0:25; hea1 = 0:15
Table 4.3: A list of exchange rate coe¢ cients for Type 4 coordination models
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Data Resources
The two-country model is simulated and compared with a V AR (1) using 7 key
macroeconomic time series for each region  real GDP, real consumption, real
investment, labour (represented by hours worked), real wage, ination and short-
term nominal interest rate as well as 3 trade related time series US imports and
exports and the real exchange rate between US dollars and the euro (see Table
4.4).
This study uses the same data in SW (2003) and SW (2007), although the data
length is extended and some observations may be subject to revisions. Key data
13Also note that model DOM-2.1 can also be one special case of the fourth type of model,
with hus0 = 0; h
us
1 = 0.
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Variables Variables Variables
yus US output yea EA output exus US export to EA
cus US consumption cea EA consumption imus US import from EA
ius US investment iea EA investment Q USD/EUR real EX
lus US labour lea EA labour
wus US real wages wea EA real wages
us US ination rate ea EA ination rate
rus US short time interest rea EA interest rate
Table 4.4: A list of key macroeconomic variables
series used for constructing seven US macroeconomic time series are obtained
mainly from the US Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) and the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). A list of these data series are tabulated in
Appendix B, Table B.6. Real GDP is expressed as billions of chained 2005 dollars
by its origin14. The real consumption and real investment are constructed by
deating personal consumption expenditure and xed private investments using
a GDP deator. Ination is taken as the rst di¤erence of the logarithm of GDP
implicit price deator. The labour variable is expressed by working hours adjusted
by civilian employment (16 years and over) 15. Real wages are represented by
the hourly compensation deated by GDP deator. The E¤ective Federal Funds
Rate (EFFR) is taken as the short-term nominal interest rate. Real GDP, real
consumption, real investment, hours and real wages are adjusted by population
index to per capita level. Apart from the interest rate, all time series take the
form of 100 times their logarithmic value (formulae are shown in Appendix B,
Table B.7).
The Euro Area data are obtained from the Area-Wide Model (AWM) data-
base established by the ECB, which covers a wide range of quarterly Euro Area
macroeconomic time series. The time series in the AWMdatabase are constructed
by aggregating available country information mainly from Eurostat, OECD na-
14It di¤ers from the data used in SW (2007) paper, where the data were expressed in billions
of chained 1996 dollars.
15Both the average weekly hours and the hourly compensation obtained from BLS are for
the non-farm business sector for all persons. The population of the non-farm business worker
only takes account of 80% of workers who produce the gross domestic product in the US.
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tional accounts, OECD main economic indicators, BIS and AMECO databases16.
The aggregation method is mainly Index method17, while some variables are
simply weighted sum (such as interest rate) or are simply summed (such as em-
ployment). In this study, the denition of the Euro Area follows the way that the
dataset denes. A list of the exact time series used can be found in Appendix B,
Table B.8. Real GDP is in millions of ECU/Euros, and is re-scaled to the cor-
rected level of the reference year 1995. Consistent with the US dataset, the rst
di¤erence of the logarithm of GDP deator is taken as an indicator of ination.
Real wages are presented as the wage per head deated by GDP deator. To
be in line with US time series, Real GDP, real consumption, real investment and
labour (hours) are all adjusted to per capita level by the population index calcu-
lated by the same method as the US index. The interest rate is the short-term
nominal interest rate. Apart from the interest rate, all variables take the form of
100 times their log value (see Appendix B, Table B.9).
Additionally, the US dollar to the euro exchange rate time series is obtained
from the Datastream. It is then inverted and adjusted by the US Consumer
Price Index (CPI) and EA Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to be
a real exchange rate series. An increase in the real exchange rate represents a
real appreciation of the US dollar or a real depreciation of the euro. US imports
from the EA and US exports to the EA are taken from the time series used in Le
et al. (2010).
4.3.2 Time Series Properties
To begin with, these seventeen key macroeconomic time series are individually
tested for their non-stationarity. For each variable, both Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests at level and rst order di¤erence
16Eurostat is the Statistical O¢ ce of the European Union; OECD is the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development; BIS stands for Bank for International Settlements;
and AMECO is the annual macroeconomic database of the European Commission.
17The log-level index for any series X is dened: lnXz =
P
z wi  lnXi , where wi is the
weight of Xi in the aggregate Xz:
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are conducted if the time series is not stationary at level. Full details of the non-
stationarity test result can be found in Appendix B, Table B.10, B.12 and B.11.
As the length of the time series varies from one to another, the individual length
of the time series is used in non-stationarity tests.
All seven time series for the US economy range from 1947Q1 to 2010Q3 (255
observations in total). The test results show stationarity of US ination and real
wages at the 1% signicance level; while both ADF and PP tests report non-
stationarity in US output, consumption, investment, labour and interest rate at
level, but stationarity at their rst di¤erence (i.e. they are I(1) processes). All
seven time series for EA economy range from 1970Q1 to 2009Q4 (160 observations
in total). Both ADF and PP tests report non-stationarity at level, but stationary
at the rst di¤erence in all seven time series (i.e. they are all I(1) processes).
US imports from the EA and exports to the EA range from 1970Q1 to 2008Q3
(155 observations in total). Taken from Le et al. (2010), these two time series
are already linearly detrended, which will be in line with the detrending method
taken in this study. Therefore, tests are carried out and reported at level only.
Finally, the time series for the real exchange rate between the US dollar and euro
is also shown to be I(1).
According to the results of the non-stationarity test, all I(1) time series are
linear-detrended by individually taking deviation of each variable from its own
mean and linear trend. Those stationary time series, US ination, real wages,
imports, and exports, are kept in their original forms. The experimental ndings
in Le et al. (2010) are consulted for the choice of detrending methods. In their
study, various methods for ltering data SWs lter, log-di¤erencing, Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) lter and linear detrending were carried out for testing the e¤ect
of changing lters on the indirect inference testing e¢ ciency. The results did
not di¤er signicantly according to the Wald test on both V AR (1) coe¢ cients
and data variances. Therefore, the log-linear detrending was used in order to
su¢ ciently stationarise time series while keeping as much information as possible.
Thirteen linear-detrended time series are then re-tested for their non-stationarity.
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Variables ADF test PP test
cus  2:415256(0:0155)  2:012042(0:0426)
ius  3:261644(0:0012)  2:401457(0:0161)
lus  3:186995(0:0015)  2:521925(0:0116)
usy  2:218320 (0:0258)  3:029959 (0:0025)
rus  2:442378(0:0144)  2:335998(0:0191)
weay  11:20522 (0:0000)  9:414113 (0:0000)
yus  2:758494(0:0059)  2:410950(0:0157)
cea  1:583393 (0:1065)  2:487046 (0:0129)
iea  3:453894 (0:0006)  2:250749 (0:0240)
lea  2:633401 (0:0086)  1:854073 (0:0609)
ea  4:035019(0:0001)  6:249280(0:0000)
rea  2:795602(0:0054)  2:335908(0:0193)
wea  1:622117(0:0987)  3:884375(0:0001)
yea  1:851255 (0:0613)  2:419604 (0:0155)
imusy  2:412372 (0:0158)  1:974060 (0:0466)
exusy  2:034836 (0:0405)  2:246027 (0:0243)
Q  1:832334(0:0638)  2:282334(0:0221)
The second column reports the t-statistics of ADF tests and the
corresponding probability. The third column reports the adjusted
t-statistics of Phillips-Perron tests and the corresponding probability.
yindicates that the time series is stationary at level, and that test
statistics are obtained from its non-stationarity test at level.
Table 4.5: The result of non-stationarity tests for the linear-detrended data
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Table 4.5 reports the results of the non-stationarity test for all seventeen time
series that are in their nal forms they are used directly in the model evalu-
ation and estimation. Overall, linear-detrending has taken out non-stationarity
from the time series successfully; the stationarity of detrended time series is not
rejected either by the ADF test or PP test, or even both.
4.4 Testing Using Indirect Inference
4.4.1 Obtaining Actual Errors
In the simulation of SWs US and EU models, parameters describing properties
of the error structure, coe¢ cients and variances of exogenous shock, are based
on Bayesian estimates conditional on the chosen individual priors. Instead of im-
posing exogenous assumptions on the shock dynamics and volatility, this study
extracts the real world information of shocks dynamics and volatility from ac-
tual data  structural errors are derived from the calibrated structural model
and hence, regressions can be conducted on the individual structural shock to
quantify the distinct autoregressive behaviour and its associate exogenous shock
component for each individual shock.
For those equations that do not have forward-looking variables (expectations)
involved in the determination process, structural errors can be derived simply
by obtaining the residual from equations. For those equations involving unob-
served expectations, an instrumental variable procedure rst publically discussed
in McCallum (1976) was used.
Theoretically, unobserved expectation terms should be endogenously deter-
mined, reecting anticipations on the economic development by market partici-
pants with rational expectations. Estimates from models are traditionally taken
as an approximation to these forward-looking behaviours. Even so, some sta-
tistical concerns have been raised on the consistency and the e¢ ciency of these
expectation estimates in order to ensure the e¢ ciency of estimations, in partic-
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ular on the model with rational expectations. Mills (1962) rst introduced a
method of implicit expectations, with which expectations could be derived from
observable behaviours that were thought to have considerable relation with the
underlying observable condition. If economic agents know better in predicting
their next movements (economists have no clear idea on the explicit expectation
formation used by economic agents), the implicit approach would have advantages
over explicitly specifying an expectation formation with exogenously imposed hy-
potheses.
In an extended work, McCallum (1976) clearly demonstrated that a simulta-
neous equation system with rational expectations can be estimated consistently
with expectation terms instrumented by their predictedvalues obtained from a
Least Squares (LS) regression on the related variables from the entire available
information set18. Compared to a substitution method, which is an alternative for
tackling this issue, the proposed method avoids the additional nonlinearity, and
gives asymptotically e¢ cient estimators using Full Information Maximum Likeli-
hood (FIML) given some requirements on econometric models (Wickens, 1982).
Based on the algorithm of FIML, the procedure of getting consistent and as-
ymptotically e¢ cient estimates can be interpreted as replacing forward-looking
variables by the associated predictions from a restricted reduced form before es-
timating the model using Maximum Likelihood (ML). Predicting the expectation
from restricted reduced form preserves the rationality, which would be transited
into the estimation, and hence provide consistent and e¢ cient estimates.
The choice of instrumental variables is based on past values of endogenous
variables that appear to be foreseen rationally in the structural model, namely,
consumption, investment, ination, rate of return on capital and real wages for
both the US and the EA, and additionally US labour supply. An eleven-variable
V AR(1) on these selected variables is then used to obtain predictions in line
with rational expectations19. Hence the structural errors in those equations
18According to the concept of Rational Expectation (RE), the available information would
include the past value of all the variables that are involved in the equation.
19A comparison of V AR(1) predicted forward-looking variables to actual time series is pre-
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Figure 4-1: US - the actual data & structural errors from model NonC
with forward-looking property can be estimated with these V AR(1) expecta-
tions. There are eight structural errors estimated for each region from the market
clearing condition ("g;us; "g;ea), consumption Euler equation ("b;us; "b;ea), invest-
ment Euler equation ("i;us; "i;ea), monetary policy rule ("r;us; ";ea), production
function ("a;us; "a;ea), price setting equation (";us; "p;ea), wage setting equation
("w;us; "w;ea) and additional labour supply shocks from the NC model wage set-
ting equation ("wNC;us; "wNC;ea)20. A comparison of actual data and the derived
structural shocks is shown in Figure 4-1 and 4-2.
Once structural shocks are reversely derived as residuals from the structural
model, regressions in accordance with the presumed innovative structure of shocks
can be carried out to quantify the dynamic and volatility property of each shock 
coe¢ cients of innovative structure and variance of exogenous innovations. Twelve
sented in Appendix Figure B-1 and Figure B-2.
20These two shocks appear in the context of no wage stickiness. Therefore, it can be explained
as the pure labour supply shock.
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Figure 4-2: EA - the actual data & structural errors from model NonC
shocks out of sixteen, including all EA shocks and four US shocks, are assumed
to follow AR(1) processes. The US price mark-up shock, wage mark-up shock,
and labour supply shock are assumed to be following the ARMA(1; 1) process.
Additionally, the US government spending shock consists of an AR(1) process as
well as a cross-e¤ect term from technology shock.
Table 4.62122.presents a comparison of innovation standard errors in this study
to previous analyses. Overall, standard errors of exogenous innovations are rela-
tively close to those estimated in the SWs US model, with the exception of the
US monetary policy shock, which appears to be more volatile when it is derived
from actual data. There is, however, less similarity in the EA. That is, standard
21y In addition to the shock to interest rate that is quoted here, there is as shock to ination
objective in SW (2003) with estimated variance 0.017. The monetary policy shock (Taylor rule
shock) in this study - the same as denition of monetary policy shock in SW (2007) - is a joint
product of those two shock in SW (2003).
22z The labour supply shock in SW (2003) is dened in representative agents utility;
while labour supply shock in this study is dened separately within a exible wage setting
environment.
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Standard error for innovations in US
Gov: Cons: Inv: Taylor Prod: PriceM WageM LabS
This study 0:5424 0:2495 0:5632 0:4612 0:478 0:1371 0:3195 2:7818
SW(2007) 0:52 0:24 0:45 0:24 0:45 0:14 0:24  
Le et al.(2010) 0:673 0:371 0:704 0:344 0:553 0:239 0:311  
Standard error for innovations in EA
Gov: Cons: Inv: Taylor Prod: PriceM WageM LabS
This study 0:3663 0:2401 1:0102 0:4184 0:3918 0:2952 0:3093 2:0937
SW(2003) 0:325 0:336 0:085 0:081y 0:598 0:16 0:289 3:52z
Le et al.(2010) 0:3755 0:5099 1:2329 0:4764 0:3017 0:0265 0:5273  
y z see footnote
Table 4.6: Standard errors of innovations - a comparison to SW(2003,2007)
errors of EA shocks deviate from the previous analyses to some extent. Notably,
standard errors of the EA investment shock and the EA monetary policy shock
are exceptionally large compared to those estimates in the SWs EU model. Al-
though it can be argued that the monetary shock in this study is dened to
include both shocks to the interest rate and ination objectives in the SWs EU
model, its variance is still substantially larger than overall variances in the mon-
etary policy rule estimated by SW. On the other hand, their restrictions on the
prior mean and the standard error may have imposed additional information that
results in the extremely low variance. For EA investment shock, prior mean is
set at 0:1 with a standard error of 2, which allows a narrow corridor at a really
low rate for the Bayesian estimator. Despite their large divergence to SWs es-
timates, these two innovation standard errors are generally consistent with the
ndings in Le et al. (2010), which are also generated from data. Two shocks
whose standard errors are noticeably larger than either of these earlier studies
are the US monetary policy shock and the EA price mark-up shock.
The AR(1), ARMA(1; 1) and cross-e¤ect coe¢ cients are quantitative rep-
resentations of the shock dynamics in each economy. A comparison of these
coe¢ cients obtained here to those reported in previous studies is shown in Ta-
ble 4.7. Overall, there is a rather large divergence in the shock dynamics across
these three studies. The most signicant divergence emerges in the dynamics of
consumer preference shocks for both the US and the EA, US monetary policy
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Coe¢ cients for innovative dynamic in US shocks
Gov: Cons: Inv: Taylor Prod: PriceM WageM LabS
This study
AR(1) 0:9768 0:0632 0:4349 0:8766 0:9803 0:9883 0:9672 0:9642
MA(1) 0:3845  0:7419  0:749  0:174
SW(2007)
AR(1) 0:97 0:22 0:71 0:15 0:95 0:89 0:96
MA(1)  0:69  0:84
Le et al.(2010)
AR(1) 0:944  0:064 0:530  0:062 0:971 0:925 0:915
MA(1)  0:709  0:848
Coe¢ cients for innovative dynamic in EA shocks
Gov: Cons: Inv: Taylor Prod: PriceM WageM LabS
This study
AR(1) 0:8348 0:1757 0:8193 0:758 0:9858 0:2700  0:205 0:9236
SW(2003)
AR(1) 0:949 0:855 0:927   0:823     0:889
Le et al.(2010)
AR(1) 0:751  0:101 0:063 0:565 0:940 0:154  0:038
Table 4.7: Coe¢ cients for shock processes - a comparison with previous analyses
shock, EA investment technology shock, although di¤erences are also noticeable
in other shocks.
This study nds that consumption preference shocks across both regions
evolve positively but less persistently. In contrast, SWs estimations found high
persistence in consumption preference shocks, whereas Le et al. (2010) reported
negative, but rather low AR(1) coe¢ cients. US monetary policy shock, by
this study, is suggested to be highly persistent, whereas both estimates from
SW (2007) and Le et al. (2010) appear to be really low, or even to be nega-
tively evolving. Furthermore, EA investment technology is shown to be close to
a random walk in Le et al. (2010), whereas estimates both in this study and in
SW (2003) show signicantly high persistence.
4.4.2 Evaluating Models by Seven Key Indicators
Subject to the data availability, indirect inference testing is applied over the
period of 1971Q1 to 2008Q3 (153 observations). Starting with a regression on
the dataset of target variables, one can obtain parameters representing the actual
macroeconomic behaviour of two regions using the auxiliary model, V AR(1).
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The main target variable dataset, although varied when the focus of the study
changes, consists of seven key macroeconomic time series output, ination and
interest rate for both the US and EA as well as the real USD/EUR exchange rate.
Therefore, an auxiliary parameter set from actual data (actual data auxiliary
parameters), T , includes 49 V AR (1) coe¢ cients and 7 variances.
Meanwhile, data simulation is carried out on the basis of a reduced-form
policy and transition matrix from the structural model, accompanied by boot-
strapped exogenous innovations that are derived in the previous section. Within
this dynamic and stochastic framework, covariance of innovations is as important
as parameters that determine the relative movement of variables. Therefore, in
order to preserve this covariant property in the analysis, a vector-bootstrapping
is used instead of normal methods that individually bootstrap each shock in every
process23.
With vector-bootstrapping, all shocks that strike the economies, both the US
and EA, within one particular period of time (here dened as one quarter) are
taken as a whole sample. The bootstrap sample size, hence, equals the number
of observations (148 in total after losing some observations in processes). In each
random drawing, vector-bootstrapping takes a sample of 16 shocks where each
innovation will be kept in line with the others consistently at a certain point of
time. Hence, as a full sample vector-bootstrapping is performed, an entire shock
prole for 148 periods (quarters) will be ready for simulating one dataset. Fi-
nally, a thousand datasets are simulated by combining the given structural model
and bootstrapped innovations (number of bootstrapping N = 1000). And cor-
respondingly, a thousand sets of simulated data auxiliary parameters, nS
 


,
n = 1; :::; N , are generated in the same way as the actual data auxiliary para-
meter setis generated.
23There are some concerns about the use of bootstrapping, particularly the robustness of the
method when the leading process is a unit root (or near unit root). To address such a concern,
Le et al. (2011) conducted a Monte Carlo experiment to check the asymptotic distribution of
the AR coe¢ cients in SWs models. The result suggested that the bootstrap was reasonably
accurate in small samples; the distribution converged asymptotically to a 2 distribution.
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For statistical analysis, the actual data auxiliary parameter setis being com-
pared with those simulated data auxiliary parameter setsusing Wald statistics
presented in the methodology section. For each Wald statistic WSnS (or WST )
computed, as a representation of closeness, a particular auxiliary parameter set
nS (or T ) is compared against the mean of the one thousand simulated aux-
iliary parameter set, S
 


= 1
N
PN
n=1 
n
S
 


. The percentile location of WST
in the distribution of WSnS (Equation 3.6) becomes an indication of how well
the model-simulated parameters can embrace true parameters that describe the
dynamics and volatility property of actual data.
In Table 4.8, a list of actual data auxiliary parameters(V AR (1) parame-
ters and variances from actual data) and their corresponding 95% bootstrapped
upper-bound and lower-bound obtained from model-simulated data is reported
for both the non-coordination (NonC) model as well as the best performing co-
ordination model referring to model C-3.6  in which the US has no direct re-
sponses to the real exchange rate, while the EA fully coordinates under a oating-
exchange-rate regime. The overall testing results, including the actual Wald sta-
tistic (WST ), the Wald percentile, and the normalised MD for each model, are
also shown at the bottom of the table.
The actual Wald statistic (WST ) measures the distance between actual aux-
iliary coe¢ cients and the corresponding mean of model-simulated auxiliary co-
e¢ cients. The simulated Wald statistic WSnS , where n = 1; : : : ; N , measures
the distance between an individual set of model-simulated auxiliary coe¢ cients
and the corresponding mean of model-simulated auxiliary coe¢ cients. Therefore,
the distribution of WSS is a Wald statistic spectrum that proles every single
bootstrap-simulated sample. The Wald percentile labels the exact position of the
actual Wald statistic (WST ) in the distribution of the simulated Wald statistics
(WSS). And nally, the normalised MD is a normalised representation of the ac-
tual Wald statistic its value coincides with 1:645 when the actual Wald statistic
is exactly at the 95% percentile of the whole simulated Wald statistics spectrum.
Hence, similar to Wald statistics, the smaller the value of normalised MD, the
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better the model-simulated coe¢ cients can describe actual data dynamics and
volatility.
Moreover, to avoid random sampling bias, the testing exercise is repeated 1000
times24. Therefore, the reported actual Wald statistics and nominalised MDs are
the means of a large number of resamples (see Appendix B Figure B-3 and B-4
for statistical distributions).
Actual V AR (1) Coe¢ cients and Their Policy Implications
The actual V AR (1) coe¢ cients (T ) are tabulated in the rst column of Ta-
ble 4.8, labelled ADI , where D and I are dependent and independent variables,
respectively; and they can be any of the target variables in the testing. All vari-
ables generally exhibit a high level of persistence, except for EA ination (A
ea
ea),
which exhibits by 0:5831 in response to its lagged value. The US monetary policy
instrument (Ar
us
rus) appears to have even stronger inertia (0:9788) relative to the
high level of persistence in the US policy rate reported in the literature. In con-
trast, the monetary policy inertia in the EA appears to be more moderate and is
consistent with some studies focusing on the Euro Area.
Both policy rates react to macroeconomic changes weakly, but generally in line
with theory, except for the response of the US policy rate to the EA monetary
policy rate (Ar
us
rea =  0:019). Theoretically, an extended US output gap from
its potential output level or a higher ination deviation from the authoritys
ination target induces a tightened monetary policy in the US; the same economic
variations that occur in its foreign counterparty, in contrast, induce a relaxation
in US monetary policy. Similarly, EA monetary policy responds positively to
domestic output expansion and ination increases, but negatively to US ination.
It, however, appears to be almost insular to US output spillover. Furthermore,
US policy rate reacts weakly, but negatively, to the increasing interest rate in
24In one testing exercise, for each actual Wald statistic (WT ) to be computed, 1000 samples
of bootstrapped innovations, and hence, simulated datasets are needed. This testing process
is exercised 1000 times to achieve a distribution of the actual Wald statistic (WT ) and its
associated normalised MD.
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the EA. This may be a contradiction with presumed uncovered interest parity
(UIP), which requires co-movement in interest rates to restore exchange rate
stabilisation. A graph of both policy rates and real exchange rate is shown in
Figure 4-3, which suggests an overall violation of UIP in the past three decades.
1970Q3 1982Q4 1995Q2 2007Q4
-2
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1
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US interest rate
EA interest rate
real exchange rate
Figure 4-3: Nominal interest rates vs. real exchange rates
More interestingly, although the real exchange rate is more inuential to mon-
etary policies than other macroeconomic variables, responses of the US and EA
policy rate to the real exchange rate follow a di¤erent rationale. The EA policy
rate is lowered reacting to a lagged euro depreciation a possible adjustment
to the tightened monetary policy previously. On the contrary, the US policy
rate, which will otherwise be tightened up as an adjustment to relaxing policy
previously, is even lower in response to a lagged dollar appreciation. It implies a
further extension, rather than presumably a reverse adjustment to its instanta-
neous reaction to the real exchange rate in the earlier period.
Impacts of the real exchange rate on output appear to be unconventional a
home currency appreciation tends to boost rather than to depress the domestic
output growth. In particular, US output grows strongly by 2:67% following a
10% real dollar appreciation, whilst US ination goes down by nearly 1%. One
102
factor contributing to the output growth may be the strong and prolonged mon-
etary policy relaxation in response to the real exchange rate. The very low,
though correctly signed, exchange rate pass-through to US ination is a poten-
tial demonstration of the argument insisting that LCP and VCP are extensive in
international trade. In contrast, a 10% euro depreciation (Q increases by 10%)
lowers EA output by 1% and EA ination by 2:63%. This phenomenon contra-
dicts the conventional argument that a home currency depreciation switches the
expenditure towards home goods and has an expansionary impact on the domestic
ination. Moreover, the argument of the incomplete exchange rate pass-through,
particularly the PTM case in Krugman (1987), may interpret the unexpectedly
falling EA ination as the euro depreciates.
The monetary spillover appears to be strong across two economies. A doubled
EA interest rate brings down US output by 83:1%, while a doubled US interest
rate boosts EA output by 20:9%. Moreover, a 10% increase in EA ination brings
down US output by 4:51%, while US ination has a fairly small, but negative
impact on EA output (Ay
ea
us =  0:061).
In addition to the dynamic property, the actual variances of the target vari-
ables are listed below the coe¢ cients in the rst column. Apart from volatile
output in both the US and EA, the volatility of ination and interest rates in
both regimes is relatively low. The volatility of the real exchange rate appear to
be really low at 0:02599.
Comparing the Non-Coordination and Coordination Models
In terms of 7 target variables, indirect inference testing is in favour of the coor-
dination model C-3.6 (Note that, in the following section, the term coordination
modelrefers to the coordination model C-3.6 in particular, unless it is stated
separately). Both non-coordination and coordination models are 100% rejected
by the joint Wald test on the models ability to replicate data dynamics and
volatility (see the Wald percentile). However, the normalised MD indicates that
the coordination model can replicate properties of the data 15% more closely
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than the non-coordination model. The actual Wald statistic drops from 15569:08
to 11574:36 when the model incorporates monetary coordination (model C-3.6).
Both models tend to over-predict V AR (1) coe¢ cients when they fail to em-
brace the true value. For coe¢ cients that have unusual values, there is no surprise
that both models are unable to capture those features. For example, the V AR (1)
regression shows that US ination reacts to US interest rate positively at a low
rate of 0:018; whereas, both models produce relatively strong and negative elas-
ticity to be in line with the economic theory. Moreover, the V AR (1) regression
shows that the real exchange rate weakly reacts to ination and the interest rate
in both economies. Whereas for the model setup, both models undoubtedly pro-
duce high values of elasticity since the real exchange rate is assumed to absorb
the information quickly and abundantly from the economy.
As a whole, the coordination model outperforms the non-coordination model
in terms of its ability to replicate data volatility. Taking data dynamics alone, the
coordination model C-3.6 is the best expression for data dynamics in this study.
Nevertheless, the non-coordination model also performs relatively well compared
to some other coordination models. The hypothesis of the existence of monetary
coordination cannot be rejected, since the models performance can be improved
in the presence of monetary policy coordination in the real exchange rate.
What Makes the Coordination Model Better?
One of the advantages of using the Wald statistic is that the squared deviation
is weighted against its relative contribution towards the variability of prediction.
The larger the variance of a simulation, the smaller the scalar it has in the
weighting matrix. As a result, if a model extends prediction variances in order
to embrace the true value of coe¢ cients, it will be penalised by a smaller weight
towards the nal score of the Wald statistic. Compared to analyses focusing on
merely impulse response functions (IRFs), the Wald statistic takes both the V AR
impulse response and the variance of simulation into account, avoiding possible
compromises of the prediction variance in order to enlarge the success of catching
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impulse responses.
Given these robust features, key factors that bring down the joint Wald statis-
tic are rst, a smaller deviation of simulated means to actual V AR(1) coe¢ cients
T   S
 


; and second, a weighting matrix W
 


specied as the inverse
variance-covariance matrix of predicted coe¢ cients (see the Wald statistic in
Equation 3.2). From a statistical perspective, an improvement of the models
performance from coordinating monetary policy may lie in the higher simula-
tion precision (dynamics aspect) or the lower simulation uncertainty (variability
aspect), although multiple reasons can be explored extensively.
Firstly, model simulation precision is, to a degree, higher in the coordination
model. Overall, only 24 true parameters out of 49 are captured by the coordi-
nation models simulated bounds less than the 28 parameters captured by the
non-coordination model. Nonetheless, some true values are marginally missed
out as a result of narrower simulated bounds in the coordination model. Fur-
thermore, the mean of a simulated parameter from the coordination model can
be closer to the true value even when it fails to capture the true impulse re-
sponse in bounds. For instance, the simulated bounds for Ay
ea
rea are reported as
[ 0:262; 0:3122] with a mean of 0:0279 by the coordination model, while the cor-
responding bounds produced by the non-coordination model are [ 0:364; 0:4233]
with a mean at 0:0675 compared to the true value at  0:299. Graphically, data
dynamics is well captured by 5% and 95% impulse response bounds in the non-
coordination model; whereas, the coordination model has a more accurate mean
and a smaller simulation variance.
From the data volatility aspects, the time series variances, simulated by the
coordination model, generally are smaller than those by the non-coordination
model; yet they are still over-predicted relative to their true values. In particular,
by incorporating monetary coordination, the mean of simulated variances for the
real exchange rate is narrowed down by nearly 30% from 119:58 to 84:99; and
that for EA output is narrowed down by more than a quarter from 27:97 to
20:67, despite the fact that they both deviate hugely from the actual values. As a
105
consequence, even though the simulated V AR impulse response seems to capture
the actual V AR impulse response better in the non-coordination model (in terms
of number of impulse responses being embraced), the actual Wald statistic for
the coordination model can be reduced remarkably, ceteris paribus.
Secondly, model prediction uncertainty is signicantly reduced in the coor-
dination model. Produced by the coordination model, 34 out of 49 V AR (1)
coe¢ cients have smaller simulation variances. In particular, the simulation vari-
ance of real exchange rate volatility (simulation variance of 2Q) has a dramatic
drop from 8982:04 in the non-coordination model to 3924:84 in the coordination
model (more than a 56% drop). Evidence also shows in simulated bounds those
narrower bounds are generally produced by the coordination model.
In theWald statistic computation, large variances enlarge the multi-dimensional
space represented by the variance-covariance matrix. Consequently, once the ma-
trix is inversed to be a weighting matrix, the values of each matrix element are
larger in general, although the penalty for being highly volatile in the simulation
is still preserved as a relatively low weighting value. When the Wald statistic
of a non-coordination model is calculated, squared deviations are weighted over
much higher scalars resulting in a high actual Wald statistic.
The aforementioned large simulated bound can be an exact case of high pre-
diction precision as well as high prediction uncertainty. Seemingly, the non-
coordination model encloses actual V AR (1) estimates better than the coordi-
nation model; however, largely due to the larger error bands it produces that
marginally capture actual values. If its simulated mean is closer to the actual
value, the Wald statistic can be improved by a smaller deviation (higher predic-
tion precision); but it will be penalised by a larger simulation variance (higher
prediction uncertainty). Nonetheless, the coordination model can still produce a
simulated mean closer to the actual value even though it marginally misses out
on embracing certain impulse responses. The actual Wald statistic is worsened
by a larger deviation as well as a higher penalty from the higher prediction un-
certainty with one example being the coe¢ cient for the response of EA output
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to EA interest rate (Ay
ea
rea ).
For these reasons, simply looking at the ability to simulate an impulse response
that embraces the actual impulse response cannot be seen as the only criterion for
judging the overall performance of a DSGE model. The bias towards catching the
dynamic property tends to result in compromising the predictive or simulative
variance and even the mean value.
Furthermore, the coordination models performance with respect to the real
exchange rate, surprisingly, exhibits a mixture of improvements and deteriora-
tions. Determinants of the real exchange rate are better illustrated in the coordi-
nation model. Not only can the coordination model deliver about an equivalent
level of performance from the data dynamics perspective, but it successfully nar-
rows down the simulation variances of the real exchange rate elasticity to the
other variables (AQI , where I can be any other target variable), by more than
40% on average (23% at minimum and 56% at maximum).
Yet the functioning of the real exchange rate channel, through which ex-
change rate uctuations can be transmitted into key aggregate variables, retains
no progress or even deteriorates. The simulated elasticities of output, ination,
and interest rate with regard to the real exchange rate (ADQ , where D can be any
other target variable) fail to capture any actual e¤ect of an explicit exchange rate
channel.
Non-coordination Coordination
Actual Mean LB UB Mean LB UB
Ay
us
yus 0:8172 0:9307 0:8612 0:9936 OUT 0:9385 0:879 0:9915 OUT
Ay
us
yea 0:0592 0:0923  0:063 0:2565 IN 0:0835  0:049 0:2128 IN
Ay
us
us  0:016  0:223  0:493 0:0613 IN  0:325  0:625  0:009 IN
Ay
us
ea  0:451 0:1873  0:486 0:8286 IN 0:3525  0:216 0:8979 OUT
Ay
us
rus 0:0967 0:0474  0:348 0:4596 IN 0:1938  0:246 0:6304 IN
Ay
us
rea  0:831  0:322  1:029 0:3417 IN  0:483  0:961 0:0012 IN
Ay
us
Q 0:2672  0:060  0:147 0:0187 OUT  0:064  0:139 0:0139 OUT
Ay
ea
yus 0:0186  0:008  0:049 0:0302 IN  0:009  0:041 0:0255 IN
Ay
ea
yea 0:9828 0:9989 0:9163 1:0766 IN 1:0010 0:937 1:0638 IN
Ay
ea
us  0:061  0:051  0:248 0:1390 IN  0:096  0:288 0:0981 IN
107
Ay
ea
ea  0:268 0:0611  0:353 0:5009 IN 0:0728  0:263 0:4085 OUT
Ay
ea
rus 0:2085 0:0567  0:197 0:3164 IN 0:1160  0:151 0:3946 IN
Ay
ea
rea  0:299 0:0675  0:364 0:4233 IN 0:0279  0:262 0:3122 OUT
Ay
ea
Q  0:099  0:015  0:059 0:0279 OUT  0:011  0:0545 0:0312 OUT
A
us
yus 0:0235 0:0003  0:037 0:0404 IN  0:003  0:036 0:0304 IN
A
us
yea 0:0053  0:007  0:095 0:0852 IN  0:001  0:073 0:0722 IN
A
us
us 0:9397 1:1169 0:9514 1:2765 OUT 1:0986 0:9123 1:2756 IN
A
us
ea 0:0308 0:0332  0:335 0:3974 IN 0:1258  0:189 0:4583 IN
A
us
rus 0:0178  0:380  0:598  0:158 OUT  0:345  0:606  0:095 OUT
A
us
rea 0:0091  0:002  0:356 0:3517 IN  0:1  0:4 0:1858 IN
A
us
Q  0:094 0:0009  0:044 0:045 OUT 0:0005  0:044 0:0412 OUT
A
ea
yus 0:0135  0:006  0:028 0:0167 IN  0:001  0:019 0:0169 IN
A
ea
yea  0:005 0:0233  0:025 0:0722 IN 0:0114  0:024 0:0476 IN
A
ea
us 0:0264  0:042  0:141 0:0644 IN  0:107  0:220 0:0042 OUT
A
ea
ea 0:5831 0:5514 0:3206 0:7664 IN 0:6046 0:3945 0:7910 IN
A
ea
rus 0:0362 0:0584  0:085 0:1964 IN 0:1484  0:002 0:3045 IN
A
ea
rea 0:0746 0:0677  0:142 0:2851 IN  0:008  0:17 0:159 IN
A
ea
Q  0:263  0:013  0:037 0:0105 OUT  0:039  0:063  0:018 OUT
Ar
us
yus 0:0120 0:0039  0:013 0:0209 IN 0:0017  0:014 0:0176 IN
Ar
us
yea  0:003  0:037  0:076  0:0004 IN  0:032  0:064 0:0017 IN
Ar
us
us 0:0096 0:5196 0:4424 0:592 OUT 0:5463 0:4591 0:627 OUT
Ar
us
ea  0:038 0:0098  0:180 0:1855 IN 0:0060  0:155 0:1659 IN
Ar
us
rus 0:9788 0:2735 0:1688 0:3869 OUT 0:2394 0:1189 0:3603 OUT
Ar
us
rea  0:019 0:0800  0:092 0:2631 IN 0:0879  0:062 0:2333 IN
Ar
us
Q  0:291 0:0219 0:0046 0:0408 OUT 0:0272 0:0083 0:0457 OUT
Ar
ea
yus 0:0001  0:012  0:034 0:0104 IN  0:018  0:043 0:0052 IN
Ar
ea
yea 0:029 0:0393  0:005 0:0918 IN 0:0454  0:002 0:0991 IN
Ar
ea
us  0:032  0:067  0:165 0:026 IN 0:0345  0:085 0:1561 IN
Ar
ea
ea 0:0148  0:177  0:39 0:0452 IN 0:0236  0:198 0:2283 IN
Ar
ea
rus 0:0817 0:0921  0:036 0:2229 IN  0:018  0:194 0:1556 IN
Ar
ea
rea 0:8603 0:8795 0:6615 1:0779 IN 0:6342 0:4221 0:8414 OUT
Ar
ea
Q  0:168  0:023  0:049 0:0003 OUT  0:054  0:088  0:024 OUT
AQyus  0:005  0:028  0:122 0:051 IN  0:028  0:092 0:0295 IN
AQyea 0:0049 0:0076  0:182 0:2043 IN 0:0134  0:112 0:1448 IN
AQus  0:010 1:2094 0:7473 1:6584 OUT 1:2411 0:8486 1:6665 OUT
AQea  0:007  0:623  1:588 0:2975 IN  0:554  1:236 0:1633 IN
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AQrus 0:0245  1:496  2:121  0:88 OUT  1:521  2:071  0:982 OUT
AQrea  0:023 0:9279 0:0179 1:7846 OUT 0:8897 0:2669 1:4609 OUT
AQQ 0:9368 0:9879 0:8869 1:0787 IN 1:0161 0:9312 1:0925 IN
2yus 8:1212 63:940 16:321 153:86 OUT 64:963 18:076 157:03 OUT
2yea 3:6088 27:971 8:0136 65:806 OUT 20:669 6:4273 47:612 OUT
2us 0:3886 3:4624 1:9538 5:6678 OUT 3:4608 1:9247 5:8428 OUT
2ea 0:2386 0:5796 0:3613 0:8577 OUT 0:983 0:4500 1:8514 OUT
2rus 0:8427 2:0674 1:1108 3:6190 OUT 2:0627 1:0578 3:6126 OUT
2rea 0:4319 1:0457 0:5650 1:7394 OUT 1:3488 0:6428 2:4698 OUT
2Q 0:0260 119:58 31:312 308:44 OUT 84:993 22:248 210:67 OUT
Wald percentile: 100 Wald percentile: 100
Actual Wald stats: 15569.0814 Actual Wald stats: 11574.3650
normalised MD: 103.1941 normalised MD: 90.0273
Table 4.8: Actual VAR parameters and model simulated bounds of
the Non-Coordination model and the Coordination model(C-3.6)
The structure of the modern global economy contributes largely to the com-
plication of exchange rate dynamics and its relationship with other macroeco-
nomic aggregates. On the one hand, exchange rate determinants are presumably
economic fundamentals, whereas the exchange rate exhibits a random walk em-
pirically. On the other hand, classical models treat the exchange rate as a shock
absorber that facilitates the international resource allocation; whereas, it is found
that exchange rate pass-through to economic fundamentals, such as output and
ination, is not as e¢ cient as the theory suggests. By incorporating monetary
policy coordination, this study nds rather limited improvements to the mod-
elsability to replicate exchange rate dynamics. Such compromise in the model
structure potentially undermines the models ability to replicate and even forecast
dynamics of key macro-aggregates.
Is the Coordinating Economy More Volatile?
In terms of time series volatility, by incorporating monetary coordination (C-
3.6), simulated variances of EA output (2yea) and the real exchange rate (
2
Q)
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have been largely narrowed down towards their actual values, though they both
still deviate from the true value to a great extent; yet variances of US output
(2yus) , ination (
2
us) and interest rate (
2
rus) remain una¤ected, and variances
of EA ination (2ea) and interest rate (
2
rea) are both higher relative to the
non-coordination model.
Intuitively, the EAs coordinating policy is e¤ective in accommodating the im-
pact from domestic shocks on both the domestic and foreign economies. Nonethe-
less, the EA economy is taking a higher risk of exposing itself to more foreign
economic uctuations, and a higher risk of stabilising the domestic output and
real exchange rate at the expense of its own ination and interest rate stability.
For instance, US monetary expansion may have a contractionary e¤ect on the
EA economy. Without coordination, the EA interest rate is forced to decline
on a larger scale when impacts of the US policy are nally passed through into
changes in bilateral trade ows. With a coordinating policy, the EA interest rate
is cut to a smaller magnitude for consecutive periods in response to instantaneous
movements in the real exchange rate25. Typically, when the transmission of shocks
to the real exchange rate is more instantaneous, the EA interest rate takes actions
even before the impact on output and ination arrives, and hence, reduces the
output and ination volatility. Nonetheless, to achieve stability, a fairly accurate
estimate is needed for impact from a one-o¤US monetary expansion. If the extent
to which the monetary spillover can have e¤ects on EA ination is overestimated,
EA monetary coordination, in contrast, creates more macroeconomic volatility
by responding and adjusting unnecessarily aggressively.
Theoretically, the US monetary authority taking no account of a real exchange
rate coordination can dampen the economic stabilisation of both economies, and
may also amplify the impact of a beggar-thy-neighbour action by the US on the
EA economy. The stabilising policy feedback from EA monetary coordination
potentially weakens the e¤ectiveness of a US devaluation policy intending to boost
25This is assuming that the interest rate response to the real exchange rate is relatively low,
such as hea0 = 0:25 in model C-3.6.
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US output and depress US unemployment. Thus, a more persistent expansionary
policy in the US is needed to achieve a certain output and employment level.
Consequently, persistent policy responses in the EA can potentially result in
more volatile situations due to the US monetary authoritys self-interest. US,
individually, may not have such an intention since its output reacts positively
to a real dollar appreciation, and hence, the competitive devaluation cannot be
an answer to restore its current account decit. However, such a conclusion can
have a wider implication to other EA trading partners.
Altogether, the ability to replicate variances of target variables is poor in both
models. The bounds simulated by both models fail to enclose any target vari-
ables actual data variance. Even so, by and large, the majority of coordination
models show stronger advantages over the non-coordination model in stabilising
macroeconomic aggregates. Table 4.9 lists the models that produce 1st and 2nd
closest mean of simulated variances to their associated actual value (3rd and 4th
column). Although these closest features scatter across a series of coordina-
tion models, distinguished by the independence of monetary policies and by the
economy that coordinates, certain features can be identied.
Actual NonC Closest Mean 2nd Closest Mean
2yus 8:1212 63:9403
C-3.10
60:0244
C-3.8
60:7012
2yea 3:6088 27:9706
C-3.6
20:6688
C-3.9
20:759
2us 0:3886 3:4624
DOM_C-4.4
1:331
DOM_C-4.5
2:151
2ea 0:2386 0:5796
DOM_C-4.5
0:4459
C-3.8
0:4598
2rus 0:8427 2:0674
DOM_C-4.4
1:0276
DOM_C-4.5
1:1893
2rea 0:4319 1:0457
DOM_C-4.4
0:6103
C-3.7
0:7496
2Q 0:026 119:583
C-3.10
77:6854
DOM_C-4.6
80:5735
The rst column reports variances of the actual time series; the second
column reports the mean values of simulated variances; the third and fourth
columns report the models that generate variances closest and 2nd closest
to the actual variance with values of the variance below.
Table 4.9: The closest simulated mean of variances
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The EAs coordinating attitude towards the real exchange rate is crucial in
cutting down the volatility for all variables except for US output, which has not
been largely varied by any model26. Its low degree of coordination only lowers
EA output to some extent, yet has marked ability to stabilise real exchange
rate uctuations. All four models with a low degree of EA coordination (model
C-3.6, C-3.9, C3.10 and DOM_C-4.6) generate the lowest real exchange rate
volatility. On the other hand, its moderate or high degree coordination tends
to lower ination and interest rate volatility in both regimes. Thus, stability of
macroeconomic aggregates can be varying partly because of changes in the EAs
manner of reacting to real exchange rate movements.
On the contrary, models with only US coordinates show no benet from sole
US responses to the real exchange rate, irrespective of exchange rate regimes.
Rather, in terms of real exchange rate volatility, it is pretty costly for the US
to have a low degree of monetary coordination. In particular, model DOM_C-
4.327 produces the highest real exchange rate volatility (825:58) which is more
than ten times the minimum. As a whole, among the three di¤erent degrees
of US coordination, only the moderate response level enables models to produce
relatively low variances for some target variables, such as US ination and interest
rate, even though these variances are not among the lowest. Either high or low
degree of sole US coordination raises the volatility of all target variables.
Partial-coordination models, by and large, have blended results. No denitive
conclusion can be made with regard to which model produces the lowest volatility
that ts into the actual data property. However, given that the manner of coordi-
nation di¤ers in these two economies, limited cases of partial-coordination might
not be able to reveal the true monetary policy stance. Further investigation can
be done by extending the number of partial-coordination cases, or by estimating
26Simulated means of US output variance varies from 60.02 by model C-3.10 to 68.93 by
model DOM_C-4.3.
27In this model, the US responds to the real exchange rate with coe¢ cients hus0 =  0:25,
hus1 = 0:15; while the EA intends to x the nominal USD/EUR exchange rate against the US
dollar.
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coe¢ cients associated with monetary coordination.
4.4.3 Evaluating Models by US Output and Ination
The volatility of output and the volatility of ination are two essential targets in
the policymakers loss function. Many studies have been carried out, and various
types of monetary policy rules have been proposed in the hope of nding an
optimal monetary policy rule that minimises the volatility of the target variables
and hence the loss function. However, the reliability of those ndings may be
undermined by the overall ability of a model used to estimate and predict these
target variables. It will be informative to examine the robustness of those ndings
by evaluating the underlying modelsoverall performance, in particular, when the
focuses are limited to output and ination.
Wald percentile
Model Dynamics Volatility Dynamics+Volatility
C-3.3 USTaylor
36:5%
( 0:6101)
85:3%
(0:2706)
56:8%
( 0:3233)
C-3.11 USTaylor,EAFull
47:5%
( 0:4403)
84:9%
(0:3192)
56:7%
( 0:2783)
C-3.9 BothTaylor
31:8%
( 0:7293)
84:6%
(0:3026)
62:1%
( 0:1680)
C-3.5 EASvensson
76:1%
(0:2016)
95:0%
(1:6584)
95:9%
(1:8187)
NonC (benchmark)
77:6%
(0:2387)
94:0%
(1:4219)
95:7%
(1:8706)
This table reports the Wald statistics percentile, followed by the normlised MD in
parentheses. The ranking is based on the normalised MD for dynamics and volatility.
Table 4.10: Best performing models by US output and ination
Table 4.10 reports the four best performing models when both US output and
ination are jointly tested. Statistics for the non-coordination model are also
included at the bottom of the table for comparison. Regarding the modelsdy-
namics, a low degree of coordination in the US, suggested in Taylor (1999), seems
to make positive progresses in all three models with a low degree of US coordi-
nation normalised MDs (for Dynamics) fall into negative, regardless of whether
there is coordination in the EA. Whereas, as the US monetary coordination gets
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stronger the modelsdynamics are undermined.
The EA monetary coordination, even though not as decisive as the US co-
ordination, does likewise. Models with a low degree of EA coordination tend to
perform better than those with a medium to high degree of coordination, irrespec-
tive of whether the US is coordinating. Yet with both economies coordinating
with a Taylor type (low degree) response to the real exchange rate, the dynam-
ics of US output and ination can be well captured. The partial-coordination
model C-3.9 performs exceptionally well relative to the non-coordination model
and other coordination models.
When both dynamics and volatility are accounted for, the coordination models
C-3.3, C-3.11 and C-3.9 outperform the others28. The strength of these models
lies in the coordination policy in both the US and EA that enables models to
better interpret the dynamics of economic aggregates. In regard to the data
volatility, however, they all perform poorly. It was previously mentioned that
a low degree of US coordination has no benet in lowering volatility. Appar-
ently, the contradiction between tting data dynamics and tting data volatility
becomes troublesome when identifying the model with the best performance.
4.4.4 Evaluating Models by EA Output and Ination
Table 4.11 lists the ve best performing models, ranked by normalised MDs on
both modelsdynamics and volatility when EA output and ination are accounted
for. Corresponding statistics for the non-coordination model, ranked 8th place,
are also listed at the bottom of the table for comparison. These models all mar-
ginally survive in the testing according to the actual Wald statistic (for both
Dynamics and Volatility). Even though normalised MDs suggest that some co-
ordination models can bring estimates closer to the actual data, there is no sub-
stantial improvement in closeness to distinguish any of these models from the
non-coordination model.
28Taking account of the variability of testing statistics, these three models perform
equivalently.
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Certainly, with regard to the economic stability in the EA, although it has
been shown that the EA monetary coordination has stabilising e¤ects, its e¤ec-
tiveness is potentially balanced out by trade-o¤s between lowering ination and
interest rate variances and lowering output and real exchange rate variances. For
instance, model C-3.10 produces the lowest output and real exchange rate vari-
ances, but relatively high ination and interest rate variances; whereas model
DOM_C-4.4 produces the lowest ination and interest rate variances, but rela-
tively high output and real exchange rate variances. For the policy design, the
choices can be made in accordance with the policy stance of a country; whilst for
evaluating the models performance, particularly when all aspects are included,
this may create close scores that make an improvement indistinguishable from
another.
Wald statistics
Model Dynamics Volatility Dynamics+Volatility
C-3.5 EASvensson
99:3%
(3:6117)
90:2%
(0:8633)
98:9%
(3:0036)
C-3.8 BothSvensson
99:1%
(3:5713)
90:9%
(1:0426)
98:8%
(3:3604)
DOM_C-4.5 EAd_Svensson
99:2%
(3:5343)
89:9%
(0:9320)
99:0%
(3:5676)
DOM_C-4.4 EAd_Full
99:6%
(3:5352)
94:3%
(1:5047)
99:5%
(3:6135)
C-3.4 EAFull
99:9%
(4:2566)
95:8%
(1:8866)
99:6%
(3:6669)
NonC (benchmark)
99:7%
(4:1551)
93:1%
(1:2883)
99:6%
(4:0862)
This table reports the Wald statistics percentile, followed by the normlised MD in
parentheses. The ranking is based on the normalised MD on dynamics and volatility.
Table 4.11: Best performing models by EA output and ination - compared with
model NonC
The dynamics of EA output and the dynamics of EA ination, surprisingly,
have not been a¤ected by the additional real exchange rate channel. That is to
say, coordination models have no substantial advantage over the non-coordination
model. Judging by normalised MDs, a small margin between the best performing
model DOM_C-4.5 and the non-coordination model suggests an equivalent level
of performance if testing variations are also taken into account.
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Most studies focusing on the optimal open economy monetary policy judge
coordinating coe¢ cients (hi0 and h
i
1) by evaluating policymakersloss functions,
which commonly consists of the weighted volatility of ination, output, and other
relevant variables. This study sheds light on the properties of those results from
a broader perspective; the fact that the non-coordination model is in the middle
range of all models being tested raises concerns that the models overall tness to
reality needs to be evaluated more generally from both dynamics and volatility
perspectives. In some circumstances, models are improved in one aspect at the
cost of compromising the other. The comparatively deteriorated tness to data
cannot describe reality well, and thus, cannot reect the true value of coe¢ cients
that are appropriate for the monetary policy design.
4.4.5 EvaluatingModels by Target Variable Combinations
Broadly speaking, the result of the indirect inference model evaluation is in favour
of coordination models, even though the non-coordination model may not be far
behind for some target variable combinations. Depending on the target variable
combination focused on in a testing practice, the best performingmodel can
vary. That is, it is inconclusive in regard to which is the best reality-reecting
model when the focus of a testing practice is changing; or in other words, a model
can be the best performingmodel for one target variable combination, but per-
form badly when it is tested against the other variable combination. Nevertheless,
investigations across a group of selected target variable combinations that hold
more researchersattention may bring wider and deeper implications.
Not surprisingly, for every variable combination, there are some coordination
models that can outperform the non-coordination model. On average, coordi-
nation models outperform the baseline non-coordination model by around 35%,
with the biggest success a 117% improvement. Regarding key macro-aggregates of
the US, coordination models with weak (low degree) US coordination and strong
(high degree) EA coordination tend to outstand the others. It is also worth
noting that EA macro-aggregates exhibit strong co-movements with US macro-
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aggregates; and hence, xed-exchange-rate models with US domination perform
strongly relative to the others, regardless of whether the US is coordinating.
Under a xed-exchange-rate regime, the leader countrys authority designs
its monetary policy according to its self-interests; whereas, implied by the real
exchange rate identity, the follower has its ination attached to the leaders in-
ation and real exchange rate di¤erentials directly (see equation 4.3 and 4.2).
Changes to the ination rate in the leader country take a shorter time to have a
direct impact on the follower, whose ination reects spontaneously the leaders
ination movements. Meanwhile, as the capital mobility is not controlled, the
international arbitrage enforces an equivalent nominal interest rate level across
borders. In other words, the follower has no monetary independence their nom-
inal interest rate moves one to one with the leaders nominal interest rate. This
relationship is mathematically represented by the nominal UIP (equation 3.14).
Moreover, when combining the real UIP (equation 3.15) and the followers
ination determination equation (take the EA as the follower), one can obtain29
rreat   rrust = Et
 
ust+1   eat+1

: (4.4)
Hence, a real interest rate di¤erential in the current period implies a future
ination di¤erential across economies.
In short, under a xed-exchange-rate regime, the followers ination and nom-
inal interest rate are determined exogenously by the leader unless there are fun-
damental changes to the real interest rate di¤erential. The e¤ectiveness of the
leaders monetary coordination hence indirectly a¤ects the followers nominal
variables. More likely, if the leaders monetary coordination is e¤ective, the
volatility of the followers ination and nominal interest rate may be more mod-
erate. Take model DOM_C-4.1 (US fully coordinates, EA acts as a follower) as
29Note that, it can also be obtained by combining the International Fisher E¤ect (IFE)
and the equivalent nominal interest rates. The IFE implies rrust = R
us
t   Etust+1 and rreat =
Reat  Eteat+1 for the US and EA, respectively. Subtracting one from the other, one can obtain
rreat   rrust = Reat   Rust   Eteat+1 + Etust+1. Knowing that Rust = Reat , the equation can be
further reduced to rreat   rrust = Etust+1   Eteat+1.
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an example, a negative monetary shock in the US lowers US nominal interest
rate, which in turn pushes up US ination in periods. With coordination in the
US monetary policy rule, the actual decline in the interest rate is smaller than its
initial movement; and its impact on US ination is smaller30. Hence, although
the EA economy still su¤ers from volatility transited from the US economy, the
magnitude of uctuation may be smaller depending on the manner of US policy
coordination. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that the leaders ex-
cessive responses to the real exchange rate can also result in a negative impact
on the follower.
1958Q1 1970Q2 1982Q4 1995Q2 2007Q4
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Figure 4-4: Nominal USD/EUR exchange rates
In reality, both monetary authorities in the US and EA label themselves with
a exible-exchange-rate regime. As shown in Figure 4-4, the nominal USD/EUR
exchange rate31 has uctuated since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
in the early 1970s. The close co-movements between the US and EA macro-
aggregates are unlikely to be the result of an intentional exchange rate interven-
tion. However, it might shed light on a newly dened era the Bretton Woods
30This is assuming a proper level of coordination. A su¢ ciently strong coordination can also
turn the movement of the nominal interest rate in the opposite direction.
31The nominal Dollar to Euro exchange rate is the synthetic exchange rate taken from Datas-
tream (Ref: USEURSN).
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IIera. The US dollar may have retained its hegemony even long after the formal
US dollar domination has ended.
Bretton Woods II originated from a paper by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and
Garber (Dooley et al., 2003), in which they argued that the global monetary
system has entered a revived BrettonWoodsera. Instead of Japan and Germany
as in the Bretton Woods era, some Asian economies become the new peripheral
economies after the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. Just as during the BrettonWoods era,
the new periphery is characterised by currency undervaluation, capital control
and accumulated reserves; the center (the US) acts as a main source of demand for
exports and nancial intermediary32. Also, Bibow (2006) argued that Euroland
has in fact been behaving like a trade-account region (a peripheral region),
contributing to the deterioration of the US twin decits.
Either as a result of Bretton Woods II or the US activism in securing its
dollar status, or both, the hegemony of the US dollar provides the privilege for
the benign neglectin regard to the US external balance; more importantly, it
can be an explanation to the isolated US economy and to the close co-movements
between EA and US macro-aggregates. On the other hand, the euro is involun-
tarily subject to external variations due to actions taken in response to the dollar
hegemony; when the EA actively seeking an export-led strategy, the EA can also
expose itself voluntarily to the external uctuations as suggested by the test
result.
Furthermore, even though coordination models t the actual data relatively
well, they have little advantage over the non-coordination model when the real
exchange rate is excluded from the joint Wald test. Table 4.12 shows the ranking
of the best performing models when output, ination and interest rate from both
regions are jointly tested. The top four models are all coordination models and
32Bretton Woods IIis used to argue that that the US current account decit is a result of
bilateral a¤airs benecial to both the centre and the periphery. Following that, the US current
account imbalance may not be as unsustainable as it looks. Bibow (2006), on the other hand,
argued that the US balance of payments imbalance is a benign neglect at the core. Desipit
the heated debate on the vulnerability of Bretton Woods II, the concept, coupled with the the
benign neglect, is in fact a reasonable description of the global economy for the past decade.
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Ranking Model normalised MD
1 DOM_C-4.4 EAd_Full 10:9787
2 C-3.7 EAFull 11:2144
3 C-3.8 BothSvensson 11:2168
4 DOM_C-4.5 EAd_Svensson 12:2780
9 NonC (benchmark) 14:4137
Table 4.12: Best performing models by output, ination and interest rate in both
regions
perform at a close range from 11 to 12:13 according to normalised MDs for both
dynamics and volatility. Still, being ranked 9th place, the non-coordination model
does not fall behind substantially relative to the others.
Noticeably, comparing the joint test of 6 target variables with the joint test of
7 target variables, the inclusion of the real exchange rate deteriorates a models
performance heavily, irrespective of whether the tested model incorporates mone-
tary coordination. The normalised MD is pushed up dramatically from just below
11 to 90 at best. Most importantly, the gap between the non-coordination models
performance and the coordination models performance is largely widened. This
phenomenon is widely found in the tested cases (see Table 4.13). Certainly, mon-
etary policy coordination explains a part of the missing link, especially determi-
nants of the real exchange rate; it also possesses an ability to stabilise economic
uctuations to a certain degree. Nevertheless, further investigation, such as in
the transmission mechanism of the exchange rate to macroeconomic aggregates,
is needed in order to improve the models ability to t the actual data.
Note that the indirect inference test evaluates the DSGE models performance
from the perspective of the models ability to replicate the properties of the
actual data (in-sample forecast). It di¤ers from the other statistical tests, such
as the LR test focusing on the models predictive ability (out-of-sample forecast);
put di¤erently, these two measurements of t are not statistically correlated
for a given model (Le et al., 2011)33. Moreover, Monte Carlo experiments also
33Le et al. (2011) also found that the Del Negro-Schorfheide DSGE-VAR weight is correlated
to the LR test; thus, these two tests are more or less testing the same aspect of the model
performance - the predictive ability.
120
Target
Variables
Di¤ Best performingNonC
Target
Variables
Di¤ Best performingNonC
yus; yea 0:6527 yus; yea; Q 3:962
us; ea 0:1497 us; ea; Q 12:1254
rus; rea 2:0425 rus; rea; Q 34:5987
yus; us 2:1939 yus; us; Q 3:6543
yea; ea 1:0826 yea; ea; Q 21:8213
yus; yea; us; ea 0:2171 yus; yea; us; ea; Q 10:8138
This table lists the di¤erentials of normalised MDs (dynamics and volatility)
between the non-coordiantion model and the best performing model
from each testing practice on the associated target variable set
(normalised MDNonC   normalised MDBest Performing );
Table 4.13: Gaps between the non-coordination and the coordination model (mea-
sured by the di¤erences in normalised MDs)
suggested that the power of the indirect inference test was considerably higher
than that of the LR test. Hence, for the purpose of detecting the e¢ cacy of the
models in-sample forecast, the indirect inference test is an appropriate but more
demanding test. For a detailed discussion on this issue, one can refer to Le et
al. (2012). Accordingly, the test result in this study should be considered to be
reliable as judged by its high statistical power; but it should not be mistaken as
a justication for the DSGE models predictive ability due to its di¤erent focal
point from other statistical tests.
4.4.6 Variance Decomposition
To understand the change in the international transmission mechanism, this sec-
tion compares the impact of a shock in the non-coordination model with that in
the best performing coordination model (C-3.6). To derive the variance decom-
position, all shocks are simply treated as deterministic and orthogonal to each
other: in each simulation, the economy is only hit by one shock in the rst period
with one unit of standard error. The volatility of each target variable in response
to this particular deterministic shock is calculated over a time horizon of 20 pe-
riods. The relative impact of this shock on a target variable (TV ) can then be
calculated as a ratio of the target variables volatility due to this shock over its
total volatility:
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V DTV"i =
2 (TV j "i)
2 (TV )
(4.5)
where "i can be any shock specied in the model setting.
Little spillover e¤ect is found in the baseline non-coordination model, which
is consistent with the nding in Le et al. (2010), though the entire structure
of shock impacts signicantly di¤ers. Wage mark-up shocks in both economies
have no signicant impacts on any key macroeconomic aggregate. Shocks are
transited into the real exchange rate variation and the net export variation from
both economies, but with a strong US domination. In particular, the US mark-
up shock contributes to about 80% volatility of the real exchange rate and net
exports. And this nding is common to both the non-coordination model and
coordination models.
Instead of a balanced impact structure, US economic volatility, especially
output and interest rate, is found to be dominated by the US price mark-up shock.
In particular, when the time horizon is extended, a domestic price-mark up shock
may take up more than 98% of the US output volatility. The productivity shock
and monetary policy shock have certain impacts on US ination and interest rate,
but the scale is smaller than the ndings in Le et al. (2010).
In contrast with the US economy, EAs economic volatility has more diverse
sources. Output volatility in the EA is attributed largely to its productivity shock
and investment shock. The EA price mark-up shock is pretty trivial in explaining
EA output volatility, yet it contributes to EA ination and interest rate rather
signicantly. Apart from the wage mark-up shock, government spending shock,
and labour supply shock, all other EA shocks have large impacts on EA ination
volatility. Noticeably, the EA monetary policy shock is strongly inuential to
ination, but not interest rate. EA interest rate volatility, more similar to its
output volatility, is largely impacted by the productivity shock and the investment
shock, though the preference shock and the price mark-up shock also a¤ect the
EA interest rate by 13% in total.
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Table 4.14 shows a comparison of the non-coordination model and the coor-
dination model (C-3.6) by the percentage e¤ect of each US shock to eight macro-
variables (7 target variables and US net exports to EA). The last row adds up
the total e¤ect from US shocks on each variable. Unsurprisingly, the e¤ect of
US shocks on the EA macro-aggregate is trivial in the non-coordination model;
whilst with EA monetary coordination, US shocks have a remarkable impact on
the total uctuation of EA macro-aggregates. In particular, US shocks now have
an unexpectedly high domination on the EA economic volatility 31:2%, 53:6%
and 53:4% of EA output, ination and interest rate, respectively. As expected,
the US shock that takes a major role in the EA volatility is the US price mark-up
shock.
Moreover, compared to the non-coordination model, there is a substantial
increase of impacts on the EA economy from the US productivity shock and
government spending shock, even though the international transmission of these
two shocks to the real exchange rate and trade balance is barely altered. This
is possibly raised by the magnied impact on the coordinating economy through
both the interest rate channel and the direct exchange rate channel. Such an
impact can lead to too much volatility in the coordinating economy when ei-
ther its counterparty is not coordinating or it has an over-aggressive response
to the real exchange rate. Given the low degree of EA coordination in model
C-3.6, the chance that the EA interest rate over-reacts to the real exchange rate
is small. Whereas, it is more likely that a US shock is delivered entirely to the
EA economic variation through both direct and indirect exchange rate channels.
Without coordination, the US monetary policy will not counter-balance its do-
mestic shocks until the associated impact hits US ination and output; on the
other hand, the entire shock impact on the real exchange rate puts immediate
pressure on the contemporaneous EA interest rate and its movements in subse-
quent periods34. And with time lags, when the expenditure-switching e¤ect takes
34The complete interest rate pass-through is assumed here in the example, as this is not the
concern of this study at this moment.
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place in both economies, the EA monetary policy will need to take both actual
changes in the domestic economy and potential changes in the US policy into
consideration. With both of these e¤ects, US shocks are more likely to induce
additional uctuations in the EA interest rate and hence other aggregates in the
case of sole EA coordination rather than partial coordination.
Table 4.15, similarly, shows a comparison of the non-coordination model and
the coordination model (C-3.6) by the percentage e¤ect of each EA shock to eight
key variables. As mirrored from a large increase in the transmission of US shocks,
the domestic contribution to the EA economic variation declines proportionally,
but remains plausible. In particular, the EA productivity shock and investment
shock are the major domestic forces. It is also worth mentioning that the EA
preference and government spending shocks have even larger impacts on EA
output in the presence of EA coordination. And again, the impact of EA shocks
on the real exchange rate and trade balance is generally constant when moving
from the non-coordination model to the coordination model.
Contrarily, hardly any impact from EA shocks is passed through to the US
economy even though the scale of information reected in the real exchange rate
is not substantially changed after introducing monetary coordination. Simply by
conducting the exercise again but with US coordination, it can be shown that
this phenomenon is partially a result of no monetary coordination from the US.
Yet even when the US coordinates to the same degree as the EA, EA shocks
still have a relatively low impact on the US economy compared to the impact
that the EA receives from US shocks. This result sheds light on other possible
reasons that can cause two orthogonal continents. For instance, an incomplete
exchange rate pass-through and a weak expenditure-switching e¤ect for various
reasons can potentially isolate the US economy. Besides, by treating the ROW as
exogenous, trade structures in the US and EA are partially truncated. And the
information that the real exchange rate reects may be far beyond that which a
simple two-country relation can demonstrate.
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yus yea us ea rus rea Q nx
NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6
Prod 2:76 2:76 0 0:99 2:57 2:57 0 1:76 2:63 2:63 0 1:45 2:81 2:84 3:13 3:27
Cons 0:12 0:12 0 0:02 0:68 0:68 0 0:05 0:87 0:87 0 0:36 0:39 0:52 1:31 2:0
Inv 0:06 0:06 0 0:02 0:06 0:06 0 0:05 0:14 0:14 0 0:04 0:11 0:14 0:12 0:16
Tayl 0:13 0:13 0 0:02 9:48 9:4 0 0:03 2:59 2:56 0 0:49 0:29 0:38 0:31 0:4
US WM 0:01 0:01 0 0 0:01 0:01 0 0:004 0:01 0:01 0 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:01
Gov 0:09 0:09 0 0:36 0:43 0:43 0 0:65 0:78 0:79 0 0:55 1:13 1:18 1:33 1:45
PM 96:7 96:7 0 29:7 86:6 86:7 0 50:95 92:8 92:8 0 50:4 80:4 78:9 79:1 76:7
LabS 0:18 0:18 0 0:07 0:19 0:19 0 0:127 0:19 0:19 0 0:1 0:21 0:22 0:18 0:18
Total 100 100 0 31:2 100 100 0 53:62 100 100 0 53:4 85:3 84:2 85:5 84:1
Table 4.14: Variance decomposition (NonC vs. C-3.6) - US shocks
yus yea us ea rus rea Q nx
NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6 NC C-3.6
Prod 0 0 40:7 24:5 0 0:002 24:1 14:0 0:01 0:003 35:0 17:3 8:15 8:77 7:54 8:05
Cons 0 0 1:80 2:18 0:003 0 9:47 5:08 0 0:001 6:34 3:1 0:15 0:2 0:66 1:03
Inv 0 0 51:7 37:1 0 0:002 34:4 13:1 0:01 0:003 50:0 22:0 5:4 5:61 5:46 5:76
Tayl 0 0 2:65 2:00 0:003 0 18:5 6:75 0 0 0:69 0:31 0:56 0:69 0:49 0:58
EA WM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gov 0 0 1:65 2:04 0 0 0:34 0:34 0 0 0:42 0:28 0:09 0:11 0:07 0:09
PM 0 0 0:31 0:28 0 0 12:7 6:64 0 0 6:9 3:28 0:14 0:19 0:14 0:19
LabS 0 0 1:14 0:74 0 0 0:47 0:43 0 0 0:65 0:40 0:21 0:24 0:19 0:2
Total 0 0 100 68:8 0:006 0:004 100 46:4 0:02 0:007 100 46:6 14:7 15:8 14:5 15:9
yi; i; ri output, ination and interest rate for economy i = US;EA, respectively;
Q the real exchange rate between the US dollar and the euro; nx net exports between the US and EA;
Prod productivity shock; Cons preference shock; Inv investment technology shock; Tayl monetary policy shock;
WM wage mark-up shock; Gov exogenous government spending; PM price mark-up shock; LabS labour supply shock;
Table 4.15: Variance decomposition (NonC vs. C-3.6) - EA shocks
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More importantly, this result provides a demonstration of the EAs crucial role
in the global economy it e¤ectively accommodates shocks from both economies.
It is expected that the stabilising e¤ect is generated from both internalising do-
mestic shocks by reacting to the self-induced exchange rate uctuation and coun-
teracting foreign shocks by reacting to the external-induced exchange rate uc-
tuation. Nonetheless, its e¤ectiveness relies on not only the degree of monetary
coordination, but also the degree of pass-through from shocks and policies.
With EA monetary coordination, US shocks are more likely to be transmitted
into the EA economy and stabilised before feeding back to the US economy.
On the other hand, even when the US coordinates, EA shocks are less likely
to be transited into the US economy; therefore, given the same level of self-
accommodating actions, the stabilising e¤ect given by the US is less e¤ective
than the EA. As a whole, EA monetary coordination is fast and e¤ective, easing
the impact of domestic shocks on the EA, as well as minimising the impact being
transmitted into the US economy. Meanwhile, US monetary coordination plays
a relatively small role (a trivial role especially in model C-3.6) in stabilising
economies.
Conventionally, analyses on the propagation of the business cycle put con-
siderable attention on TOT, international trade and interest rate e¤ects; indeed,
the implication was meaningful. Nonetheless, this exercise also raises the impor-
tance of monetary policy coordination, which opens up a direct exchange rate
channel for modelling the international transmission mechanism of shocks. Pro-
vided that economic fundamental changes are reected in the real exchange rate
on the same scale across both the non-coordination and coordination models, it
would be expected that any of the increased international transmission of shocks
is facilitated by monetary policy coordination. It also implies that allowing trade
in the good and nancial markets is not su¢ cient in mimicking the international
transmission mechanism if the representation of relative prices is unclear. The
missing exchange rate channel might disable the propagation mechanism even if
the trade channel and the interest rate channel are present.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter evaluates a non-coordination model and various coordination models
using the indirect inference method. The benchmark model, the non-coordination
model, is a two-country DSGE model built on the inuential work of Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007), with additional cross-country links. The featured
international good and nancial market enables the propagation of shocks across
borders. Although the framework is found to perform better than other DSGE
alternatives, especially in terms of the dynamic behaviour of key macroeconomic
aggregates, it left a puzzle of surprisingly weak spillover between economies.
On the other hand, the modern economy witnesses a growing macroeconomic
interdependence as a result of economic, technological, political and sociological
developments. The call for macroeconomic policy coordination has increased
during the years of global integration, particularly in periods of crises. Despite all
that, the majority of the literature, including strategic game models and NOEM
models, found an insignicant role played by monetary coordination. The interest
of this study, therefore, lies in the existence of monetary coordination, embedded
in the monetary policy rule as a direct response to the real exchange rate, and its
impacts on the DSGE modelsperformance. Monetary authoritiescoordination
actions as a consequence of macroeconomic interdependence are unveiled by the
policy instruments direct response to the real exchange rate. Thus, the null
hypothesis that monetary policy coordination exists holds if incorporating real
exchange rate responses in a monetary policy rule can improve the DSGE models
ability to replicate data substantially closer to the actual data.
Indirect inference is used to draw a statistical inference from various DSGE
models for model evaluation and comparison. To evaluate the overall performance
of a model, coe¢ cients of the auxiliary model (dynamics) and simulated variances
(volatility) are both included in the testing object. Corresponding normalised
MDs are also reported alongside the Wald statistic percentile. The testing period
is extended relative to previous studies; ranging from 1970 to 2008 subject to
127
data availability.
The testing result implies that coordination models generally outperform the
baseline non-coordination model, due to improvements in both the prediction
precision and the prediction uncertainty. Hence, the null hypothesis holds; mon-
etary policy coordination, or such interdependent actions, exists over the past
four decades within the sample period of this study.
By a close investigation of various coordination models, it is suggested that
EA monetary coordination has a crucial role in stabilising both economies to
some extent. However, there are trade-o¤s that potentially complicate the design
of a coordination policy in the EA the weak coordination tends to cut down the
volatility of output and the real exchange rate, whilst the strong coordination is
more e¤ective at lowering ination and interest rate variances. On the contrary,
sole US coordination has no considerable benet as an economic stabiliser; in-
stead, it becomes one of the causes of high real exchange rate volatility as the
degree of coordination rises.
When variables of interest are limited to output and ination, which are
essential in the CBsloss function considered in most studies, the modelsability
to replicate US data, but not EA data, is dramatically improved. Moreover,
modelsperformance deteriorates heavily once the real exchange rate is included,
irrespective of whether monetary coordination is present. This sharply widened
gap implies that reproducing the real exchange rate is essential in improving
DSGE modelsin-sample performance.
Additionally, variance decomposition exercise justies the importance of mon-
etary coordination in illustrating real exchange rate dynamics and enhancing the
transmission mechanism of shocks. The simple trade channel and interest rate
channel are not su¢ cient in modelling the international transmission mechanism
since a mis-illustrated exchange rate will disable the proper functioning of those
conventional channels to some extent. As a whole, the models propagation of
shocks is enhanced by the direct exchange rate channel, but the benets in terms
of lowering variances of macroeconomic aggregates in either economy are ambigu-
128
ous. Monetary coordination provides feedback routes to accommodate shocks and
stabilise the economy, whilst it also implies a higher exposure of the coordinating
economy to foreign shocks. In particular, when its counterparties have no in-
tention of coordinating, the EA economy is more likely to su¤er from instability
transmitted from the US.
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Chapter 5
Estimating the US-EA
Two-Country DSGE Model
5.1 Introduction
Ever since the renement of DSGE models that allows conventional econometric
techniques to be applied, this theoretically attractive framework has drawn im-
mense attention from researchers focusing on forecasting and quantitative policy
analysis, and even gained itself a place in CBs and some multilateral institu-
tions1. Its coherent and micro-founded properties enable researchers to identify
sources of variations, predict impacts from policy adjustments and structural
changes as well as perform counterfactual experiments. Moreover, its ability to
link structural parameters to reduced-form parameters facilitates a large break-
through in understanding structural behaviours of the economy. The progress of
DSGE modelling is quickly absorbing and incorporating all of the di¤erent fea-
tures of the economic reality, such as sectoral specications, heterogeneities and
the behavioural psychology and so forth.
Notwithstanding these advantages, a question remains on how well a DSGE
1Some central banks have already developed their own DSGE models. Examples are the
Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the US Federal Reserve.
Also, international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also have their own
DSGE model.
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model is tting the actual data, in other words, can it be empirically validated?
Smets and Wouters in 2003 (SW, 2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans in 2005 (hereafter CEE (2005)) set forward the success of DSGE models.
The evidence emerged that an elaborate DSGE model with nominal and real
rigidities can forecast macroeconomic time series reasonably well, accounting for
the e¤ects of various structural shocks, especially monetary policy shock.
In 2010, the work of Le, Meenagh, Minford and Wickens (Le et al., 2010) pre-
sented a two-country DSGE model, which is a combined version of the individual
models in SW (2003) and SW (2007). The method of indirect inference was con-
ducted to evaluate the models closeness to actual data properties from the per-
spective of traditional econometric inference. It was shown that a cross-country
link by a good market and a nancial market improved the open-economy DSGE
models performance to an extent, but a mystery remained as the cross-country
interactions were still absent from the system. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, to
restore the link between two economies and improve the models performance, it
is important to allow monetary coordination by means of a policy instruments
direct reaction to real exchange rate movements.
As an extension, this chapter goes one step further to estimate this US-EA
two-country DSGE model with monetary policy coordination using the indirect
inference methodology. In three main aspects, this attempt di¤ers from previous
studies.
First, despite the large amount of literature estimating or parameterizing
DSGE models, only a few of them used the indirect inference estimation2. The
most relevant method of this kind is the Minimum Distance Estimation (MDE)
used in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and CEE (2005), in which parameters
were chosen to minimise the di¤erence between IRFs, estimated from a V AR,
and the analogous objects in a model. Theodoridis (2011) also used this method
2Except for calibrations from the empirical evidence, other methods to parameterise models
include estimations using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), Full-Information Maximum
Likelihood (FIML), Bayesian method as well as Minimum Distance Estimation (MDE).
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to estimate a DSGE model, but has chosen to match both impulse responses and
the reduced-form error covariance.
Second, this study is one of the few studies focusing on large open-economy
DSGE models. The existing literature employing DSGE models is mainly focus-
ing on closed-economy or small open-economy models. In contrast, by pooling
the US and EA economies together, three quarters of the Worldeconomy is then
covered in this study. More importantly, there are strong bi-directional inuences
between markets and interactions between authorities in these two regions. It is
such mutual dependence that enables the concept monetary policy coordination
to be developed, and the potential welfare improvement to be realised.
Last but not least, the model incorporates monetary coordination specied by
a monetary instruments direct responses to real exchange rate movements. The
incentives of a monetary authority adopting monetary policy coordination lie in
the macroeconomic interdependence  their policy inuences each other at an
aggregate level. This specication opens up an additional exchange rate channel,
hence, changes both the domestic and international propagation mechanism. The
spillover between the two economies is hence clearly observed shocks and policies
are channelized not only through the traditional trade and interest rate channels,
but also through a direct exchange rate channel and implicitly through policy
adjustments.
5.2 Parameters in Estimation
The focus of the estimation lies in two parts: rst, common parameters charac-
terising economic fundamentals in both the non-coordination and coordination
models; second, parameters characterising the monetary policy coordination fea-
ture in a coordination model.
There are thirty-three common parameters, including two capital share coef-
cients (us, ea), four consumption or labour supply elasticities (usc , 
us
l , 
ea
c ,
eal ), eight nominal rigidity and partial-indexation coe¢ cients (
us
w , 
us
p , 
us
w , 
us
p ,
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eaw , 
ea
p , 
ea
w , 
ea
p ), six coe¢ cients accounting for real economic frictions ( S
us00,
usp ,  
us, Sea00, ea,  ea), nine monetary policy rule coe¢ cients (us, rus , r
us
y , r
us
y,
ea, rea , r
ea
y , r
ea
y, r
ea
), and nally four New Keynesian weighting parameters in
the wage and price setting equations (usw , 
us
p , 
ea
w ,
ea
p ). These parameters and
their initially calibrated values are listed in Table 5.1.
By searching for the optimal values for a broad range of parameters, it will
be interesting to see what a well-established DSGE framework can imply for
economic behaviours, from an explorative rather than inspectoral aspect.
The rst category of these parameters denes a real side of the economy
regarding the production and consumption preferences. The capital share, re-
ecting the production input structure in an economy, is closely linked to the
status of the economic development. Elasticities of intertemporal substitution
and labour supply, directly a¤ecting the e¤ectiveness of both the monetary and
scal policies, are reections of a households preferences regarding timing and
leisure.
The second category of parameters reveals economic rigidities both from nom-
inal and real aspects. Coe¢ cients for the Calvo setting and the partial indexation
form the price and wage setting behaviours in both forward and backward looking
manners. Weights of the NK behaviour are the additional elements used in Le
et al. (2010), which permit an investigation on the scope of the NK behaviour in
an economy. In addition to the price and wage setting equations, Le et al. (2010)
also characterised the scope of the NK behaviour in both monetary policy rules.
However, for the purpose of nding a single monetary policy rule that prevails
in each individual economy, the NK weights in the monetary policy rule are laid
aside in the estimation.
Costs of capital adjustment and utilization, characterising real economic fric-
tion, are put forward to form more realistic links between investment, output
growth and technological developments. The share of xed costs in the pro-
duction to some extent determines the production capacity and future economic
growth. Last but not least, a set of parameters features monetary policies preva-
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lent over four decades in these two largest economies in the world.
Initial Descriptions
us 0:19 share of capital in production
Sus00 5:74 steady state elasticity of capital adjustment cost
usp 1:5 one plus the share of xed costs in production
 us 0:54 elasticity of capital utilization cost
usc 1:38 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of households
usl 1:83 inverse of elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage
usw 0:7 degree of nominal wage stickiness
usp 0:66 degree of nominal price stickiness
usw 0:58 degree of indexation to past indexation in wage setting
usp 0:24 degree of indexation to past indexation in price setting
usw 0:1* weights of NK in wage setting equation
usp 0:2* weights of NK in price setting equation
us 0:81 degree of interest rate smoothing in monetary policy rule
rus 2:04 coe¢ cient of ination deviation in monetary policy rule
rusy 0:08 coe¢ cient of output gap in monetary policy rule
rusy 0:22 coe¢ cient of short-run output gap in monetary policy rule
ea 0:3 share of capital in production
Sea00 7 steady state elasticity of capital adjustment cost
ea 1:487 one plus the share of xed costs in production
 ea 0:175 elasticity of capital utilization cost
eac 1:608 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of households
eal 1:188 the inverse of elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage
eaw 0:758 degree of nominal wage stickiness
eap 0:909 degree of nominal price stickiness
eaw 0:663 degree of indexation to past indexation in wage setting
eap 0:425 degree of indexation to past indexation in price setting
eaw 0:08 weights of NK in wage setting equation
eap 0:06 weights of Nk in price setting equation
ea 0:931 degree of interest rate smoothing in monetary policy rule
rea 1:661 coe¢ cient of ination deviation in monetary policy rule
reay 0:143 coe¢ cient of output gap in monetary policy rule
reay 0:173 coe¢ cient of short-run output gap in monetary policy rule
rea 0:221 coe¢ cient of short-run ination deviation in monetary policy rule
Table 5.1: Parameters in the estimation
Aside from the conventional coe¢ cients3, four parameters characterizing mon-
etary policy coordination are also estimated in the coordination model. hus0 and
hea0 represent the degrees to which monetary authorities respond to the contem-
3Depending on the monetary regime, a conventional monetary policy rule may consist of
some, or all, of the factors including the interest rate smoothing (policy inertia), the ination
deviation from the authoritys ination targets, the output gap between the current output
and the output level that prevails in the corresponding exible economy, the short-run ination
deviation from its lagged ination rate, the short-run output gap between the current output
and the lagged output level, etc.
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poraneous real exchange rate (Qt), while hus1 and h
ea
1 are the degrees to which
monetary authorities respond to the lagged real exchange rate; in other words,
they represent the adjustments to the previous policy response regarding the real
exchange rate.
Theoretically, a real depreciation (a decline in the value of Qt for the US,
or an increase in the value of Qt for EA) will be balanced instantaneously by a
tightening monetary policy that raises the short-run nominal interest rate. That
is to say the US nominal interest rate is negatively inuenced by the current real
exchange rate, whilst the EA nominal interest rate is positively responsive to the
current real exchange rate. Meanwhile, the nominal interest rates adjust to the
lagged real exchange rate in an opposite manner to the way they react to the
current value. Depending on the elasticity of responses, the adjustments to the
lagged real exchange rate help to balance out the previous monetary policy e¤ect,
preventing excessive uctuations.
Most of the common parameters are estimated subject to 50% upper and lower
bounds around the initial values4. The coe¢ cients for monetary coordination are
set within a [0; 1] interval ensuring a wider range for searching for the best t
monetary policy rule. The initial values of parameters are partially adopted from
the original closed economy SW (2003) and SW (2007) models, and partially
estimated in the two-country version in Le et al. (2010).
5.2.1 Objectives of the Estimation
The aim of an indirect inference estimation is to nd out a set of parameters that
minimises the distance between the simulated and actual data. Such a distance
is measured by an actual Wald statistic (WT ) computed according to the outputs
from an auxiliary model.
In an open-economy DSGE model, the cross-country interactions are also
4For the weighting coe¢ cient such as degrees of the nominal price stickiness and NKs
weights in the price and wage equations, the value of upper bound is manually set to 1 if its
50% upper bound value exceeds 1.
135
mimicked along with the other real and nominal properties. By seeking parame-
ters that best describe the economic reality in such a DSGE model, this study can
(1), further evaluate how well a DSGE model can perform providing the exist-
ing structural setting and optimised parameters; (2), better understand the way
that economies behave from a more globalised perspective, providing the model
evaluation is supportive towards a substantial improvement.
Additionally, the thirty-three common parameters, providing a source of com-
parison, are estimated using the non-coordination model. In the previous chapter,
the existence of monetary policy coordination is proved robustly. Nonetheless, the
fact that structural parameters are mostly calibrated according to some closed-
economy models can be held against this result.
Parameters that can describe the behaviour of a closed economy reasonably
well may not be appropriate for describing an open economy. Inappropriate cal-
ibrations may well be the main factor that fails the non-coordination model,
rather than the lack of monetary policy interaction in the model structure. In
such a case, the monetary policy coordination may be unnecessary or even coun-
terproductive. Thus, the estimation of the non-coordination model serves to
clarify the issue of calibration, by comparing the actual Wald statistics of the
non-coordination and the coordination model when both are at their estimated
optimum. The lower the actual Wald statistic, the closer the actual data is to
the model-simulated mean, hence, the better the model can replicate economic
reality.
In actual practice, nevertheless, the specic objective to be minimised may
vary subject to the di¤erence in research interests, such as variables of interest
(target variables) and the number of variables in joint interest as well as the
aspects of performance that are focused upon.
To be consistent with the model evaluation in the previous chapter, a target
variable set consists of seven variables across both economies, including output,
ination, interest rate and the real USD/EUR exchange rate. The actual Wald
statistic for both dynamics and volatility is used as a criterion.
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5.2.2 Estimation Particulars
The method used for estimating models is the method of indirect inference as
specied in Chapter 3, assisted by the Simulated Annealing (SA) algorithm for
searching for the value of parameters within set boundaries.
Simulated Annealing (SA) is a generic probabilistic algorithm for approximat-
ing global optimisation of a given function across a large spatial area. In order
to avoid being trapped in the local optimum, SA algorithm allows jumps that
shift away from the set of parameters that seems to be optimal by an assigned
probability. Compared with an exhaustive search that enumerates all possible so-
lutions, the SA algorithm keeps the computation to a minimum. And it is more
suitable here as long as the number of iterations is su¢ ciently large to allow for
a thorough search over a restricted space.
An iteration in the estimation begins with a set of parameter values gener-
ated by the SA algorithm. The following process is carried out in the exact order
as the model evaluation deriving shocks and the associated coe¢ cients for the
shock dynamics and volatility; generating bootstrap-simulated datasets; obtain-
ing auxiliary parameters from the actual and model-simulated data; and nally
computing Wald statistics and the associated statistics. One actual Wald statis-
tic (WT ) is produced by each iteration, and is taken as a criterion for judging
the optimal estimates. The estimation process repeats until a certain criterion is
matched for example, the estimation has converged or the maximum number
of iterations is reached.
For a computational reason, the maximum number of iterations is pre-set at
2300, considering the possibility of unsolved cases. As there is no additional
parameter restriction, it is possible that the model cannot be solved by Dynare.
To guarantee a creditable estimating result, the same exercise is conducted again
with initial values being the indirect inference estimates from the rst estimation.
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5.3 Estimation Results
5.3.1 A Comparison of the Non-Coordination and Coor-
dination Models
Twomodels, one benchmark non-coordination model and one partial-coordination
model, are estimated. The partial-coordination model with initial coordinating
elasticity hus0 =  hea0 =  0:5 and hus1 =  hea1 = 0:5 is selected given that the
model evaluation shows a mixed implication from the diverse coordination spec-
ications. By allowing the absolute values of coordinating elasticities to vary
within a [0; 1] interval, the cases of single country coordination or even a case of
non-coordination are not excluded.
Taking the non-coordination model with original calibrations as a benchmark
model5, this section compares the performance of the estimated non-coordination
and the estimated partial-coordination model with the performance of a cali-
brated benchmark. Insomuch that both models show better performances after
the estimation, parameters adopted from a closed economy are not capable of de-
scribing economic reality in the context of global interactions. More importantly,
it is conrmed by an outstanding performance of the partial-coordination model
that monetary policy coordination plays an important role regardless of what the
o¢ cial label says.
Table 5.2 lists the actual Wald statistics across models before and after es-
timations and their corresponding test results. Though the case for benchmark
is drawn randomly, the reported actual Wald statistics for the estimated non-
coordination and partial-coordination models are the average of 1000 simulations
in order to avoid bias by random sampling (see Appendix C Figure C-2 and C-1
for statistical distribution).
Clearly, even without coordination policy, the actual Wald statistic has fallen
5All other calibrated values are kept the same as in the model evaluation, except for two
coe¢ cients for the NK weights in the monetary policy rules (usm , 
ea
m ). They are both set to
one for specifying an e¤ective monetary policy rule. This is for the purpose of comparing with
indirect inference estimates in this chapter.
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dramatically to 2001:97 with estimated parameters, suggesting a possible 93:6%
drop in the actual Wald statistic value compared to its analogic version using
original calibrations.
The test result6 also shows a substantial improvement in the models perfor-
mance after the estimation. There are substantial changes in parameters, within
which half move away from the calibrated value by around 20%. A large di-
vergence of an estimated value from its initial calibration may suggest a high
level of parameter sensitivity to the changing data7, or more likely, inappropriate
calibrations adopted from the previous closed economy studies. After all, the
majority of calibrated values are originally from the individual closed-economy
models. Merely adopting parameters from a closed-economy model and presum-
ing the way that an economy, government or monetary authority responds may
no longer be su¢ cient in an open economy case.
Such a result is not too surprising knowing that the economic agents are
constantly adjusting their optimisations according to all the available information
imposed by the Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH). As dened by John
Muth (1961), the information set included all the exogenous variables, all past
values of endogenous variables and the structure of the model. Changes in the
monetary policy rule should alter the structure of the model accordingly  as
suggested by Lucas Critique. Therefore, the reduced form of the model should
also be changed; and suggested by the statistics, t the actual data better in this
case.
Meanwhile, regardless of the improvement in the baseline model, the partial-
coordination model is tting the actual data signicantly better than the baseline
6For the benchmark case, the test result is obtained from the sample that generates the
actual Wald statistic WT = 31299:21. While for estimated models, since the reported actual
Wald statistics are the average values, their corresponding test results are taken from the
case that produces the closest actual Wald statistic to the mean. For the estimated non-
coordination model, the test result is obtained from the simulation that gives an actual Wald
statistic WT = 2001:855. For the estimated partial-coordination model, the test result is taken
from the simulation that gives an actual Wald statistic WT = 600:925.
7Although the selected datasets are consistent with those in SW (2003), SW (2007), and Le
et al. (2010), they are subject to revisions. Also, the data length is extended to cover a period
between 1970 and 2008.
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Wald stats Wald percentile
(actual WT ) Dynamics+Volatility
Baseline non-coordination 31; 299:21
100%
(147:8)
Estimated non-coordination 2; 001:97
100%
(33:64)
Estimated partial-coordination 600:9
100%
(15:15)
The rst column shows actual Wald statistics of the individual model;
The second column shows the joint test results concerning all seven
variables using the corresponding parameter set. The gures
in parenthesis are the corresponding normalised MDs.
Table 5.2: The estimation result (7 variables)
non-coordination model and even to the estimated non-coordination model. The
actual Wald statistic falls more than 98% to 600:9 relative to the baseline non-
coordination model, and about 70% relative to the estimated non-coordination
model even though the magnitude of the fall is still not su¢ cient for its value
to be in the acceptance range.
The comparative improvement of the estimated non-coordination model rel-
ative to the estimated partial-coordination model can be illustrated through the
improvement in (1) the models ability to replicate data dynamics (V AR(1) co-
e¢ cients); (2) the models ability to replicate data volatility (variance of a target
variable).
From a dynamic perspective, 34 out of 49 actual V AR (1) coe¢ cients (70%)
fall between bounds simulated by the estimated partial-coordination model. Specif-
ically, the dynamics of US aggregates and the real exchange rate are well mim-
icked. Only 3 out of 21 simulated bounds associated with the US aggregate dy-
namics (Ay
us
I ; A
us
I ; A
rus
I ) fail to capture actual V AR (1) coe¢ cients in the partial-
coordination model. The models ability to capture real exchange rate dynamics
(AQI ) is remarkably improved only an autoregressive coe¢ cient for the real ex-
change rate is marginally missed out by the simulated bounds (see Table 5.3;
notations are the same as in Table 4.8). Also, the transmission of impacts from
the real exchange rate to each target variable is better captured compared with
the estimated non-coordination model, even though the improvement is marginal
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non-coordination partial-coordination
Actual Mean LB UB Mean LB UB
Ay
us
Q 0:2672  0:062  0:154 0:0179 OUT  0:147  0:558 0:2841 IN
Ay
ea
Q  0:099  0:019  0:073 0:0349 OUT  0:003  0:219 0:1955 IN
A
us
Q  0:094  0:013  0:097 0:0568 IN  0:259  0:501  0:012 IN
A
ea
Q  0:263 0:0254  0:027 0:0794 OUT  0:021  0:139 0:0913 OUT
Ar
us
Q  0:291 0:028  0:037 0:0905 OUT  0:089  0:284 0:1075 OUT
Ar
ea
Q  0:168  0:007  0:025 0:0103 OUT 0:0159  0:111 0:1369 OUT
AQyus  0:005  0:059  0:175 0:0472 IN  0:0007  0:022 0:0209 IN
AQyea 0:0049 0:0876  0:037 0:223 IN  0:017  0:076 0:0335 IN
AQus  0:010 1:5374 1:0645 2:0324 OUT 0:2425  0:071 0:5454 IN
AQea  0:007  0:661  0:954  0:373 OUT  0:188  0:373 0:0013 IN
AQrus 0:0245  1:832  2:376  1:314 OUT  0:206  0:566 0:1927 IN
AQrea  0:023 0:6934 0:2507 1:1116 OUT  0:176  0:563 0:1723 IN
AQQ 0:9368 0:9111 0:7675 1:0303 IN 0:7764 0:6 0:9272 OUT
2yus 8:1212 31:35 10:309 64:418 OUT 50:94 15:27 111:28 OUT
2yea 3:6088 21:646 6:608 47:129 OUT 5:7173 2:2587 11:038 IN
2us 0:3886 2:3626 1:3899 3:8845 OUT 2:7086 1:4617 4:4029 OUT
2ea 0:2386 3:172 1:7699 5:234 OUT 0:3747 0:2054 0:616 IN
2rus 0:8427 2:3449 1:4826 3:5737 OUT 2:2274 1:2027 3:591 OUT
2rea 0:4319 2:3752 1:0606 4:1871 OUT 0:3627 0:2207 0:5705 IN
2Q 0:0260 28:96 10:361 66:221 OUT 0:7207 0:3415 1:3035 OUT
Table 5.3: VAR parameters, simulated means and bounds for the estimated non-
coordination and partial-coordination models
141
(considering both the error band and the simulated mean).
Compared to the previous studies nding random walks in the exchange
rate, the partial-coordination model connects the real exchange rate dynamics
to macroeconomic fundamentals. In particular, the inuence of monetary poli-
cies on the exchange rate is well captured. Although partly due to a lower level of
ination persistence (A
us
us = 0:7713, A
ea
ea = 0:2626), the replicated real exchange
rate is less persistent than the actual data. On the contrary, the exchange rate
disconnectpuzzle remains as the real exchange rate does not appear to explain
the dynamics of macroeconomic fundamentals.
Nevertheless, the improvement comes at the expense of the deteriorating abil-
ity to capture EA aggregate dynamics, especially EA ination. It is also worth
noting that the simulation volatility is exaggerated in the estimated partial-
coordination model, which widens its simulated bounds in order to capture the
actual data dynamics.
Contrasting with the worsening EA aggregate dynamics, the estimated partial-
coordination model has overwhelming success in replicating the volatility of EA
output, ination and interest rate the simulated bounds embrace the actual time
series variance reasonably well (see Table 5.3). Most remarkably, the simulated
variance of the real exchange rate has gone down to 0:72, a 97:5% improvement
even when comparing with the simulated variance produced by the estimated
non-coordination model. Interestingly, despite a slight downward movement, the
partial-coordination model fails to bring down the volatility of US aggregates
substantially.
By and large, this estimation result is consistent with the testing nding in
Chapter 4 that the monetary coordination property enables the open-economy
DSGE model to describe reality better. Therefore, monetary coordination by
means of reacting directly to the real exchange rate plays an important role
between these two economies over the period since the 1970s, regardless of what
is claimed by the o¢ cials. However, it is also clear that even nding suitable
parameters through the indirect inference estimation cannot develop this model
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well enough to be accepted by the statistical test jointly on seven key macro-
indicators.
5.3.2 Estimated Parameters from the Partial-Coordination
Model
As mentioned previously, there are 37 parameters involved in the estimation of
the partial-coordination model 33 of which are common parameters regardless
of whether countries are coordinating with each other, and 4 of which are par-
ticularly specied for characterising the coordination feature. All of the common
parameters are estimated within 50% upper and lower bounds around the initial
calibrations. Four parameters featuring coordination are estimated within a [0; 1]
interval, with starting coe¢ cients all at 0:5. Intuitively, a monetary authority is
able to specify its policy rule responding to the contemporaneous real exchange
rate at a degree between 0% and 100%. Meanwhile, a lagged adjustment to policy
impacts from the previous policy action is also limited within the same interval.
The calibrated parameters and their estimated values from the partial-coordination
model are compared in Table 5.4. The last column of the table shows how signif-
icant an estimated parameter di¤ers from its associated calibration by presenting
a percentage change of the estimate relative to its initial value. Most parameters
di¤er from the associated initial values to an extent after all, the calibrations
are mainly taken from closed-economy models, and are for a period not cover-
ing the entire sample period in this estimation. Yet it is still surprising to nd
that the way these two economies behave has exhibited such a large deviation
from the previous studies. Given 50% estimation bounds, 17 out of 33 common
parameters (51:5%) shift away from their initial values by 20% at least.
Capital Share, Risk Aversion and Labour Supply Elasticity
The share of capital (or factor share in general) in production function is always
in the frontline studies on economic growth and trade. It has been particularly
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Initial
Estimated from
Coordination model % changes
hus0    0:537412404   
hus1    0:188682261   
hea0    0:916113347   
hea1    0:380882356   
us 0:19 0:18099328  4:74
(Sus)
00
5:74 3:718443232  35:219
usp 1:5 1:040320152  30:645
 0:54 0:588376843 8:959
usc 1:38 1:457612432 5:624
usl 1:83 1:168410138  36:152
usw 0:7 0:75707935 8:154
usp 0:66 0:795572529 20:541
usw 0:58 0:497532053  14:219
usp 0:24 0:237827833  0:905
usw 0:1 0:078627618  21:372
usp 0:2 0:204074451 2:037
us 0:81 0:49276564  39:165
rus 2:04 2:624063542 28:63
rusy 0:08 0:082510137 3:138
rusy 0:22 0:216930262  1:395
ea 0:3 0:315276978 5:092
Sea00 7:0 9:48270622 35:467
ea 1:487 1:859896947 25:077
 ea 0:175 0:119606142  31:654
eac 1:608 2:218967882 37:996
eal 1:188 1:120739279  5:662
eaw 0:758 0:880001682 16:095
eap 0:909 0:970792531 6:798
eaw 0:663 0:836072184 26:104
eap 0:425 0:426825108 0:429
eaw 0:08 0:047234646  40:957
eap 0:06 0:045662162  23:896
ea 0:931 0:662154512  28:877
rea 1:661 1:634455747  1:598
reay 0:143 0:193813819 35:534
reay 0:173 0:116835092  32:465
rea 0:221 0:20517139  7:162
Table 5.4: Estimated parameters from the partial-coordination model
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puzzling for researchers in terms of the stylised factof its long-term stability and
short-term variability. Since the early studies date back to the 1950s, conventional
wisdom considers a relatively constant factor share over time and space, which
has been deeply embedded in economic models thereafter.
For instance, it is particularly invoked by the economic modelling justifying
the use of the Cobb-Douglas production function and its similar kinds, which
explicitly presume a constant factor share. Nevertheless, some recent studies
have not only heavily criticised the conventional approach for measuring factor
shares, but also documented a time-varying (or trendy) pattern over time and
across industries, in particular, in the US whose factor shares in production were
taken as smooth in much literature.
In SWs models, intermediate good producers are assumed to have a Cobb-
Douglas production function and hence the value of factor shares is assigned
taking into account previous empirical ndings.
The EA capital share was calibrated at 0:3, well within the bounds suggested
by the empirical evidence. The US capital share was estimated using Bayesian
estimation. The estimate fell much lower than its initial value to 0:19, though it
is still on the edge of the past empirical nding.
As a result of indirect inference estimation, the average capital share across
EA countries is estimated to be around 0:315 over the past four decades, implying
a share of labour income in the total output at just below 70%. This estimate
of capital share is fairly in line with the SWs calibration, and is consistent with
previous studies that found estimated capital shares vary between 0:2 and 0:4
across countries8. In contrast, an average capital share of 0:181 in the US over
the same period indicates a mild decline relative to the SWs Bayesian estimate9.
This gure implies a labour income share above 80%, which is touching the ceiling
8For example, Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) estimated labour shares for 53 countries,
of which 11 countries are members of the Euro Area. The exception of Cyprus, Estonia,
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia together only accounts for 2% of total EA nominal
GDP. They found that the average labour shares across countries was 0:65 even when taking
di¤erent approaches.
9The SWs estimate of the US capital share was 0:19 over a period between 1980 and 1999.
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of the literature ndings as well as the conventional assumptions in economic
models.
Some early studies suggested that the US capital share can represent the level
of capital share in other countries to some extent10. The moderate discrepancy
of capital shares between the US and EA does not largely contradict this state-
ment. Nonetheless, it might be informative on the di¤erence of openness, nominal
rigidities and economic developments between these two economies.
The second investigated aspect is the behaviour of the utility function, in-
cluding coe¢ cients of the risk aversion and elasticities of the labour supply with
respect to real wages.
The household risk aversion (or the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution) reects sensitivity of the consumption growth to the real interest rate.
Accompanied by coe¢ cients of the habit formation, it forms the interest rate
semi-elasticity of consumption demand, which is crucial in a policy transmis-
sion mechanism. The higher it is, the lower the consumption responsiveness to
the interest rate, hence, the lower the degree of policy e¤ects in terms of the
consumption stimulation.
Both SWs EA and US models reported the Bayesian estimates of the risk
aversion to be close at around 1:35 1:40, suggesting that households are slightly
insensitive to the real interest rate. The indirect inference estimate for EA risk
aversion is higher than the SWs estimate by more than 50%, and is also higher
than the calibrated value in Le et al. (2010) by nearly 37%. The corresponding
real interest rate semi-elasticity is about 0:14211, signicantly lower than the
suggested value of 0:65 in Casares (2001)12. The suggested direct monetary policy
10For example, Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) reported that labour share across 53 coun-
tries is 0:65, lying between 0:60 and 0:8. Collin (2002) used an alternative measurement, and
also found labour shares generally fall into the range of the US.
11The nominal interest rate is adjusted by the expected ination rate, hence the real interest
rate semi-elasticity is 1 h
ea
eac (1+h
ea) . Given the coe¢ cient of habit formation is kept constant at
the calibrated value of 0:522. The rise of household risk aversion lifts sensitivity of the EA
consumption growth to the direct policy change in the real interest rate.
12Casares (2001) estimated the structural consumption equation using data pre-dating the
Euro Area (1970Q1-1998Q4). The data were the weighted averages over member countries.
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impacts are hence much smaller than what would be expected from previous
empirical studies.
US household risk aversion has a slight increase compared to the calibrated
value, yet it is still lower than the EA by more than half. Comparatively, it is
not that costly for US households when consumption is volatile. Hence, although
US households save more for the future depending upon the magnitude of the
increased real interest rate, the consumption smoothing is not as strong even
though the interest rate uctuates over time. However, given a high level of
habit formation in the US13, the real interest rate semi-elasticity remains low at
0:116. That is, the US consumption growth is still less likely to be inuenced by
a monetary policy relative to its EA counterpart14.
The habit formation here captures real frictions on the household consump-
tion growth, suggesting that households are more likely to track back their past
consumption, instead of adjusting savings and consumption in accordance with
real interest rate uctuations or monetary policies. As more of a domestic fac-
tor, its value is adopted from the previous study. In short, in terms of lowering
interest rate for the purpose of stimulating consumption demand, monetary poli-
cies are not very e¤ective, especially in the US. On the other hand, consumption
demand may not be dampened too much even when a contractionary monetary
policy is needed.
The elasticity of the labour supply has a critical role in economic policy analy-
sis, especially in the area of scal policies. Its high value represents a larger policy
e¤ect on employment, leading to a higher excess burden when policies such as
tax and benet reforms are imposed.
However, empirical studies evaluating labour supply elasticity took various
approaches and reached dispersive results; and hence, there is no denitive con-
Their ndings suggested that the direct policy impact on consumption was high on average.
13The coe¢ cient for the habit formation was estimated in SWs US model to be 0:71.
14The coe¢ cient of habit formation is set to be high at 0:71, suggesting that US households
keep their consumption in line with the past to a high degree, rather than follow what is
happening with the interest rate contemporarily.
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clusion on the value that should be used in a policy analysis15. Meanwhile, the
general equilibrium model tends to adopt a high elasticity value for the purpose
of evaluating policy implications, contradicting the relatively low value found in
the micro-level data. Similar to SWs models, the inverse of labour supply elas-
ticities are estimated to be lower than the initial calibrations, suggesting a higher
level of labour supply elasticities in both economies.
The US inverse elasticity declines to 1:168 36% lower than SWs estimate of
1:83, and much lower than the range reported by SW (2005) using a longer time
series up to 2002. Meanwhile, the EA inverse elasticity also declines slightly to
1:121, and is signicantly lower than the SWs estimation. Accordingly, labour
supply elasticity in the US has risen by more than half to 0:856, and in the EA
has risen by a tiny amount to 0:892. This result is less in line with the recent
empirical studies that found a low to moderate level of labour supply elasticities.
Together with other estimated parameters, the coe¢ cient of impacts from real
wage changes on labour supply climbs to 0:929 in the US, and 0:936 in the EA16.
Stickiness in the Economies
Researchers have been seeking ways to incorporate certain features of macro-
economic observables into the modelling, for instance, the inertial ination and
persistent output in response to a monetary shock. There are considerable studies
on nominal rigidity following Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). But mostly, there
have been di¢ culties in matching the high level of rigidity required in macroeco-
nomic models and a relatively short observed duration in the actual data.
In some studies of the US and EA, nominal wage rigidity is found to be a crit-
ical tribute to the output persistence in models; on the other hand, nominal price
rigidity solely was not su¢ cient to generate the same result. Some discussions
15Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) summarised four corewage elasticities existing in the em-
pirical literature. They also concluded that the elasticity suitable for policy analysis should
also measure responses to a parametric shift in the lifecycle prole itself.
16Other factors inuencing this coe¢ cient consist of the risk aversion, nominal wage stickiness,
and the weight of NK wage setting.
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dated back to the late 1980s hence turned to identify the real economic frictions
that might alter the functioning of a lower nominal rigidity in macroeconomic
models17. More recently, CEE (2005) studied this issue quantitatively by esti-
mating a nominal rigidity model with and without the real rigidity. The nding
conrmed that the key real friction that enables a model to match the observed
features of ination and output was the variable capital utilization, while the
other real frictions accounted for the dynamics of the other variables.
Nominal Rigidities
Adopted from SWs models, the models in this study also specify nominal
rigidities by embedding a Calvo price and wage setting, complemented with a past
ination indexation. The Calvo price setting transforms a price setting equation
into a pure forward-looking function of the expected ination. Meanwhile, the
partial indexation allows the price to be updated according to the past ination
partially when the price is not subject to re-optimisation in the current period18.
This setting allows backward-looking behaviour as described by a traditional
Phillips curve.
Accordingly, the price setting equation consists of both forward-looking and
backward-looking behaviours, and so does the wage setting equation. Empiri-
cally, the price responses to the lagged ination rate, represented in a traditional
Phillips curve with a number of lags, are proven to be robust. The combination
of the backward-looking and forward-looking features plays an important role in
producing the aggregate output and ination persistence. Moreover, it also illus-
trates its key role in replicating a hump shape response of ination to monetary
shocks (Dixon and Bihan, 2012).
Additionally, the model is weighted over an NK price setting, where prices are
subject to a Calvo sticky price and partial indexation, and an NC price setting,
17For example, Ball and Romer (1990) argued that with the combination of real rigidities,
particularly when combined with good market imperfection and the labour market imperfection,
a small nominal rigidity can generate substantial persistence.
18This di¤ers from the indexation in CEE (2005), in which a full indexation is used and the
price is adjusted fully to the past ination rate.
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where prices are perfectly exible and are adjusting instantaneously to the market
demand and supply condition.
Comparing the indirect inference estimates with the estimates in Meenagh et
al. (2009) and Le et al. (2011), the coe¢ cients for price partial indexation are
fairly stable in both economies; the EA economy exhibits a lower degree of NK
price setting behaviour, while the US economy agrees with the assigned degree;
and coe¢ cients of Calvo price setting behaviour are both signicantly higher.
Relative to the estimate in SW (2007), the US price rigidity is 20% higher at
0:796, which indicates an average price duration of 4:9 quarters. This result is just
above the observed empirical evidence from microeconomic data that prices are
generally changed every 3 to 4 quarters. Both coe¢ cients of price partial index-
ation and the weights for the NK price setting have been fairly stable compared
to the original calibrated values.
In general, the New-Keynesian behaviour has only a slightly wider scope in
the US economy than what was considered and the degree of the backward-
looking and forward-looking manner is fairly stable over time. Even coupled with
other changing parameters, the impact from the past and future ination on the
contemporaneous ination rate remains constant at 0:19 and 0:81, respectively.
The only signicant change in the ination dynamics is that ination becomes
less sensitive to the rental rate of capital.
In contrast to a moderate level of price rigidity in the US market, the coe¢ -
cient for the EA price rigidity rises to 0:971, even higher than what was suggested
in the SWs Bayesian estimation. Such a result implies that almost the entire EA
market is maintaining a constant price over a long period. Accordingly, the price
duration is approximately 8:6 years, which is far beyond what was suggested in
empirical ndings. The EA price partial indexation is barely changed at 0:427,
suggesting a similar backward-looking manner, ceteris paribus. The weight for
the NK pricing in the EA, however, is about a quarter lower than the origi-
nal calibration, that is, less EA market behaviour can be described by the NK
property.
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Overall, EA ination becomes highly insensitive to both past ination and
rental rate of capital, but more sensitive to real wages and productivity shock,
while its forward-looking behaviour remains strong at 0:7. Noticeably, it is real
factors predominantly changes in real wages that cause uctuations in EA
ination. This is the same as the US but with almost three times the respon-
siveness. Also, EA ination is nearly four times as sensitive as US to technology
shocks.
The staggered wage (or wage stickiness) is crucial in the macroeconomic mod-
elling for two reasons it not only accounts for the persistence in the aggregate
output and ination, but also provides a channel for the real e¤ect of a mone-
tary shock to be passed through to the real side of the economy. As shown in
CEE (2005), an inertial ination is a result of the inertial marginal costs, depend-
ing positively on the wage, rental rate of capital and interest rate. According to
the discussion above, the impact of real wage dynamics on ination outweighs
the other factors notably. In particular, such an impact is exaggerated when in-
ation becomes more sensitive to real wages as a result of changes in nominal
price rigidity. In other words, nominal wage rigidity is one of the main factors
responsible for the ination persistence.
The coe¢ cient for the Calvo wage setting in the US is higher than what was
estimated in an individual closed-economy context. The suggested wage contract
duration is approximately 4 quarters, which is generally in agreement with the US
price duration. There is a lower degree of backward-looking wage setting among
US households that cannot reoptimise their wages. Noticeably, there is also a
good 20% decline to 0:079 in the weight of the NK wage setting in the US. The
scope of the NK wage setting, which itself exhibits more a forward-looking but
less a backward-looking manner, is much narrower. Accordingly, wage elasticities
to various factors drop in the US, except for a tiny increase in the elasticity to
the expected real wage due to the joint e¤ect of higher wage stickiness and lower
NK wage setting weight.
Both coe¢ cients for Calvo wage setting and for wage partial indexation in the
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EA are higher than the initial calibration. Hence, the model produces a longer
EA wage contract duration at 8:3 quarters relative to the empirical observation
in previous studies. That is to say, even though this partial-coordination model
produces a reasonable EA wage contract duration, the implied EA price contract
duration is not only far beyond the empirical observation, but also mis-matched
with the wage contract duration. Also, the EA wage is more responsive to past
ination accounted for by the increased past indexation. In contrast, the EA
economy exhibits fewer New-Keynesian wage setting behaviours its NK weight
for wages drops almost 41% to 0:047. As a whole, the EA wage elasticities move
exactly the same way as the US all fall slightly with the exception of a tiny
increase in the response to the expected real wage.
Broadly, wages are less sensitive, while prices are more sensitive to their own
domestic economic conditions, especially the real wage and productivity shocks.
Additionally, the actual impact of real wages on labour supply has been raised
markedly to 0:929 for the US and 0:936 for the EA. As the decline of labour supply
elasticity outweighs the change in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the
labour supply in both regions is more sensitive to the change in consumption and
the associated expectation. To some extent, these two economies are acting in
line with each other. Such a result is consistent with the similarities stated in
SW (2005), where they applied an EA model setting on both the US and EA
data over a sample period from 1974 to 2002.
Real Frictions
Two coe¢ cients featuring real frictions in each economy are estimated  a
parameter for steady state elasticity of capital adjustment costs and an elasticity
of capital utilization cost19.
The models with a neoclassical investment accelerator impose a strong as-
sumption of perfect capital mobility among rms and countries, and predict neg-
19The coe¢ cients for habit formation are left out due to the change in value causing problems
in solving the structural model. Further research in estimating the coe¢ cient of habit formation
may be done by imposing some appropriate restrictions on structural parameters.
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atively correlated international factor comovements. On the contrary, variable
capital utilization allows a change in output to be realised by an adjustment of
the capital utilization rate rather than solely by changing investments. Therefore,
impacts of an output uctuation on the rental rate of capital will be eased, and
so will the strong hypothesis on capital mobility. It may also enable a model to
produce positive comovements of macroeconomic aggregates without requiring a
very high negative correlation between productivity shocks in the two economies.
The implied steady state elasticity of capital utilisation cost function takes the
form of u =
	(1)00
	(1)0 =
 
1  
20, in which the coe¢ cient  is estimated. Accordingly, a
rise in the coe¢ cient  results in an increase in the steady state elasticity of capital
utilization costs, and vice versa. The initial calibrations of  are quite di¤erent,
leaving the e¢ ciency of capital usage signicantly divergent in two economies.
The estimation brings up its value for the US even further to 0:588, implying a
rise in the steady state elasticity to 1:429. On the other hand, although the base
value of  for the EA is small, the indirect inference estimation implies an even
lower value (a 32% decline) for  . As a result, there is an almost 36% decline
in the EA steady state elasticity of capital utilisation costs to only 0:136. This
large divergence between two economies contradicts the nding in SW (2005),
particularly in terms of the e¢ ciency of the capital application in the US.
The household optimization implies that a household will use capital more
intensively up to the point where the cost of an increase in the capital utilisation
rate is equivalent to the cost of employing one more unit of capital. Hence, u
plays a role in the models dynamics for stabilising the rental rate of capital from
the output volatility. When output increases as a result of an expansionary policy,
households raise their capital utilisation up to the point where rkt = uzt, rather
than further pumping capital into production, seeing that the cost of capital is
already higher up and given the presence of the capital adjustment cost. As a
result, capital in service is increased to catch up with the output increase without
20The cost of variations in the capital utilization rate takes the form of 	(zt), where zt is a
rate of capital utilization. It is assumed that zt = 1 and 	(1) = 0 in the steady state.
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pushing up the rental rate of capital.
On the whole, a lower u implies that EA households can raise the capital
utilisation rate even further to keep the rental rate of capital, and hence, ination
stabilised without incurring too much cost. Contrarily, a very high u in the
US dampens the e¤ectiveness of variable capital utilisation. For the need of
raising output, US households are left with smaller room to adjust their capital
utilisation, but have to adopt more capital (invest). The rising demand for capital
will then push up the rental rate of capital. Intuitively, the US rental rate of
capital is more volatile in response to output uctuations; and furthermore, US
ination can be even more volatile if it is sensitive to changes in the rental rate of
capital. Although knowing this, US ination, beneting from its lower nominal
rigidity, has a lower sensitivity to the productivity shock than EA ination does.
As stated in CEE (2005), the dynamics of ination and output may not be
very sensitive to capital adjustment costs and other real frictions. Nevertheless,
capital adjustment costs are crucial in understanding the dynamics of investment
and other variables.
The capital adjustment cost takes on the neo-classical assumption of a convex
adjustment21, in which the adjustment cost function S () is a positive function of
changes in investment rather than the level of investment. The models dynamics,
hence, are inuenced by the steady state second order derivative S 00 = S 00 (1) > 0.
The presence of a capital adjustment cost forces economic agents to be forward-
looking when the price of capital changes persistently. Consequently, investment
has higher sensitivity to capital price changes.
The initial value of S 00 is lower for the US at 5:74, and higher for the EA at
7. The indirect inference estimates show even larger divergence between the two
economies the value of S 00 is even lower at 3:718 for the US and higher at 9:483
for the EA. Accordingly, for the US, the elasticity of investment in response to
21Although some studies, for example Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), criticised that the
capital adjustment costs did not necessarily follow a convex function, the non-convexity might
mimic the dynamics of the data better, especially at plant-level.
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changes in the real value of capital 1S00(1+) is more than 50% higher than what
the initial calibration has implied; whilst for the EA, the elasticity is lower by
more than a quarter.
That is, relative to US investment, EA investment will have a smaller per-
centage increase when its real value of capital is foreseen to be falling. Intuitively,
when the steady state convexity of a capital adjustment function gets higher, the
increase of costs for installing an extra unit of capital becomes faster. Economic
agents are more reluctant to change their investment schedules in response to
the changing real price of capital, unless the benet of raising an extra unit of
capital at a higher price or cutting the capital level in order to ease the high cost
pressure can outbalance the cost of adjustments.
Such an implication is somehow echoing the previous implication on capital
utilisation cost. In spite of a high capital adjustment cost, the EA economy has
a relatively low steady state elasticity of capital utilisation costs. Hence, when
encountering a sudden production expansion, the EA economy alters its capital
utilisation rate primarily, whilst the US economy changes investment primarily
since it has a high capital utilisation cost but a low investment adjustment cost.
In other words, due to their heterogeneities in the investment cost structure, an
investment shock may have a reasonable scale of impacts on the EA economy,
while a shock on the capital price level may cause more economic variations in
the US.
Monetary Policy Rules
Recall that the monetary policy rule in this two-country DSGEmodel may consist
of interest rate smoothing, short-run responses to ination deviation and output
gap as well as real exchange rate coordination in addition to the original Taylor
rule in Taylor (1993a). All of the parameters are estimated using indirect infer-
ence starting with initial calibrations mainly adopted from SWs models. Apart
from the coordination coe¢ cients for each economy, there are four parameters
from the US monetary policy rule (one interest rate smoothing, two long-term
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responses and one short-term response) and ve parameters from the EA mon-
etary policy rule (one interest rate smoothing, two long-term responses and two
short-term responses).
Monetary Policy Inertia
CBs behaviours have been recognised by much of the literature as seeking
to smooth nominal interest rate  characterised by CBs taking a series of ac-
tions in the same direction to adjust the short-term nominal interest rate to a
desired level, rather than having a once-and-for-allaction in response to cur-
rent economic conditions and real activities. Some researchers put together a
certain rationale for justifying the optimality of CBsgradualism, whilst some
criticised that the policy inertia might result in an insu¢ cient or delayed policy
response to macroeconomic situations. Numerous empirical studies estimating
policy rules tend to support the existence of interest rate smoothing (represented
by i, i = us; ea), although some raise arguments against this.
Based on the historical data from the US, the estimate of us tends to range
between 0:7 to 0:9. In particular, among early literature to nd a strong policy
inertia, Clarida et al. (2000) found the value of us to be approximately 0:8 in
a forward-looking policy rule22. Fewer studies have investigated the EA policy
inertia, though the public indeed observes a more or less stronger pattern. As one
of the early explorers in this region, Castelnuovo (2007) reported a high degree
of policy inertia at ea = 0:8423.
The degrees of interest rate smoothing in both the US and EA are shown to
be relatively high in SWs ndings, but are both in agreement with the literature.
22Investigations on other countriesmonetary rules also found a strong policy inertia. For
example, Clarida et al. (1998) estimated various monetary policy functions for Germany, Japan,
the US, the UK, France and Italy, and found the value of  ranged from 0:87 to 0:97. Noticeably,
in their study, the US monetary policy rule, which took the form of a second-order partial
adjustment, had the sum of partial adjustments 1 + 2 ranging from 0:90 to 0:97.
23The data used in Castelnuovo (2007) ranged from 1980Q1 to 2003Q4, within which the EA
did not actually exist over a large period. Also, the target/desired interest rate was expressed
as an original Taylor rule; hence, the short-run responses to ination deviation and output gap
were not accounted for.
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The indirect inference estimates, however, reveal some deviations. The values of
i have dropped by 39% to 0:493 for the US and by 29% to 0:662 for the EA, which
are both in contrast with their high persistence previously shown by the strong
autoregressive dynamics and are considerably lower than the literature ndings.
To achieve a certain interest rate target, possibly in response to a particular
shock, a low degree of interest rate smoothing (or policy inertia) implies that
the speed of interest rate adjustments is more radical, rather than at a sluggish
pace.
Disagreement with these ndings from SWs closed-economy estimates may lie
in the fact that the link via the good and nancial market forces central bankers
to think more beyond their domestic matters. In fact, the indirect inference esti-
mates of i show an even higher degree of declines in the non-coordination model.
The endogenous macroeconomic aggregates inuence each other simultane-
ously in a global economic system. Such relations create trade-o¤s between sta-
bilising one or the other in a changing economic condition, making the open-
economy monetary policy design much more comprehensive. Even though only
one target, commonly domestic ination, is o¢ cially announced, a CB that in-
sists on a strict ination targeting is rare. More commonly, a exible ination
targeting is adopted besides ination, other multiple targets or issues will be
taken into consideration when a monetary policy is designed.
As a consequence, the short-run nominal interest rate responds to address not
only the domestic macroeconomic variation but also the di¤erential between the
domestic and foreign macroeconomic variations. The movement of the short-run
nominal interest rate may be more frequent and radical, but less persistent and
smooth.
The other potential factor propelling this disagreement is that the determi-
nant of interest rate dynamics is portioned out by the real exchange rate coor-
dination; put di¤erently, that an additional link of the real exchange rate may
have contributed to the lower persistence of interest rate dynamics. On one
hand, the contemporaneous interest rate adjustments are needed to accommodate
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macroeconomic uctuations as well as restore the real exchange rate. Hence, the
backward-looking interest rate dynamics are weaker than we have ever estimated
using however complex a monetary policy rule (without the exchange rate). On
the other hand, a clearer link between the real exchange rate, the nominal in-
terest rate and all the other macroeconomic variables either facilitates a more
e¢ cient policy transmission, or restricts CBs in taking su¢ cient actions due to
an additional trade-o¤. The former enables CBs to minimise the nominal interest
rate variations, the latter can cause excessive variations in the nominal interest
rate.
Responses to Ination Deviation and Output Gap
An interest rate response to economic fundamentals, typically ination de-
viation and output gap, has been the centre of attention since Taylor (1993a)
summarised the rationale for a monetary policy rule. Cited as the Taylor rule
and Taylor principle later on, the objectives of the policy rules of this kind are
grounded by a quadratic loss function, measured by an ination deviation from
the target rate and the real activity (the output gap relative to a potential level).
In the US, there is a nearly 29% rise in the long-run response of the nominal
interest rate to an ination deviation and a 3% rise in the long-run response of
the nominal interest rate to an output gap. Together with a lower interest rate
smoothing, coe¢ cients of the net long-run response to an ination deviation and
an output gap have risen considerably to 1:331 and 0:042, respectively. On the
contrary, the SWs nding of a strong response to the short-run output gap is
slightly weakened here by a near gure at 0:217.
In the EA policy rule, the coe¢ cient for the long-run reaction to an ination
deviation is only lowered to 1:634; while the coe¢ cient for the long-run response
to an output gap has risen dramatically to 0:194. Coupled with a lower interest
rate smoothing, coe¢ cients of the net long-run response to an ination deviation
and an output gap have risen to 0:552 and 0:065, respectively. Nevertheless, there
are considerable declines in the responses to a short-run ination deviation and a
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short-run output gap. In general, a 1% change in the ination di¤erential eat
or in the output di¤erential yeat can only induce 0:205% or 0:117% changes in
the nominal interest rate.
Overall, both economiespolicy rules obey the Taylor Principle since both
values of ri (where i = us; ea) are greater than unity ensuring a unique and stable
equilibrium. Broadly speaking, both values are in line with empirical ndings if
not slightly higher24, although the values of riy (where i = us; ea) have not been
able to match the criterion of either Taylors original idea or an e¢ cient weight
being greater than 0:5 in Ball (1999a). There is quite a big discrepancy relative to
the results in Castelnuovo (2007) and Peersman and Smets (1999). Nonetheless,
the weak response to an output gap is reasonable when the results in Clarida
et al. (1998) are taken into account25. Therefore, over the past four decades,
monetary policies have been tight on stabilizing ination, but fairly relaxed on
narrowing the output gap.
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that monetary policies have put
more e¤ort into the long-run stability of ination and output, but have been less
concerned about short-run issues. Put di¤erently, the lower interest rate smooth-
ing contributes partially to a higher degree of reactions to long-run fundamentals,
while as a monetary policy becomes more radical, short-run deviations are less
of a concern for CBs.
Monetary Coordination
The role of the real exchange rate in monetary policy rules has been subject
to a long and heated debate. Few empirical studies have given support to the
welfare benet from monetary coordination. Theoretically, strategic game models
provided a reasonable motive for internalising policy externalities; although an
24For instance, Castelnuovo (2007) reported the value of r in the EA mainly being between
1 to 1:3, but could be 1:8 in a forward-looking Taylor rule; Clarida et al. (1998) found the value
of r ranged between 1:05 to 2:2 depending on various types of Taylor rule.
25Notes that both Castelnuovo (2007) and Peersman and Smets (1999) used the weighted
average data over some EA countries for a period when the EA did not in fact exist. Clarida et
al. (1998) used data from individual countries and reported that the values of ry ranged from
0:25 to 0:35 for Germany,  0:07 to 0:88 for France and  0:03 to 0:22 for Italy.
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application of the repeated game later on proved that it might not necessarily
be the case. The NOEM stated that the globalisation process may have diluted
the need for monetary coordination, while more e¤orts have been made to justify
the optimality for the presence of the exchange rate in monetary rules from some
other aspects.
To explore a wider range of possible coordination degrees, the bounds for
coordination coe¢ cients hi0 and h
i
1 (i = us; ea) are set to be within an interval
[0; 1]. Thus, monetary authorities can follow a policy that falls between a non-
coordination (when coe¢ cients are set to zero) and a full coordination policy
(when coe¢ cients approach unity).
Note that this chapter adopts the hypothesis from Chapter 4 that the ex-
change rate coordination exists when monetary policy coordination can better
describe the actual economic behaviour, or specically, when a model can pro-
duce certain macro-indicators that better t the actual data. Put di¤erently,
the null hypothesis holds when the coordination coe¢ cients are estimated to be
non-zeroes.
The estimated coordination parameters are shown on the top rows of Table
5.4. The US reacts to the contemporaneous real exchange rate (hue0 ) at the mod-
erate degree of 0:5374; the corresponding coe¢ cient for the lagged real exchange
rate (hus1 ) is also relatively low at 0:1887. Accordingly, the short-run nominal
interest rate has risen by 53:74% in response to a 100% real dollar deprecia-
tion (halved in the value of Qt), but then lowered by 18:87% in the following
period as an adjustment to the current policy action. The implied US policy
rule is stable, respecting that the net e¤ect of the real exchange rate is posi-
tive at 34:87%; and is consistent with the rationale proposed by Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (1995), Ball (1999b) and Taylor (1999) that the net interest rate response
shall be non-positive in response to a real depreciation of the home currency26.
26In Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), they limited the absolute value of two parameters to be
equal ( h1 = h0), and hence had an interest rate rule reacting to changes in the real exchange
rate. In Ball (1999b) and Taylor (2001), the absolute value of h0 is greater than the absolute
value of h1.
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Figure 5-1: IRFs to a positive monetary policy shock by the model in Ball (1999b)
In contrast to the mild exchange rate policy in the US, the EA has shown
to have a rather radical exchange rate policy, though it is also a stable and
consistent policy in agreement with the literature. The EA policy response to
the contemporaneous real exchange rate (hea0 ) is exceptionally strong at 0:9161
and to the lagged real exchange rate (hea1 ) is also high at 0:3809. Although the
adjustment elasticity is well above some previous ndings, it is comparatively
low that the net policy response to 100% euro depreciation (double in the value
of Qt) is a 53:52% rise in the EA nominal interest rate. To achieve such a net
response, the EA nominal interest rate has risen by 91:61% contemporarily and
is cut by 38:09% in the following period as a counteraction to the temporary real
exchange rate e¤ect.
To demonstrate the mechanism that monetary coordination can, or is assumed
to be able to, accommodate shocks and inuence macroeconomic aggregates, the
three-equation open-economy model in Ball (1999b) is stochastically simulated,
coupled with exogenously dened Taylor rules (1) with no coordination speci-
cation, (2) with the estimated US coordination specication and (3) with the
estimated EA coordination specication. All parameters are calibrated exactly
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the same as the original. Four shocks (to output, ination, real exchange rate and
monetary policy) are specied, assuming all to be white noise with one standard
error. The steady state impulse responses of output, ination, interest rate and
the real exchange rate to a positive monetary shock are shown in Figure 5-1, and
to a positive real exchange rate shock are shown in Figure 5-2.
The illustration begins by considering a case where a monetary shock strikes
the economy leading to a rise in the nominal interest rate by 1 (shocked by
one standard error) in the rst period. By the model setting, the elasticity of
the immediate real exchange rate response to an interest rate increase is 227.
Without coordination, the nominal interest rate and real exchange rate move
fully in response to the monetary shock. With either the US or EA coordination,
the magnitude of a nominal interest rate increase is reduced by an immediate real
exchange rate feedback, as with the real exchange rate. With a mild coordination
in the US, the US dollar appreciates only by 0:964; and thus, the observed US
nominal interest rate rises only to 0:482. With a strong coordination in the EA,
the euro appreciates only by 0:706 and the net EA nominal interest rate rises
only by 0:353.
By a weaker starting variation in the nominal interest rate and real exchange
rate, both coordination cases have considerably low output and ination varia-
tions in the second period. In response to an initial monetary tightening (a rise
in the US nominal interest rate), US output and ination decline by 0:482 and
0:193, respectively; and in its analogic case, EA output and ination decline by
0:353 and 0:141, respectively. Moreover, the negative interest rate movement in
the second period is so strong that the initial increase is overturned to have a net
decrease to  0:168 in the US and  0:042 in the EA hence, a home currency
depreciation occurs.
Subsequently, policy interventions set in to prevent further output and ina-
27The real exchange rate is dened in a way that its increases in value indicate real apprecia-
tion of the home currency. The elasticity of the real exchange rate in response to the domestic
interest rate is assumed to be 2.
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Figure 5-2: IRFs to a real exchange rate shock by the model in Ball (1999b)
tion drifts. As a whole, the impact of the initial shock dies out during a long
period of oscillation, but with a much smaller volatility and in a much smoother
manner.
On the contrary, failing to account for the instantaneous feedback from the real
exchange rate, the non-coordination model produces extremely volatile impulse
responses. In the rst period, the nominal interest rate takes on the exact impact
of the initial monetary shock leading to a strong real exchange rate appreciation
by a scale of 2. In the subsequent period, output and ination drop more than
double relative to the case with coordination; the nominal interest rate has a
remarkable swing from 1 to  1:1, and the real exchange rate swings from 2 to
 2:2.
Overall, in the absence of a direct real exchange rate channel, the nominal
interest rate needs to shift greater in order to counteract the impacts of a shock,
such as a monetary shock or a real exchange rate shock. However, such reactions
result in more volatile output, ination, and real exchange rate as well as the
nominal interest rate itself.
Even though the above example is plausible, the e¤ectiveness of exchange rate
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coordination may still be subject to the type of shocks that hit the economy this
is in agreement with the nding in Adolfson et al. (2007). It is shown by the same
simulation, neither an ination shock nor an output shock can be accommodated
properly by the additional exchange rate channel. Instead, monetary coordination
causes excessive and prolonged economic uctuations.
When ination or output changes on the impact of a shock, the nominal inter-
est rate responds promptly. However, the simultaneous counter-movements of the
real exchange rate have an undermining e¤ect the aforementioned stabilising
e¤ect of the real exchange rate e¤ectively mitigates the monetary policy e¤ect on
ination and output. Thus, to eventually absorb the impact from an ination or
output shock, a prolonged monetary policy is needed. In fact, the time lag of a
monetary policy impact is about 2 to 3 periods longer than the non-coordination
case (see Appendix C, Figure C-3 and C-4). As a whole, the cumulated variance
of ination and output under monetary coordination can be even larger than the
variation in a non-coordination context.
Therefore, whether an economy benets, in terms of its economic stability,
from monetary policy coordination can have implications on the major shocks
that drive that particular economy. Put another way, whether an economy should
coordinate monetarily, and to what extent monetary coordination can be welfare-
improving are partially determined by the main drives of the economic volatility.
Turning to an evaluation of the estimated model, interestingly, the estimation
has improved the models performance in terms of both dynamics and volatility.
Recall that Chapter 3 concludes that a moderate US coordination generates a rel-
atively low time series variance, but a low US coordination enhances the models
dynamic performance; and that a weak EA coordination tends to cut down the
volatility of output and the real exchange rate, whilst a strong EA coordination
lowers ination and interest rate variances. Given this contradiction between the
testing conclusion and the estimation outcome, the source of the improvement in
the estimated model can be multiple and quite comprehensive.
To get a rough idea about the possible causes, indirect inference model evalu-
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Alternative 1 Alternative 2
AW Wald AW Wald
yus; yea; us; ea;
rus; rea; Q
5605:69
100%
(63:63)
11348:77
100%
(95:27)
yus; us; Q 107:92
100%
(8:56)
494:44
100%
(17:72)
yea; ea; Q 993:62
100%
(31:25)
5789:82
100%
(70:39)
yus; yea; us; ea; Q 1818
100%
(34:1)
2168:15
100%
(38:28)
AW indicates actual Wald statisics; The column Waldconsists of Wald percentile
for both models dynamics and volatility on the top gure and
the corresponding normalised MD at the bottom in bracket.
Table 5.5: Robustness check on the e¤ectiveness of monetary coordination
ations are run on two alternative models (see Table 5.5 for test results). The rst
model (Alternative 1) is a partial-coordination model with estimated coordina-
tion parameters but with other common parameters being the initial calibrations.
The second model (Alternative 2) is a non-coordination model with the common
parameters taken from the estimated partial-coordination model.
The model performs reasonably well with the presence of monetary coordina-
tion even though the common parameters are taken from the initial calibration.
On the contrary, without coordination, the second alternative model performs
badly even with the estimated parameters taken from the partial-coordination
model.
In other words, monetary coordination plays a considerably plausible role
between the US and EA economies. It is the coordinating feature that brings the
actual Wald statistic down from 15569:08 to 5605:6928; although undeniably, the
renement of common parameters also has a large contribution towards the nal
improvement in the models performance.
It is noteworthy that coordination coe¢ cients estimated for both economies
28The gure 15569:08 is the actual Wald statistic reported for an indirect inference testing
on the coordination model C-3.6 (see Table 5.3). This model (Alternative 1) di¤ers from
model C-3.6 only in terms of their coordination parameters. Hence, their test results are
comparable in order to identify the robustness of estimated coe¢ cients. However, note that
there is the possibility of a minor bias as a result of random sampling. The test result for
Alternative 1 is drawn from a random sample, while the result formodel C-3.6 is the mean
value over 1000 simulations.
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are well above some optimal or reasonable values proposed in the literature.
Providing empirical evidence, Taylor (1999) and Taylor (2001) argued that a
strong policy reaction to the real exchange rate could have an adverse e¤ect on
macroeconomic performances.
In spite of the observed accommodating impacts from simple model simula-
tions, there is also the possibility that such aggressiveness in counteracting shocks
can put the economy into the exact situation that a monetary policy is trying
to address. Intuitively, a radical action of the nominal interest rate can induce
excessive variations in the real exchange rate and thus the nominal interest rate
itself. As a result, the output and ination variations can even be larger than the
non-coordination case.
Nonetheless, given the above model simulation, the volatility of major macro-
economic aggregates in the EA is not exaggerated by the radical monetary policy
coordination. In fact, only when hit by a real exchange rate shock does the EA
economy exhibit visibly higher output and ination volatility than the US.
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Figure 5-3: IRFs to an interest rate shock - by the model in Ball (1999b) with
responses to real exchange rate changes
What may be causing a prolonged and large-amplitude oscillation is the level
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of a policy adjustment in response to the lagged real exchange rate. To illustrate
this point, a model is simulated with a coordination specication h (Qt  Qt 1)29
the policy instrument responds to real exchange rate changes rather than the
level real exchange rate. The simulated IRFs show a comparatively low starting
variation, but rather prolonged and exaggerated swings from a few periods on-
wards (see 5-3 for IRFs to an interest rate shock30). Even with a weak response
to real exchange rate changes, such as h =  0:25 , the coordination model still
produces prolonged variations, particularly in output and ination.
This nding contradicts some proposals suggesting a policy rate to react to
exchange rate changes rather than the level exchange rate. It is also somehow
against the interpretation put forward by Ball (1999b) that policy rates should
correct the temporary exchange rate e¤ect in order to avoid an ine¢ cient oscilla-
tion in output and ination. By limiting the net responses to the exchange rate
to be zero, the accommodating e¤ect from a direct real exchange rate channel
can only cover a really small time span. Given a reasonable time lag that a
macro-economy requires to respond to the real exchange rate and interest rate,
the benet from such a monetary coordination can be nil, or even negative.
However, a more comprehensive analysis will be required. After all, such
a simple model simulation can potentially miss out crucial information that is
possessed by the comprehensive economic architecture. Whether this type of co-
ordination policy is benecial and whether more practical and e¤ective proposals
can be adopted are subject to a wide range of heterogeneities in economies; any
structural or parametric changes can potentially overturn an initial conclusion.
Further extension can be done by analysing an optimal coordination monetary
policy using the prevailing welfare-based loss function.
29As an increase in the value of Qt indicates a real domestic currency appreciation, h should
be non-positive.
30IRFs to other shocks are shown in Appendix C, Figure C-5, C-6, and C-7.
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5.3.3 Assessing Performance over Di¤erent Variable Com-
binations
In this section, the estimated non-coordination and coordination models are re-
evaluated by indirect inference testing with regard to di¤erent macroeconomic
aspects (Table 5.6). This exercise not only evaluates the models overall perfor-
mance across di¤erent target variable combinations, but also demonstrates the
improvement of a models performance from more specic aspects. For compari-
son, the rst two columns list the test results from the baseline non-coordination
model, in which the original calibrations are used. The third to sixth column
report evaluations on the estimated non-coordination and partial-coordination
models, respectively.
NonC - original NonC C-HH
AW Wald AW Wald AW Wald
yus; yea; us; ea;
rus; rea
830:859
100%
(19:86)
775:48
100%
(21:32)
373:9
100%
(12:43)
yus; yea; us; ea;
rus; rea; Q
31299:21
100%
(147:78)
2024:87
100%
(37:25)
582:64
100%
(17:2)
yus; yea 41:83
99:3%
(3:88)
35:55
99:6%
(3:21)
58:36
100%
(5:31)
yus; yea; Q 609:48
100%
(17:14)
209:3
100%
(9:65)
54:48
99:7%
(3:94)
us; ea 37:66
99:9%
(4:95)
33:31
99:9%
(3:84)
23:59
99:1%
(2:90)
us; ea; Q 2418:26
100%
(50:62)
409:47
100%
(16:69)
73:94
100%
(5:69)
rus; rea 29:91
99:2%
(3:26)
56:01
100%
(5:97)
25:13
99:2%
(3:07)
rus; rea; Q 40064:12
100%
(185:51)
1647:04
100%
(38:64)
193:12
100%
(10:76)
yus; yea; us; ea 123:23
99:9%
(6:36)
141:41
100%
(7:29)
63:48
99:7%
(3:39)
yus; yea; us; ea; Q 1547:85
100%
(29:64)
316:27
100%
(11:54)
118:78
100%
(5:32)
AW indicates actual wald statisics; The column Waldconsists of Wald percentile
for both models dynamics and volatility on the top gure and
the corresponding normalised MD at the bottom in bracket.
Table 5.6: Model evaluation after the estimation - by various combinations
To a great extent, the estimated partial-coordination model has better per-
formances across di¤erent aspects concerned by monetary authorities. Except for
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the joint test on both the US and EA output, actual Wald statistics for various
target variable combinations have fallen by 60% on average and the correspond-
ing normalised MDs have fallen by 52% on average in the partial-coordination
model.
The test result also agrees with the previous conclusion in Chapter 4 that when
the real exchange rate is included in the joint Wald test, the coordination model
signicantly outperforms the non-coordination model. It can be observed in Table
5.6 that every single target variable set containing the real exchange rate has at
least a 90% improvement in the models performance when partial-coordination
is incorporated. Moreover, although the inclusion of the real exchange rate still
heavily deteriorates the models performance, the gap has been narrowed down
to a great extent. In other words, the property of the real exchange rate is better
captured by the estimated coordination model.
Noticeably, the outperformance of the coordination model lies in its ability
to represent both the dynamics and volatility of ination, real exchange rate and
potentially nominal interest rates. The models performance for both the US
and EA ination is improved by more than 40% according to the normalised
MD, mainly attributed to the improvement in the US ination dynamics and
volatility. There is no clear evidence that the models performance for both the
US and EA interest rate is higher in the partial-coordination model. The models
ability to reproduce both the US and EA output is, however, rather controversial.
Compared to the baseline non-coordination model, the estimated coordination
model can better reproduce US output dynamics, but not volatility; whilst the
reproduced EA output is far more volatile partly due to a higher exposure to
both the domestic and international shocks. On the other hand, since the real
exchange rate is absent in the policy rule, the estimated non-coordination model
is able to better reproduce EA output, especially in terms of volatility.
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5.3.4 Impacts of a Monetary Shock on Output and Ina-
tion - IRFs
Since the 1980s, researchers have been using both the univariate and multivariate
analyses to study time series properties of some macroeconomic variables31. In
particular, stylised facts of output and ination have been extensively recorded by
empirical studies. Contrasting to the short-run positive autocorrelation, output
was found to have a potential negative autocorrelation over a long time horizon.
Moreover, some components of the output uctuation are permanent.
By examining long-run properties, Cochrane (1988) clearly stated that GNP
had a trend-reverting manner following a shock. Campbell and Mankiw (1987)
also concluded that shocks were persistent at least over a normal business cycle of
two to three years. Thereafter, the traditional view about the outputs persistent
shock-driven uctuations and temporary deviation from a natural rateof output
growth were questioned. For example, Cogley and Nason (1995) found a stan-
dard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model cannot reproduce those stylised facts
without a persistent exogenous resource. Henceforth, whether a general equi-
librium model can replicate the hump-shaped IRFs becomes one of the critical
aspects for evaluating the modelsperformances.
SWs EU and US models were able to reproduce hump-shaped IRFs following
the introduction of a large number of shocks. Additionally, CEE (2005) used a
model of a similar kind, and successfully replicated hump-shaped IRFs following
a monetary policy shock identied from a V AR.
To assess whether a model with cross-country interactions and monetary coor-
dination can also replicate the main features of macroeconomic time series, IRFs
of output and ination for both economies are presented in Figure 5-4. IRFs of
the estimated partial-coordination model following a US or EA monetary policy
shock are presented in the upper panel (a) in Figure 5-4. The corresponding IRFs
31Examples for the univariate analyses are Nelson and Plosser (1982), Campbell and Mankiw
(1987), and Cochrane (1988). Examples for the multivariate analyses are Blanchard and Quah
(1989), Cochrane (1994), and Pesaran and Shin (1998).
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generated from the estimated non-coordination model are presented in the lower
panel (b) in Figure 5-4. Following denitions in Dynare, IRFs here represent
deviations of the variable trajectory from its steady state values after the strike
of an idiosyncratic shock. That is to say, a convergence of impulse responses to
zero indicates a convergence of the economy back to a steady state.
Perceptibly, there are several characteristics in IRFs that are particular to the
estimated partial-coordination model.
First of all, there is a hump-shaped pattern in IRFs generated from the esti-
mated partial-coordination model. In particular, either a foreign or a domestic
monetary policy shock hits the EA economy, EA output and ination fall in the
rst period before growing and peaking at a level above the steady state value,
where a weak reverting e¤ect eventually sets in lowering both output and ina-
tion over a long horizon. US output and ination, however, behave in a slightly
di¤erent way. They glide down further after the initial drop and pick up gradually
back to the steady state level without overshooting.
Overall, domestic shocks have more persistent impacts on the domestic econ-
omy, while impacts from foreign shocks tend to die out quickly. Following a US
monetary policy shock (see Figure 5-4, (a1)), US output and ination converge
over 35 to 40 periods; while EA output and ination peak at about the 7th and 4th
period, respectively. Following an EA monetary shock (see Figure 5-4, (a2)), US
output and ination converge within 20 periods, while EA output and ination
generally peak at the 20th period before sliding down smoothly to a steady state.
The non-coordination model, on the other hand, produces rather di¤erent
IRFs. When a domestic monetary shock hits the economy, output and ination
grow more rapidly back towards a steady state after an initial drop. When a
foreign monetary shock hits the economy, both output and ination rise and
then drop sharply before a sudden pick-up to push them back to a steady state.
The convergence normally takes about 10 periods for the former, while it only
takes 4 to 5 periods for an economy to recover from a foreign shock.
Second, the magnitude of impulse responses to a foreign shock is considerably
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higher in the estimated partial-coordination model. If IRFs from two models
are put into one graph, by the exact scale, the changes of US output and in-
ation in response to an EA shock in the non-coordination model can almost
be negligible. Put di¤erently, the monetary spillover between two economies
in the partial-coordination model is comparatively strong relative to the non-
coordination model.
Moreover, the estimated partial-coordination model exhibits a high output
and ination persistence, particularly in the EA. It may be due to the fact that
the estimated nominal rigidities are higher in the estimated coordination model.
It may also be the result of a fair amount of exchange rate policy adjustments
mentioned previously.
5.3.5 How Well are the Economies Linked?
Three relevant papers, in the sense of models and regions involved, all have
studied the contribution of structural shocks to key macroeconomic variables.
SW (2003) and SW (2007) both used historical decomposition, and were able to
identify contributions from each structural shock according to both the quantity
and time horizon. They concluded that in both economies output was mainly
driven by demand shocks in the short run, but by supply shocks over a medium
and long horizon. And at all horizons, supply shocks, mainly wage and price
mark-up shocks, accounted for the majority of ination variations. Moreover,
neither output variations nor ination variations were signicantly a¤ected by
monetary policy shocks.
By treating shock to be orthogonal to each other, Le et al. (2010) reported
a variance decomposition for a two-country DSGE model combining SWs EU
and US models. They found a surprisingly weak spillover between economies,
meaning that both economies were acting like closed economies, and were only
driven by their own domestic shocks. Also, both economies were predominantly
driven by supply shocks; only in the EA economy were monetary policy shocks
important in determining output and ination variations.
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The upper and lower panels show IRFs from the estimated partial-coordination
and non-coordination models, respectively; y1 and pi1 represent US output
and ination; y2 and pi2 represent EA output and ination, respectively.
Figure 5-4: IRFs from estimated models
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As shown in Chapter 4, EA monetary policy coordination changes the internal
propagation mechanism of shocks. As a result, a substantial fraction of shocks
striking in one economy will be channelled into the other economy through a
monetary policy reaction to the real exchange rate. Hence, as an extension, it
is expected that the estimated partial-coordination model can produce a certain
degree of cross-country spillover as the coordination policy changes, but the frac-
tion of shocks channelised and the impact structure from each shock also rely on
the changes in other structural parameters.
Table 5.7 shows the impact contribution from each US shock to output, in-
ation, and interest rate in both economies as well as net exports and the real
exchange rate. Similarly, Table 5.8 shows the impact contribution from each EA
shock to all those listed endogenous variables.
Overall, the impact structure of shocks is more balanced contributions to
the economic volatility from shocks are more evenly spread out. Wage mark-
up shocks remain unimportant in deciding the volatility in both economies. US
shocks, especially the price mark-up shock and labour supply shock, vary net
exports the most; while EA shocks are somewhat more responsible for the real
exchange rate volatility.
Even though the real exchange rate volatility is driven by the EA economy to
a great extent, the spillover from the EA to the US economy remains rather weak.
In particular, US output is entirely insulated from EA shocks even within a model
with multiple transmission channels. Note that, this failure of capturing a cross-
country spillover cannot be purely pinned on the ine¤ectiveness of a monetary
policy. Factors such as the trade structure, degree of openness, sensitivity of
the economy to a particular type of shock, degree of exchange rate pass-through,
policy stance, and preference di¤erential can have rather decisive power over an
economys exposure to external inuences.
The US dollar is the most common currency in international trade, especially
in the trade of raw materials and crude oil, and for o¢ cial reserves. Such an
inuential position may benet the US dollar due to the fact that product prices
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yus yea us ea rus rea Q nx
Prod. 36:0518 32:6386 4:0883 7:04353 9:80381 8:02822 12:7851 5:07234
Cons. 0:21601 0:36295 3:25792 0:12049 8:00319 10:452 4:76718 2:94617
Inv. 0:16735 0:62835 1:06043 0:20899 3:17519 4:16097 1:85136 0:279
Tayl. 0:15071 0:04173 64:0973 0:01002 40:7722 6:8029 3:22127 0:4075
US WM 0:00496 0:00184 0:00272 0:00044 0:00427 0:00229 0:00189 0:0098
Gov. 0:90715 18:6152 1:57274 4:43762 3:56422 1:14199 6:59286 0:8621
PM 41:824 14:7324 7:97886 3:06094 9:4392 10:0478 4:94332 46:1492
Lab. 20:6718 7:49337 13:4152 1:81931 21:3323 12:4493 9:20578 40:9293
Total 99:9938 74:5144 95:4735 16:7013 96:0943 53:0855 43:3687 96:6555
Table 5.7: Variance decomposition - the partial-coordination model (US shocks)
yus yea us ea rus rea Q nx
Prod. 0:00004 0:48491 2:49014 29:2298 2:37643 24:674 28:9139 1:27666
Cons. 0:00002 1:15636 0:0025 0:28597 0:00497 0:26979 0:14233 0:67737
Inv. 0:00135 19:6076 1:28824 16:455 1:25822 13:51 14:9379 0:65502
Tayl. 0:00372 0:2299 0:57874 0:08797 0:15602 0:81553 9:65328 0:56279
EA WM 0 0:00001 0:00001 0 0:00003 0:00312 0:00109 0:00007
Gov 0:00001 3:94718 0:00619 0:11501 0:0041 0:07556 0:07986 0:00424
PM 0:00097 0:03751 0:08005 26:6004 0:01536 1:93376 1:84793 0:11447
Lab. 0:00011 0:02214 0:0807 10:5246 0:09056 5:63276 1:05498 0:05392
Total 0:00622 25:4856 4:52657 83:2987 3:90569 46:9145 56:6313 3:34454
Table 5.8: Variance decomposition - the partial-coordination model (EA shocks)
are intentionally xed to the US dollar an LCP or VCP strategy. If the re-
sulting exchange rate pass-through to the US price level is su¢ ciently low, the
expenditure-switching e¤ect cannot be triggered; and hence US output and other
macro-variables are not responding to foreign shocks.
In general, the US economic volatility is mainly driven by the domestic supply
shocks, such as the productivity, labour supply and price mark-up shocks. The
monetary policy shock is not a¤ecting output, but is the largest determinant
of US ination and interest rate variances. Only about 4% of US ination and
interest rate variance is accounted for by EA shocks mainly the productivity
and investment shocks.
The EA economic volatility has a wider range of resources, including a large
portion of US shocks. About three quarters of EA output volatility comes
from the US contribution, including US productivity, price mark-up, govern-
ment spending and labour supply shocks; while, domestically, the EA investment
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and government spending shocks take responsibility for nearly one quarter of the
output variation. EA ination is more domestically determined by supply shocks,
except for 16:5% by the investment shock. Given the radical coordination policy
in the EA, it is not surprising that more than 50% of the EA interest rate volatil-
ity is driven by US shocks; while domestically the EA interest rate volatility is
also subject to the productivity and labour supply shocks.
5.4 Conclusion
Extended from the model evaluation, this chapter applies indirect inference es-
timation on a US-EA two-country DSGE model (1), without monetary policy
coordination and (2), with partial-coordination. In general, thirty-seven parame-
ters are included in the estimation of the partial-coordination model. Thirty-three
parameters are common in both the partial-coordination and non-coordination
models and four parameters are specically designed to characterize monetary
policy coordination. The estimation of most parameters is typically limited
within the 50% upper and lower bounds of their initial values. Coordination
coe¢ cients are, however, estimated within a [0; 1] interval in order to investigate
a full range of potential coordination policies. The exercise is eventually carried
out by minimising the actual Wald statistic of 7 key macroeconomic time series,
including output, ination, and interest rate from both regions as well as the real
exchange rate.
All in all, the partial-coordination model achieves the lowest actual Wald sta-
tistic at 600:9, signicantly lower than the non-coordination model. Accordingly,
the conclusion of this estimation agrees with the previous model evaluation that
incorporating monetary coordination improves the models performance in the
sense that it better describes the property of the actual data. This progress can
be threefold: a great improvement in the models ability to replicate the dynam-
ics of US time series; a great improvement in the models ability to replicate the
volatility of EA time series; and a great improvement in the models ability to
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replicate both the dynamics and volatility of the real exchange rate. Nonetheless,
even these improvements cannot develop this model well enough to be accepted
by an indirect inference evaluation on 7 target variables.
The estimated fundamental parameters are not in great conict with the
literature ndings. Nonetheless, they do reveal some di¤erences between the US
and EA economies in various aspects, such as openness, productivity and policy
sensitivity. Interestingly, both the US and EA show a moderate to high degree
of coordination with a relatively low level of policy adjustment to the lagged real
exchange rate. Therefore, the net policy response to the real exchange rate is
rather signicant. Despite the surprisingly strong coordination, the coordinating
property is a major contribution to the improvement in the models performance.
Moreover, depending on the type of shocks that hit the economy, the e¤ectiveness
of coordination can be diverse.
The model evaluation on smaller target variable combinations suggests that
the partial-coordination model can t the dynamics and volatility of ination,
real exchange rate and interest rate rather well. Nevertheless, its controversial
ability to t either US or EA output undermines the models overall performance.
Moreover, the estimated partial-coordination model produces clear hump-
shaped IRFs with a high persistence following a monetary policy shock. The
greater scale of responses is also an indication of a signicant monetary spillover.
Finally, providing a moderate degree of coordination and a relatively high level of
shock transmissions from the EA economy to the real exchange rate, the variance
decomposition implies that the US economy is quite insular, particularly in terms
of its output.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks and Future
Prospects
This thesis began with a literature review on the exchange rate and its impor-
tant role in monetary policy. The advance of macroeconomic modelling, such
as the NOEM and DSGE models, integrates international misalignments into its
comprehensive structure, permitting the possibility of large welfare gains from
monetary coordination. Such misalignments can hinder the international relative
price from adjusting e¤ectively, and in turn, cause economic resource allocation
to deviate from the e¢ cient level. Even so, there is no denitive conclusion on
whether monetary policy coordination is benecial. On the other hand, it is
challenging to ascertain monetary policy coordination when its appearances are
rather diverse and are denied by most monetary authorities.
Motived by such an ambiguity, this thesis attempts to assess the existence and
the extent of monetary coordination based upon a plausible two-country DSGE
model of the US and EA. The null hypothesis is that the existence of monetary
coordination holds if the models performance is signicantly improved by the
presence of a policy instruments direct responses to the real exchange rate. An
additional interest of this thesis lies in the improvement on the DSGE models
performance and the scale of cross-country interactions in the presence of a direct
exchange rate channel.
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In Chapter 4, selected coordination models are compared with the benchmark
non-coordination model with regard to their overall performances evaluated by
indirect inference. In general, coordination models outperform the baseline non-
coordination model. Among others, the coordination model C-3.6 performs ex-
ceptionally well in terms of its ability to replicate 7 key macroeconomic variables.
In other words, the null hypothesis holds that monetary authorities are, to some
extent, coordinating with each other by means of a policy instruments direct
responses to the real exchange rate.
The improvement associated with monetary policy is twofold: a higher pre-
diction precision and a lower prediction uncertainty. The EA coordinating policy
is crucial to the stabilisation of both the US and EA economies. Yet for all that,
there is a trade-o¤between coordinating weakly to cut down output and exchange
rate volatility, and coordinating strongly to lower ination and interest rate vari-
ations. Contrarily, sole US coordination has no considerable benet in terms of
lowering economic variations; instead, an increasing degree of US coordination
may serve as a destabiliser, particularly to the real exchange rate.
Additionally, an inclusion of the real exchange rate in indirect inference test-
ing heavily deteriorates the modelsperformance no matter whether monetary
coordination is incorporated. Yet the gap between the performances of the coor-
dination and non-coordination models is sharply widened, reassuring the essential
role of monetary coordination.
Extended from the model evaluation, Chapter 5 applies the indirect inference
estimation on the US-EA two-country DSGE model both in a context of non-
coordination and partial-coordination. Without doubt, the estimated partial-
coordination model achieves the lowest actual Wald statistic at 600:9 support-
ing the conclusion from the model evaluation that the monetary coordination
specication improves the DSGE models performance in the sense that it can
better replicate properties of the actual data. The threefold progress lies in the
models ability to replicate the dynamics of US time series, the models ability
to replicate the volatility of EA time series and the models ability to replicate
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both dynamics and volatility of the real exchange rate.
Overall, estimated fundamental parameters are in agreement with the lit-
erature, although the observed nominal price rigidities are comparatively high.
Unexpectedly, both economies have a moderate to high degree of coordination
in terms of the contemporaneous response. Coupled with a minor adjustment to
the lagged real exchange rate, net policy responses to the real exchange rate are
rather signicant in both economies. Despite that monetary coordination in both
economies is surprisingly strong, it is the major contribution to a models sound
performance. It is worth noting that depending on the type of shocks that hits
the economy, the e¤ectiveness of coordination can be diverse.
Furthermore, the estimated partial-coordination model produces considerably
clear hump-shaped IRFs with high persistence following a monetary policy shock,
especially for EA output and ination. Beyond the rst glance of the cross-
country interaction in Chapter 4, there is clearer evidence of signicant monetary
spillovers between the two economies from a larger scale of impulse responses
in both economies and a shift in the impact contribution of the variance decom-
position. In fact, the EA economy, especially its output and interest rate, is well
a¤ected by US shocks. Even though providing a moderate degree of coordination
and a relatively strong shock transmission from the EA economy to the real ex-
change rate, the variance decomposition suggests that the US economy is quite
insular, particularly in terms of its output.
Nonetheless, even these improvements cannot develop this model well enough
to be accepted by the indirect inference evaluation on 7 target variables. Further
research prospects can be broader and deeper.
Firstly, focusing on a positive aspect, this thesis assesses the existence and
extent of monetary policy coordination. Further research can analyse if such
an existence is welfare improving; and from a normative perspective, suggest an
optimal degree of monetary coordination using utility-based welfare analyses.
Moreover, there are issues in evaluating xed-exchange-rate models with all 7
target variables jointly tested. Intuitively, by assuming uncovered interest parity
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(UIP), the follower countrys interest rate or ination have an almost identical
comovement to the leader countrys interest rate and ination, with the assistance
of the real exchange rate. The Wald statistic is not reliable in such cases, since
variance-covariance matrices are near singular. There are two possible ways to go
around this problem by using a pseudo-inverse matrix as the weighting matrix
in computing Wald statistics; or by introducing a risk premium shock in the UIP
equation. In the former case, xed-exchange-rate coordination models (such as
DOM_C-4.1 and DOM_C-4.5) can possibly be equivalent to, or even outperform,
the oating-exchange-rate coordination model C-3.6 in indirect inference testing.
Nonetheless, such experiments need to be extended to ensure (1), the validity of
the use of a pseudo-inverse matrix; (2), no bias in the random sample testing;
and (3) a better performance even after estimations. In the latter case, the
oating-exchange-rate coordination model, especially model C-3.6, is still the best
performing model according to the indirect inference model evaluation (random
sampling), although the xed exchange rate model DOM-2.1 performs closely.
Further investigation can be done to nd out suitable representations of the
long-run relation between the interest rate and exchange rate beyond UIP.
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Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Derive the Real Exchange Rate
The CPI-based price level for the home and foreign economies are:
Pt =
h
aHP
1 
H;t + (1  aH)P 1 F;t
i 1
1 
P t =
h
(1  aF )P 1 H;t + aFP 1 F;t
i 1
1 
where Pi (i = H;F ) indicates the price level of goods produced in the economy
i; Asterisk indicates goods are consumed in the foreign economy (are priced in
the foreign currency).
Dene the deviations from LOOP as H;t =
PH;t
"t
PH;t
and F;t =
PF;t
"t
PF;t
for the
home and foreign economies, respectively.
The real exchange rate hence can be derived in terms of TOT and the devia-
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tion:
Q1  =

"tPt
P t
1 
=
aH ("tPH;t)
1  + (1  aH) ("tPF;t)1 
(1  aF )P 1 H;t + aFP 1 F;t
=
aH ("tPH;t)
1  + (1  aH) ("tPF;t)1 
aHP
1 
H;t + (1  aH)P 1 F;t
=
aH

"tPH;t
P H;t
P H;t
1 
+ (1  aH) ("tPF;t)1 
aHP
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H;t + (1  aH)

P F;t
"tPF;t
"tPF;t
1 
=
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
1
H;t
P H;t
1 
+ (1  aH) ("tPF;t)1 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1 
H;t + (1  aH) (F;t"tPF;t)1 
=
aH

1
H;t
1 
+ (1  aH)
 T Ht 1 
aH + (1  aH) (F;tT Ht )1 
Based on the assumption of symmetric parameters across economies, coe¢ -
cients for the home bias are aH = aF = (1  aH) and the deviations H;t =
F;t = t. The real exchange rate can be written as a log-linearised form:
Q =   (2aH   1) ~T Ht   aH

^F;t + ^H;t

=   (2aH   1) ~T Ht   2aH^t
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Chapter 4 Appendix
B.1 Consumer Maximization Over Home and
Foreign Goods
The households in each regime maximise their consumption composite, subject
to their consumption budget constraint. The Lagrangean can be written as
L =

!
 
Cdt
 
+ (1  !) & t

Cft
 (  1)
+ 

~Ct   pdtCdt + qtCft

The rst order conditions (F.O.C.) with respect to the domestic good con-
sumption, foreign good consumption and the total consumption composite are:
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@L
@Cdt
=

 1


!
 
Cdt
 
+ (1  !) & t

Cft
   1 1
( )!  Cdt   1   pdt = 0
(B.1a)
@L
@Cft
=

 1


!
 
Cdt
 
+ (1  !) & t

Cft
   1 1
( ) (1  !) & t

Cft
  1
 qt = 0
(B.1b)
@L
@ ~Ct
=  (B.1c)
where  is the marginal increment in the utility index on the one unit change of
the consumption composite. While at the maximum level L = ~Ct, hence @L@ ~Ct = 1.
When combining with the F.O.C. (B.1c) the marginal utility of consumption
composite is 1 as shown:
@L
@ ~Ct
= 1 =  (B.2)
Substituting B.2 into the F.O.C. with respect to the domestic good consump-
tion (B.1a), we obtain

!
 
Cdt
 
+ (1  !) & t

Cft
   1 1
!
 
Cdt
  1
= pdt
Re-arranging it using the total consumption composite, we have the home
demand for home goods relative to the total consumption composite:
(
!
 
Cdt
 
+ (1  !) & t

Cft
 (  1))1+
!
 
Cdt
  1
= pdt
(Ct)
1+ !
 
Cdt
  1
= pdt
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Cdt
Ct
= !
 
pdt
 
(B.3)
Similarly, substitution of B.2 into the F.O.C. with respect to the foreign good
consumption (B.1b) gives us:

!
 
Cdt
 
+ (1  !) & t

Cft
   1 1
(1  !) & t

Cft
  1
= qt
(
!
 
Cdt
 
+ (1  !) & t

Cft
 (  1))1+
(1  !) & t

Cft
  1
= qt
(Ct)
1+ (1  !) & t

Cft
  1
= qt
Cft
Ct
= [(1  !) & t] (qt)  (B.4)
Note that, we can transform the consumption composite 3.8 into unity by
deviding through Ct:
1 =
"
!

Cdt
Ct
 
+ (1  !)
 
Cft
Ct
! #(  1)
(B.5)
Substituting B.3 and B.4 into B.5, we obtain the optimized consumption
budget 3.12 and hence the log-linearized approximation 3.13 of the domestic
price level.
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B.2 Model Specication
B.2.1 United States (Home country)
Flexible economy
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Tobin q equation
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Market clearing condition
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Exogenous innovations
b;ust  IID-Normal
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B.2.2 Euro Area (Overseas)
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Consumption decomposition
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Flexible Economy Variable Flexible Economy Variable
rk;usft US rental rate of capital c
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zusft the degree of capital utilisation in the US i
eaf
t EA real investment
lusft US labour (hours) im
eaf
t EA imports from the US
kusft US capital stock q
eaf
t the value of capital in the EA
ks;usft current capital service used in production r
eaf
t EA nominal interest rate
iusft US real investment k
eaf
t EA capital stock
qusft the value of capital in the US w
eaf
t EA real wage
rusft US nominal interest rate l
eaf
t EA labour (hours)
cusft US real consumption r
k;eaf
t EA rental rate of capital
yusft US real output c
eadf
t EA real domestic consumption
imusft US imports from the EA
Qft real USD/EUR exchange rate
cusdft US real domestic consumption
Table B.1: Variables in the Flexible Economy
Sticky Economy Variable Sticky Economy Variable
cust US real consumption c
ea
t EA real consumption
lust US labour l
ea
t EA labour
rust US nominal interest rate r
ea
t EA nominal interest rate
ust US ination 
ea
t EA ination
iust US real investment i
ea
t EA real investment
qust the value of capital in the US q
ea
t the value of capital in the EA
kust US capital stock k
ea
t EA capital stock
yust US real output y
ea
t EA real output
wust US real wage w
ea
t EA real wage
rk;ust US rental rate of capital r
k;ea
t EA rental rate of capital
imust US imports from the EA im
ea
t EA imports from the US
Table B.2: Variables in the Sticky Economy
US shocks EA shocks
"b;ust US preference shock "
g;ea
t EA government spending shock
"i;ust US investment technology shock "
i;ea
t EA investment technology shock
"a;ust US productivity shock "
;ea
t EA monetary shock
"r;ust US monetary shock "
w;ea
t EA wage mark-up shock
"w;ust US wage mark-up shock "
a;ea
t EA productivity shock
";ust US price mark-up shock "
b;ea
t EA preference shock
"g;ust US government spending shock "
p;ea
t EA price mark-up shock
"wNC;ust US labour supply shock "
wNC;ea
t EA labour supply shock
Table B.3: Structural Shocks
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Calibration Descriptions
us 0:19 share of capital in production
us 0:9984 discount factor 
us
= us (us)
 usc = 0:9925
hus 0:71 external habit formation
imea
yus
0:016066 US equilibrium export to output ratio
imus
yus
0:020635 US equilibrium import to output ratio
usg 0:8 elasticity of import to real exchange rate
!us 0:7 porpotion of domestic product in total domestic consumption
Sus00 5:74 steady state elasticity of capital adjustment cost
us 0:025 capital depreciation rate
&usw 10 curvature parameters of Kimball aggregator in labour market
&usp 10 curvature parameters of Kimball aggregator in good market
us 1:0043 parameter of US common quarterly trend
usw 1:5 steady state mark-up in labour market
usp 1:5 one plus the share of xed costs in production
 us 0:54 elasticity of capital utilisation cost
usc 1:38 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of households
usl 1:83 inverse of elasticity of labour supply with respect to real wages
usw 0:7 degree of nominal wage stickiness
usp 0:66 degree of nominal price stickiness
usw 0:58 degree of indexation to past indexation in wage setting
usp 0:24 degree of indexation to past indexation in price setting
usw 0:1 weights of NK in wage setting equation
usp 0:2 weights of NK in price setting equation
usm 0 weights of NK in monetary policy rule
us 0:81 degree of interest rate smoothing in monetary policy rule
rus 2:04 coe¢ cient of ination deviation in monetary policy rule
rusy 0:08 coe¢ cient of output gap in monetary policy rule
rusy 0:22 coe¢ cient for short-run output gap in monetary policy rule
rk;us 0:0326 r
k;us
 = 1us (
us)
usc   (1  us)
ius
kus
0:0292
ius
kus
= 1  1 usus
iusy 0:1710 i
us
y =
ius
kus
us  usp
0B@ 1 usus rk;us

usp

ius
kus
us 11 us
(us)
us
(1 (us)us)
1CA
us 1
cusy 0:6535 c
us
y = 1  0:18  iusy   im
ea

yus
+
imus
yus
crkky 0:19 crkky = rk;us usp
0B@ 1 usus rk;us

usp

ius
kus
us 11 us
(us)
us
(1 (us)us)
1CA
us 1
whL
c
0:8263
whL
c
= 1usw
1 us
us
rk;us 
us
p
0BBB@ 1 usus
r
k;us
"
usp

ius
kus
us# 11 us
(us)
us (1 (us)us )
1CCCA
us 1
cusy
Table B.4: Parameter calibration for the US economy
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Value Descriptions
ea 0:3 share of capital in production
ea 0:99 discount factor
hea 0:552 external habit formation
imea
yea
0:001413 EA equilibrium import to output ratio
imus
yea
0:00122 EA equilibrium export to output ratio
eag 0:8 elasticity of import to real exchange rate
!ea 0:7 propotion of domestic products in total domestic consumption
Sea00 7 steady state elasticity of capital adjustment cost
ea 0:025 capital depreciation rate
ea 1:487 one plus the share of xed costs in production
 ea 0:175 elasticity of capital utilisation cost
eac 1:608 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of households
eal 1:188 the inverse of elasticity of labour supply with respect to real wages
eaw 0:596 coe¢ cient of Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
eaw 0:758 degree of nominal wage stickiness
eap 0:909 degree of nominal price stickiness
eaw 0:663 degree of indexation to past indexation in wage setting
eap 0:425 degree of indexation to past indexation in price setting
eaw 0:08 weights of NK in wage setting equation
eap 0:06 weights of NK in price setting equation
eam 0:04 weights of NK in monetary policy rule
ea 0:931 degree of interest rate smoothing in monetary policy rule
rea 1:661 coe¢ cient of ination deviation in monetary policy rule
reay 0:143 coe¢ cient of output gap in monetary policy rule
reay 0:173 coe¢ cient for short-run output gap in monetary policy rule
rea 0:221 coe¢ cient for short-run ination deviation in monetary policy rule
keay 2:2 capital output ratio
ceay 0:7652 c
ea
y = 1  eakeay   0:18  0:00122 + 0:001413
Table B.5: Parameter calibration for the EA economy
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B.3 Data Resources and Formulae
Code Description
GDPC96 Real Gross Domestic Product
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deator
PCEC Personal Consumption Expenditures
FPI Fixed Private Investment
CE16OV Civilian Employment
FEDFUNDS E¤ective Federal Funds Rate
LNS10000000 Population Level-Civilian noninstitutional population
PRS85006023 Major sector productivity and cost index-Average weekly hours
PRS85006103 Major sector productivity and cost index-Hourly Compensation
Table B.6: US raw data series
Time series Formular of constructing
Output 100  ln real GDPpopulation index
Consumption 100  ln personal consumption expenditure/GDP deatorpopulation index
Investment 100  ln xed private investment/GDP deatorpopulation index
Ination 100  [ln (GDP deflatort)  ln (GDP deflatort 1)]
Hours 100  ln average weekly hours*employment index/100population index
Real wage 100  ln hourly compensationGDP deator
Interest rate E¤ective federal fund rate4
Table B.7: List of the formulae for US macroeconomic time series
Code Description Units
PCR Rea private consumption Millions of ECU/Euro
ITR Real gross investment Millions of ECU/Euro
YER Real GDP Millions of ECU/Euro
LNN Total employment Thousands of persons
WRN Average compensation per head
YED GDP deator Index 1995 = 1:0
STN Short-term nominal interest rate-three months
Table B.8: EA raw data series
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Time series Formular of constructing
Output 100  ln real GDPpopulation index
Consumption 100  ln real private consumptionpopulation index
Investment 100  ln real gross investmentpopulation index
Hours 100  ln total employmentpopulation index
Ination 100  [ln (GDP deflatort)  ln (GDP deflatort 1)]
Real wages 100  ln Wage per headGDP deator
Interest rate Short-term nominal interest rate4
Table B.9: List of the formulae for EA macroeconomic time series
B.4 Non-Stationarity Properties of Key Mar-
croeconomic Time Series
Seventeen key macroeconomic time series are tested for their non-stationarity by
ADF tests and PP tests (without trend and intercept). The following three tables
report the result of non-stationarity (ADF and PP) tests for 17 key macroeco-
nomic time series. The time series range from 1947Q1 to 2010Q3 for the US (255
observations in total); range from 1970Q1 to 2009Q4 for the EA (160 observations
in total); range from 1970Q1 to 2008Q3 for US imports from and exports to the
EA (155 observations in total); range from 1958Q1 to 2011Q2 (214 observations
in total). Since the length of time series di¤ers, tests are carried out individually
in accordance with each time seriesown length.
The probability (in bracket) is shown below the test statistics. * indicates sig-
nicant stationarity at 10% level, ** indicates signicant stationarity at 5% level,
and *** indicates signicant stationarity at 1% level. For those time series that
are non-stationary at level, tests for the rst order di¤erence are also conducted
and reported. US ination, real wage, imports, and exports are stationary at
level, the tests for the rst order di¤erence are, therefore, unnecessary.
B.5 VAR(1) Expectation
There are 11 forward-looking variables required to derive structural shocks and
their associated exogenous innovations. They are US consumption, investment,
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yust c
us
t i
us
t
Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Statistic 4:458  6:726 4:947  6:174 0:975  8:716
(1:00) (0:00)*** (1:00) (0:00)*** (0:913) (0:00)***
PP Statistic 5:219  9:692 7:398  13:76 1:242  8:743
(1:00) (0:00)*** (1:00) (0:00)*** (0:945) (0:00)***
lust 
us
t w
us
t
Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Statistic  0:573  9:026  2:218   11:21 
(0:47) (0:00)*** (0:03)*  (0:00)*** 
PP Statistic  0:74  9:1  3:03   9:414 
(0:4) (0:00)*** (0:00)***  (0:00)*** 
rust
Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Statistic  1:112  7:171
(0:24) (0:00)***
PP Statistic  1:3708  12:33
(0:16) (0:00)***
Table B.10: Non-stationarity tests for US time series
imust ex
us
t Qt
Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Statistic  2:41237   2:03484   1:09352  11:3158
(0:016)**  (0:041)*  (0:248) (0:000)***
PP Statistic  1:97406   2:24603   1:25016  11:3716
(0:047)*  (0:024)**  (0:194) (0:000)***
Table B.11: Non-stationarity tests for trade variables and the real exchange rate
yeat c
ea
t i
ea
t
Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Statistic 4:902  4:086 3:263  2:261 1:668  5:702
(1:00) (0:00)*** (1:00) (0:02)** (0:98) (0:00)***
PP Statistic 6:618  5:8 6:967  7:184 2:199  9:81
(1:00) (0:00)*** (1:00) (0:00)*** (0:99) (0:00)***
leat 
ea
t w
ea
t
Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤. Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Statistic 1:381  3:273  1:292  11:73 2:11  3:974
(0:96) (0:00)*** (0:181) (0:00)*** (0:99) (0:00)***
PP Statistic 2:533  3:346  1:477  25:87 3:158  6:1
(1:00) (0:00)*** (0:13) (0:00)*** (1:00) (0:00)***
reat
Levels 1st Di¤.
ADF Statistic  1:138  7:55
(0:23) (0:00)***
PP Statistic  1:055  7:55
(0:26) (0:00)***
Table B.12: Non-stationarity tests for EA time series
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ination, rental rate of capital, real wage and labour; EA consumption, invest-
ment, ination, rental rate of capital and real wages.
The values of these forward-looking variables are obtained from a V AR(1)
regression on these 11 time series. The comparison of obtained forward-looking
time series and original time series is presented in Figure B-1 and B-2.
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Figure B-1: US forward-looking variables predicted by VAR(1)
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Figure B-2: EA forward-looking variables predicted by VAR(1)
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B.6 Statistical Distribution for Testing Statis-
tics
1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9
x 104
0
50
100 Mean 15569.0814
 Std 910.7446
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
0
50
100 Mean 103.1941
 Std 5.5559
Mean 55.3773
 Std 2.6049
Actual Wald statistic(FIsher) normalised MD(WH)Actual Wald statistic
Figure B-3: Statistical distribution for the non-coordination model (NonC) (test-
ing)
0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45
x 104
0
50
100 Mean 11574.3650
 Std 698.8644
50 60 70 80 90 100
0
50
100
Mean 90.0273
 Std 4.7864
Mean 50.2583
 Std 2.3396
Actual Wald statistic normalised MD(Fisher) normalised MD(WH)
Figure B-4: Statistical distribution for the coordination model (C-3.6) (testing)
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Appendix C
Chapter 5 Appendix
C.1 Statistical Distribution for Test Statistics
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Figure C-1: Statistical distribution for the partial-coordination
model(estimation)
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Figure C-2: Statistical distribution for the non-coordination model (estimation)
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C.2 Indirect Inference Estimates for the Non-
Coordination Model
Initial
Estimated from
non-coordination model % changes
us 0:19 0:153690704  19:11
(Sus)
00
5:74 6:064671563 5:656
usp 1:5 0:928633478  38:091
 0:54 0:482219909  10:7
usc 1:38 1:144585878  17:059
usl 1:83 1:706728618  6:736
usw 0:7 0:644921392  7:868
usp 0:66 0:468292485  29:047
usw 0:58 0:44260073  23:69
usp 0:24 0:186734192  22:194
usw 0:1 0:082842333  17:158
usp 0:2 0:195272343  2:364
us 0:81 0:416474311  48:58
rus 2:04 2:533062127 24:17
rusy 0:08 0:078880513  1:399
rusy 0:22 0:189038151  14:074
ea 0:3 0:197579577  34:14
Sea00 7:0 7:112347631 1:605
ea 1:487 1:488036207 0:07
 ea 0:175 0:120034413  31:409
eac 1:608 0:938064766  41:663
eal 1:188 0:986469299  16:964
eaw 0:758 0:475188497  37:31
eap 0:909 0:669281064  26:372
eaw 0:663 0:519165697  21:694
eap 0:425 0:446380231 5:031
eaw 0:08 0:060149246  24:813
eap 0:06 0:054955017  8:408
ea 0:931 0:619131217  33:498
rea 1:661 1:213030729  26:97
reay 0:143 0:139293178  2:592
reay 0:173 0:214415911 23:94
rea 0:221 0:255054643 15:409
Table C.1: Estimated parameters from the non-coordination model
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C.3 IRFs simulated from the model in Ball (1999b)
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Figure C-3: IRFs to an ination shock by the model in Ball (1999b)
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Figure C-4: IRFs to a productivity shock by the model in Ball (1999b)
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Figure C-5: IRFs to an exchange rate shock - by the model in Ball (1999b) with
responses to real exchange rate changes
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Figure C-6: IRFs to a productivity shock - by the model in Ball (1999b) with
responses to real exchange rate changes
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Figure C-7: IRFs to an ination shock - by the model in Ball (1999b) with
responses to real exchange rate changes
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